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THE NEW FEDERALISM AND THE ADA: STATE
SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY FROM PRIVATE
DAMAGE SUITS AFTER BOERNE
ROGER C. HARTLEY*
State sanctioned disability-based discrimination comes in two basic
flavors: prejudice and thoughtlessness.' The former takes disability into
consideration, while the latter ignores it.2 The Fourteenth Amendment's
Equal Protection Clause3 prohibits the prejudice4 but not the thoughtless-
ness, at least when the latter is unassociated with irrational assumptions
based on myths, fears and stereotypes.5 Unlike most other civil rights stat-
utes, the Americans With Disabilities Act (hereinafter "ADA" or "Act")
6
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1. See Alexander v. Choate, 469 U.S. 287, 296 n.12 (1985) (acknowledging "well-cata-
loged instances of invidious discrimination against the handicapped," along with discrimina-
tion resulting from "thoughtlessness and indifference-of benign neglect").
2. See Robert L. Burgdorf, Jr., "Substantially Limited" Protection From Disability Dis-
crimination. The Special Treatment Model and Misconstructions of the Definition of Disabil-
ity, 42 Vniu L. REv. 409,517 (1997) [hereinafter Burgdorf, Substantially Limited] (defining
the two ways in which people with disabilities are "socially differentiated").
3. The Fourteenth Amendment provides, in relevant part:
Section 1 .... No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the
privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State de-
prive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law, nor deny
to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.
Section 5: The Congress shall have power to enforce, by appropriate legislation,
the provisions of this article.
4. In Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, 473 U.S. 432 (1985), the Court described the
constitutional principles restricting disability-based discrimination through the adoption of
notoriously uncertain boundaries. The Court held that disability-based discrimination rates
only a rational basis standard of judicial review but then applied that relaxed requirement
with an uncommon bite. Specifically, the Court held unconstitutional a Texas city's denial
of a special use permit for a group home for developmentally impaired persons, finding a
prejudicial motive primarily from the underinclusiveness of the reasons advanced for deny-
ing the permit but also from the city's willingness to accede to the prejudicial attitudes of
some local residents. See also discussion infra notes 154-162 and accompanying text.
5. See discussion infra notes 163-168 and accompanying text.
6. Americans With Disabilities Act (ADA) of 1990, codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-
12213 (1994).
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prohibits both prejudice and thoughtlessness7 and aptly has been character-
ized as a "second-generation civil rights statute."' Unfortunately, the
ADA's claim to innovation might yet prove to be its constitutional Achilles
heel. Across the United States, state governments are challenging Con-
gress's constitutional power under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment
to prohibit any state-sponsored disability-based discrimination other than
prejudice-based differential treatment.9 The spear point of this constitu-
tional attack is the ADA's requirement that the states as employers some-
times must provide a reasonable accommodation. This article explores the
issues raised by this constitutional assault on the ADA.
OVERVIEW
In June 1998, the Supreme Court decided Pennsylvania Department of
Corrections v. Yeskey, 1° holding that the ADA applies to state prison in-
mates. The Court refuted the Pennsylvania Department of Corrections'
statutory arguments in a short unanimous opinion written by Justice Scalia.
In this otherwise straightforward case, petitioner raised the constitutional
argument that Congress had exceeded its Fourteenth Amendment Section
5 power by enacting the ADA, applying it to the states, and providing for
federal court enforcement." The Court dismissed these constitutional is-
sues because they were not raised in a timely fashion.
Until recent years, it seemed almost self-evident that Section 5's "posi-
tive grant of legislative power to secure the guarantees of the Four-
teenth Amendment"' 2 was sufficient to enact a civil rights statute such as
the ADA. 3 Three well-established propositions bolstered this view: 1)
7. No other civil rights statute so aggressively roots out needless impediments to full
participation in the mainstream of American economic and social life. The ADA's most
innovative strategy for integrating persons with disabilities is requiring employers to provide
reasonable accommodations that do not impose an "undue hardship." See ADA, 42 U.S.C.
§§ 12111(9), 12111(10), 12112(b)(5)(A).
8. See generally Robert L. Burgdorf, Jr., The Americans With Disabilities Act: Analysis
and Implications of a Second-Generation Civil Rights Statute, 26 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV.
413 (1991) [hereinafter Burgdorf, Analysis and Implications] (arguing that as a "second gen-
eration" civil rights statute, the ADA provides a novel framework for eradicating
discrimination).
9. See discussion infra notes 19-23 and accompanying text.
10. 524 U.S. 206 (1998).
11. Id. at 212. Petitioners also challenged congressional power under the Commerce
Clause. Id. These constitutional arguments relied primarily on two 1997 Supreme Court
decisions: Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997) (finding lack of commerce power), and
City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997) (finding lack of Section 5 power).
12. Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 651 (1966).
13. It was not uncommon or unreasonable in the years immediately following ADA's
enactment to conclude that Congress clearly possesses Section 5 authority to enact the
ADA. See, e.g., Stephen L. Mikochik, The Constitution and the Americans With Disabilities
Act: Some First Impressions, 64 TEMP. L. REV. 619, 626 n.45 (1991) (asserting that "the
ADA... is plainly a 'measure adopted [sic] to enforce .. the [Fourteenth] Amendment"')
(quoting Morgan, 384 U.S. at 651 n.10)). See also ROBERT L. BURGDORF JR., DISABILITY
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Section 5 does not limit Congress's power to prohibiting only unconstitu-
tional conduct; Congress may create broader statutory rights;14 2) the scope
of Congress's Section 5 authority parallels the broad authority provided
through the Necessary and Proper Clause; s and 3) the scope of judicial
review of Congress's exercise of Section 5 power is limited to an inquiry
into whether the judiciary can "perceive a basis" upon which to conclude
that legislation was aimed at enforcing fights guaranteed by the Fourteenth
Amendment.
1 6
Because of constitutional law developments over the past several
years, Congress's authority under Section 5 to enact a statute such as the
ADA is now the subject of considerable dispute. Through eight cases de-
cided during the 1990s, the Supreme Court has refashioned its conception
of federal-state relations. 17 Although much still remains to be decided m1
there is no doubt that these recent decisions embrace principles sufficient
DIsCRIMINATION IN EMPLOYMENT LAv 51 (1995) [hereinafter BURGDORF, DIsAetwrv Dis-
CRnMuNATION] (stating that to the extent that the ADA regulates the activities of state and
local governments, "such activity constitutes state action and thus certainly falls within the
scope of congressional authority to enact legislation appropriate to implement the equal
protection guarantee of the Fourteenth Amendment.").
14. See Fullilove v. Kluznick, 448 U.S. 448, 502 (1980) (Powell, J., concurring) (assert-
ing that it is incorrect to conclude that Congress lacks enforcement authority "unless the
judiciary [first] decides... that [the proscribed behavior] is forbidden by the Equal Protec-
tion Clause itself.... [1It is beyond question... that Congress has the authority to identify
unlawful discriminatory practices, to prohibit those practices, and to prescribe remedies to
eradicate their continuing [effects]."). Accord Morgan, 384 U.S. at 648-49 (requiring the
judiciary to find constitutional violation before upholding congressional enactment that
would unnecessarily limit legislative power); BURGDORF, DisAaLur DzsciuCuNATIO-n,
supra note 13, at 50 (stating that "[tihe Supreme Court has indicated that congressional
authority to regulate under Section 5 does not depend on whether the judiciary would find a
denial of equal protection in the absence of legislation.").
15. U.S. CoNsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 18. See Morgan, 384 U.S. at 650 (determining that Sec-
tion 5 grants Congress "the same broad powers expressed in the Necessary and Proper
Clause").
16. See Morgan, 384 U.S. at 653 ("It is enough that we be able to perceive a basis upon
which the Congress might resolve the conflict as it did.").
17. The Court held that the Commerce Clause excludes intrastate regulation of fire-
arms near schools because such legislation has a limited effect on interstate commerce and
hence exceeds congressional authority. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995). Simi-
larly, the Court has found that Congress lacks the power to enforce federal rights against
the states in federal court via the Indian or Interstate Commerce Clauses because the doc-
trine of sovereign immunity denies Congress this power against the states. Seminole Tribe
of Fla. v. Florida, 514 U.S. 44 (1996). The Court has also found that the strictures of the
intergovernmental immunity doctrine forbid Congress from appropriating local officials to
help administer federal regulatory statutes (here the handgun Violence Prevention Act).
Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997). Intergovernmental immunity was also em-
ployed in New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992), to invalidate the take-title provi-
sion of a federal regulatory program to dispose of nuclear waste. The provision required the
state either to legislate a solution to the accumulation of low-level nuclear waste or claim
ownership and liability for the waste. The Court held Congress has no authority to "'com-
mandee[r] states' legislative processes."' Id. at 161 (quoting Hodel v. Virginia Surface Min-
ing & Reclamation Ass'n, 452 U.S. 264, 288 (1991)). Relying on the enumerated powers
doctrine, the separation of powers doctrine, and notions of federalism, the Court in Boerne,
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to sustain a successful counterattack against the ADA. Indeed, they may
have the effect of dismantling much of Congress's work since World War II
to place state governments within the regulatory and enforcement frame-
work of federal law.
One need not speculate whether the States appreciate the unique op-
portunity presented by the Court's recent federalism cases. The counterat-
tack is well underway. Pennsylvania's aborted constitutional challenge to
the ADA in Yeskey is but one of many examples. States have success-
fully challenged Congress's Section 5 authority to enact the ADA in two
United States Circuit Court of Appeals 9 and federal district courts in
521 U.S. 507 (1997), limited Congress's Section 5 authority to prohibit state and local inter-
ference with religious freedom. Boerne stiffened the nexus required between the proscrip-
tions of Section 5-based legislation and the limitations on state action imposed by the
Fourteenth Amendment itself, as interpreted by the Court. Applying Boerne, the Court
ruled in Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Education Fund v. College Savings Bank, 119 S. Ct.
2199 (1999) (College Savings Bank 1), that Congress lacked authority under Section 5 to
provide for patent infringement suits against state governments in federal court because the
aim of extending patent infringement legislation to the states was to provide for enforce-
ment uniformity rather than eradicate deprivations of property without due process of law.
In a companion case, College Savings Bank v. Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Education
Expense Board, 119 S. Ct. 2219 (1999) (College Savings Bank I1), the Court similarly ruled
Congress could not extend the false advertising prohibitions in federal trademark laws to
the states on the theory of preventing the deprivation of property without due process of
law because neither the right to be free from a competitor's false advertising nor the right to
be secure in one's business interests is "property" protected by the due process clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment. Also in College Savings Bank II, the court held that Congress may
not require a waiver of state sovereign immunity from suit in federal court as a condition of
engaging in commercial activities in interstate commerce. Id. at 2226-31. Finally, in Alden
v. Maine, 119 S. Ct. 2240 (1999), the Court ruled that state sovereign immunity implicit in
the history and structure of the Constitution prohibits Congress from providing for a private
damage action on a federal claim against a state in a state's own courts, at least when Con-
gress is barred from providing a federal forum to adjudicate such claims.
18. See, e.g., David Cole, The Value of Seeing Things Differently: Boerne v. Flores and
Congressional Enforcement of the Bill of Rights, 1997 Sup. CT. REv. 31,75 (1997) (conclud-
ing that Boerne and Lopez are part of "an increasingly long line of cases reaffirming the
importance to today's Court of states' interests. Whether [these cases] will in the end im-
pose a significant constraint on Congress's Section 5 powers remains to be seen."); Richard
H. Fallon, The Supreme Court, 1996 Term: Implementing The Constitution, 111 HARV. L.
REv. 54, 133, 137 (1997) (noting that "it has proved difficult for the five justices most con-
cerned about judicial federalism to agree on a doctrinal structure that effectively guards the
states from suit in federal court .... [These] Justices apparently remain uncertain or divided
about how federalism principles should be specified and implemented beyond the facts of
the few particular cases that they have decided in recent Terms.").
19. Alsbrook v. City of Maumelle, 184 F.3d 999 (8th Cir. 1999); cert. granted, No. 99-
423, 2000 WL 63302, at *1 (U.S. Jan. 25, 2000); Brown v. North Carolina Div. of Motor
Vehicles, 166 F.3d 698 (4th Cir. 1999), affg 987 F. Supp. 451 (E.D.N.C. 1997), petition for
cert. filed, 68 U.S.L.W. 3164 (U.S. Sept. 8, 1999) (No. 99424). But see Amos v. Maryland
Dep't of Pub. Safety & Correctional Servs., 178 F.3d 212 (4th Cir. 1999) (holding that Con-
gress has Section 5 power to apply Title II of ADA to state prisons).
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Ohio,2 ° Alabama,2 1 New York2 " and Tennessee33 Many other federal dis-
trict courts have resolved the issue in favor of congressional Section 5
power, but have done so based on widely disparate and, in many cases,
problematic reasoning.24 Several United States Circuit Courts of Appeals
have held Congress possesses Section 5 power to enact the ADA, with
many decisions inspiring strong dissents315 The states also have mounted
20. See Nihiser v. Ohio Envtl. Protection Agency, 979 F. Supp. 1168 (S.D. Ohio 1997)
(granting Ohio Environmental Protection Agency's motion to dismiss a former employee's
ADA claim).
21. See Garrett v. Board of Trustees of Univ. of Ala., 989 F. Supp. 1409 (N.D. Ala.
1998) (granting summary judgment to state defendants in case consolidating two employees'
claims).
22. See Kilcullen v. New York State Dep't of Transp., 33 F. Supp. 2d 133 (N.D. N.Y.
1999) (granting summary judgment due to state defendant's immunity to suit in federal
court, under the 11th Amendment).
23. See Hedgepeth v. Tennessee, 33 F. Supp. 2d 668, 674-77 (NV.D. Tenn. 1998) (grant-
ing state's motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction a challenge under ADA
to assessment of handicapped parking placard fees). See also Florida Paraplegic Ass'n v.
Miccosukee Tribe of Indians of Fla., 166 F.3d 1126 (11th Cir. 1999) (finding that ADA Title
III cannot be applied to Native American Indian tribes because Congress failed to express
clearly an intent to abrogate Indian tribes' sovereign immunity).
24. See, e.g., Thompson v. Colorado, 29 F. Supp. 2d 1226 (D. Colo. 1998); Martin v.
Kansas, 978 F. Supp. 992 (D. Kan. 1997); Anderson v. Dep't of Pub. Velfare, 1 F. Supp. 2d
456 (E.D. Pa. 1998); Johnson v. State Tech. Ctr. at Memphis, 24 F. Supp. 2d 833 (,V.D. Tenn.
1998); Thorpe v. Ohio, 19 F. Supp. 2d 816 (S.D. Ohio 1998). See also Schnurbusch v. North
Carolina Dep't of Admin., 1998 WL 757968 (E.D.N.C. 1998) (upholding Congress's Section
5 power to enact the ADA-post-Boeme-making no reference to Boerne); Vallin v. Min-
nesota Dept. of Corrections, 974 F. Supp. 1234 (D. Minn. 1997) (same).
The pre-Boerne decisions that considered the issue uniformly found Congress possesses
Section 5 authority to enact the ADA. Most based this conclusion on evidence of Con-
gress's unequivocal expression of intent to abrogate. See, eg., Williams v. Ohio Dep't of
Mental Health, 960 F. Supp. 1276, 1280-83 (S.D. Ohio 1997); Muller v. Costello, 1996 VL
191977 (N.D.N.Y. 1996); Ellen v. Florida Bd. of Bar Exam'rs, 859 F. Supp. 1489 (S.D. Fla.
1994); Eisfelder v. Michigan Dep't of Natural Resources, 847 F. Supp. 78 (W.D. Mich.
1993); Martin v. Voinovich, 840 F. Supp. 1175 (S.D. Ohio 1993); Davis v. Mak, 1997 WL
133410 (Conn. Super. Ct. March 7, 1997); Anonymous v. Connecticut Bar Examining
Comm'n, 15 Conn. L. Rptr. 218 (Docket No. 534160 Aug. 17, 1995).
Other pre-Boeme courts explored the issue more deeply to conclude Congress acted
within its Section 5 authority to enact the ADA. See Mayer v. University of Minn., 940 F.
Supp. 1474, 1477-80 (D. Minn. 1996) (reasoning that the Act was within Section 5 power
because Congress possesses authority to "find[ ] that [a] class of persons has been subjected
to a history of unequal treatment and legislat[e] pursuant to its enforcement powers under
the Fourteenth Amendment to protect that class of persons from arbitrary discrimination");
Armstrong v. Wilson, 942 F. Supp. 1252, 1260-62 (N.D. Cal. 1996) (reasoning that the
ADA's provisions are a prophylactic rule to prevent and remedy invidious discrimination
prohibited by the Fourteenth Amendment), affd on other grotnds, 124 F.3d 1019 (9th Cir.
1997).
25. See Seaborn v. Florida, 143 F.3d 1405 (11th Cir. 1998) (unanimous opinion) (relying
on the precedent set in Kine infra), cert. denied, 119 S. Ct. 1038 (1999); Autio v. AFSCME
Local 3139, 157 F.3d 1141 (8th Cir. 1998) (6-6 en bane opinion) (affirming district court
opinion finding Section 5 power to enact ADA); Kimel v. Florida Bd. of Regents, 139 F.3d
1426 (11th Cir. 1998) (2-1 opinion) (finding "the ADA was properly enacted under Con-
gress's Fourteenth Amendment enforcement powers"), cert. granted on related issue, 119 S.
Ct. 901 (1999); Coolbaugh v. Louisiana, 136 F.3d 430 (5th Cir. 1998) (2-1 opinion) (finding
Congress did not exceed its Section 5 powers in enacting the ADA), cert. denied, 119 S. Ct.
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vigorous, and frequently successful, constitutional attacks on Congress's
Section 5 authority to enact other civil rights and labor legislation26 as well
as regulations relating to bankruptcy, patent, trademark, copyright and
other business activities.27
Two Constitutional issues converge when a state challenges Section 5
power: 1) whether Congress is barred from abrogating a state's Eleventh
Amendment immunity from a federal court damage suit brought by a pri-
vate party and 2) whether Congress is barred from abrogating a state's im-
munity from such a suit in that state's own courts. The first examines state
sovereign immunity as a forum-allocation concept, the second as a liabil-
ity-immunization doctrine. This article discusses both.
THE NEW FEDERALISM AND THE ADA - STATE SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY
FROM SUIT IN FEDERAL COURT
Contraction of Congress's Authority to Abrogate Sovereign Immunity
The Eleventh Amendment provides: "The judicial power of the
United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity,
commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens of
another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State. '28 On its
face, the Eleventh Amendment does not incorporate an overarching sover-
eign immunity principle. 9 Nevertheless, the Court has discovered one in
58 (1998); Clark v. California, 123 F.3d 1267 (9th Cir. 1997) (finding "the ADA ... within
the scope of appropriate legislation under the Equal Protection Clause") (unanimous opin-
ion), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 2340 (1998); Crawford v. Indiana Dep't of Corrections, 115 F.3d
481, 487 (7th Cir. 1997) (unanimous opinion) (finding the ADA to be properly enacted
under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment). Compare Amos v. Maryland Dep't of Pub.
Safety and Correctional Servs., 178 F.3d 212 (4th Cir. 1999) (2-1 opinion) (holding that
Congress has Section 5 power to apply Title II of ADA to state prisons), with Brown v.
North Carolina Div. of Motor Vehicles, 166 F.3d 698 (4th Cir. 1999) (2-1 opinion) (holding
that regulation promulgated pursuant to ADA Title II prohibiting states from charging fee
for issuance of parking placards permitting use of handicapped parking spaces is beyond
Congress's Section 5 power). See also Torres v. Puerto Rico Tourism Co., 175 F.3d 1, 6 n.7
(1st Cir. 1999) (declining to address the Section 5 issue but stating in dicta "we have consid-
ered the issue of Congress's authority sufficiently to conclude that, were we to confront the
question head-on, we almost certainly would join the majority of courts upholding the [ab-
rogation] provision").
26. See discussion infra notes 337-346 and accompanying text.
27. See discussion infra notes 347-352 and accompanying text.
28. U.S. CONsT. amend. XI.
29. Its literal terms do nothing more than strip federal courts of Article III diversity
jurisdiction when a state is a defendant. Seminole Tribe, 514 U.S. at 54 (1996). Eleventh
Amendment immunity applies equally to a state agency because it is considered an "arm of
the State." Mt. Healthy City Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 280 (1977). Accord Pen-
nhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 101 (1984) (noting that suits against
state agencies and subdivisions constitute suits against the state because the state is the real
party in interest).
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the Constitution's history and structure.3 0 The Court interprets the Elev-
enth Amendment "to stand not so much for what it says, but for the pre-
supposition... which it confirms.' Consequently, "for over a century
[the Court] has reaffirmed that federal jurisdiction over suits against non-
consenting States 'was not contemplated by the Constitution when estab-
lishing the judicial review power of the United States."'"-
Eleventh Amendment immunity is not absolute, however 33 Congress,
for example, possesses authority to abrogate states' sovereign immunity
and provide for private damage actions against a state in federal court.
"Because the Eleventh Amendment implicates the fundamental constitu-
tional balance between the Federal Government and the States, [the] Court
consistently has held that [the] exceptions [to sovereign immunity] apply
only when certain specific conditions are met."'s This principle has re-
sulted in a considerable judicial debate regarding two questions: 1) what
demonstration of congressional intent to abrogate is required; and 2) under
what circumstances does Congress possess abrogation authority?
In 1996, the Supreme Court addressed both issues in Seminole Tribe of
Florida v. Florida.3 1 Prior to Seminole Tribe, the Court had confirmed that
Congress could abrogate states' immunity from suit in federal court
through its commerce power3 6 and its power under Section 5 of the Four-
30. "The Amendment is rooted in a recognition that the States, although a union.
maintain certain attributes of sovereignty, including sovereign immunity." Puerto Rico
Aqueduct & Sewer Auth. v. Metcalf & Eddy, Inc., 506 U.S. 139, 146 (1993).
31. Blatchford v. Native Village of Noatak, 501 U.S. 775, 779 (1991). The presupposi-
tion confirmed is two-part: "first, that each state is a sovereign entity in our federal system;
and second that 'it is inherent in the nature of sovereignty not to be amenable to the suit of
an individual without its consent."' Seminole Tribe, 514 U.S. at 54 (quotations omitted)
(quoting Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 13 (1890) (quoting THE FE DERALsT No. 81, at 487
(Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961))).
32. Seminole Tribe, 514 U.S. at 54 (quoting Hans, 134 U.S. at 15). The most renowned
application of this principle is that notwithstanding its literal language, the Eleventh
Amendment also bars federal courts from hearing cases against a state brought by its own
citizens. See Puerto Rico Aqueduct & Sewer Auth., 506 U.S. at 144 (1993) (holding that "an
unconsenting State is immune from suits brought in federal courts by her own citizens as
well as by citizens of another state").
33. State sovereign immunity does not apply to suits against the states in federal court
brought by the United States government or its agencies. United States v. Mississippi, 380
U.S. 128, 136-38 (1965); United States v. Texas, 143 U.S. 621, 643-46 (1892). Also, a state
may consent to jurisdiction, and thereby waive immunity, by "express language" or by
"overwhelming implication." Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 673 (1974).
34. Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 238-39 (1985).
35. 514 U.S. 44 (1996).
36. See Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 491 U.S. 1, 19-20 (1989) (plurality opinion)
(holding that Congress has the authority to render states liable in federal court for monetary
damages under the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability
Act (CERCLA) when legislation was passed pursuant to the commerce clause).
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teenth Amendment.37 Seminole Tribe expressly rejected Congress's com-
merce power as a source of abrogation authority, leaving only Section 5.3
The Court in Seminole Tribe also held that a reviewing court must de-
termine whether Congress "'unequivocally expressed its intent to abrogate
the immunity' [and whether Congress acted] 'pursuant to a valid exercise
of power.'" 39 Thus, in every dispute over congressional authority to abro-
gate states' immunity from suit in federal court, the party asserting abroga-
tion must show that (1) Congress made a sufficiently clear statement of its
intent to abrogate, (2) Congress acted pursuant to its Section 5 power, and
(3) the exercise of Section 5 power was valid under the circumstances. 40
The first two requirements are both readily met in ADA litigation and
no court has held to the contrary.41 The heart of the constitutional contro-
versy currently being litigated in the lower courts is whether the ADA rep-
resents a valid exercise of Congress's Section 5 power. Resolution of that
37. See Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445, 452-56 (1976) (limiting the Eleventh Amend-
ment by section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, and therefore allowing private suits
against states which would be unconstitutional in other contexts).
38. The abrogation issue arose in Seminole Tribe because the court had agreed to de-
cide whether the Indian Commerce Clause also was a source of congressional abrogation
authority. Finding it was not, the Court held that neither was the Interstate Commerce
Clause, reversing Union Gas Co.. See Thorpe v. Virginia State Univ., 6 F. Supp. 2d 507, 512
(E.D. Va. 1998) (declaring that Seminole Tribe "now is generally regarded as foreclosing
Article I as a source of power for the congressional abrogation of States' Eleventh Amend-
ment immunity" (citations omitted)). For an argument that the War Power may have sur-
vived Seminole Tribe as an additional source of abrogation authority see discussion infra
note 352.
39. Seminole Tribe, 514 U.S. at 55 (quoting Green v. Mansour, 474 U.S. 64, 68 (1985)).
40. The second step has generated some debate. Compare Coger v. Board of Regents,
154 F.3d 296,303 (6th Cir. 1998), vacated and remanded, No. 98-821, 67 U.S.L.W. 3364 (U.S.
Jan. 18, 2000) (stating that "[e]ven after Seminole Tribe, the question we must answer is
whether Congress actually possessed the authority to adopt the legislation, not whether
Congress correctly articulated the source of that authority .... As long as Congress pos-
sesses the authority, whether it also has the specific intent to legislate pursuant to that au-
thority is irrelevant"), and Scott v. University of Miss., 148 F.3d 493, 501 (5th Cir. 1998)
(determining that "Congress need not 'recite the words "Section Five" or "Fourteenth
Amendment" or "equal protection" for "[t]he... constitutionality of action taken by Con-
gress does not depend on recitals of the power which it undertakes to exercise""' (citing
EEOC v. Wyoming, 460 U.S. 226, 243 n.18 (1983)), with Driesse v. Florida Bd. of Regents,
26 F. Supp. 2d 1328, 1332. (M.D. Fla. 1998) (asserting that for a statute to "be regarded as
an enactment to enforce the Equal Protection Clause,... the statute should indicate that it is
being passed to enforce Fourteenth Amendment rights"). See Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp.
v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 16 (1981) (stating that "we should not quickly attribute to Con-
gress an unstated intent to act under its authority to enforce the Fourteenth Amendment").
See also EEOC v. Wyoming, 460 U.S. 226,243 n.18 (1983) (concluding that a court must "be
able to discern some legislative purpose or factual predicate that supports the exercise of
[the Section 5] power").
41. The ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12202 provides:
A State shall not be immune under the eleventh amendment to the Constitution of the
United States from an action in Federal or State court of competent jurisdiction for a viola-
tion of this chapter. In any action against a State for a violation of the requirements of this
chapter, remedies (including remedies both at law and in equity) are available for such a
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issue will depend on whether the ADA satisfies the requirements estab-
lished by the 1997 decision in City of Boerne v. Flores,4" which held that
Congress lacked Section 5 authority to enact the Religious Freedom Resto-
ration Act of 1993 (RFRA).43
Contraction of Congress's Authority to Exercise Its Section 5 Power
In what has been described as an "unusually bipartisan effort-only
three members of Congress vot[ing] against its passage"m-Congress en-
acted RFRA to reverse a 1990 Supreme Court decision, Employment Divi-
sion v. Smith.45 In Smith, the Court held that the Free Exercise Clause of
the First Amendment does not provide protection from the incidental bur-
dens on religious expression that may result from the nondiscriminatory
violation to the same extent as such remedies are available for such a violation in an action
against any public or private entity other than a State.
Courts overwhelmingly hold that by this language, Congress unequivocally expressed
its intent to abrogate. See, e.g., Coolbaugh v. Louisiana, 136 F.3d 430, 433 (5th Cir. 1998)
(finding Congress's intent to abrogate in the ADA "patently clear"); Clark v. California, 123
F.3d 1267, 1269 (9th Cir. 1997) (characterizing Congress's intent to abrogate as "unequivo-
cally expressed"); Nihiser v. Ohio Envtl. Protection Agency, 979 F. Supp. 1168, 1170 (S.D.
Ohio 1997) (finding first prong of Seminole Tribe test to be clearly satisfied, although hold-
ing that accommodation provision of ADA was not a valid exercise of Congress's enforce-
ment power under the 14th Amendment); Mayer v. University of Minn. 940 F. Supp. 1474,
1477 (D. Minn. 1996) (finding that Congress "explicitly indicated" its intention to abrogate).
Moreover, Courts uniformly agree that Congress intended to exercise its power under
Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. In 42 U.S.C. § 12101(b)(4), Congress stated that
one purpose of the ADA was "to invoke the sweep of congressional authority, including the
power to enforce the fourteenth amendment [sic] in order to address the major areas of
discrimination faced day-to-day by people with disabilities." See Martin v. Kansas, 978 F.
Supp. 992, 998 (D. Kan. 1997) (stating that "Congress abrogated the States' immunity with
respect to the ADA pursuant to a valid exercise of its power under Section 5 of the Four-
teenth Amendment"). See also Nihiser, 979 F. Supp. at 1171 (interpreting the language of
the ADA at 42 U.S.C. § 12101(b)(4) to indicate that "Congress intended to utilize its en-
forcement powers under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment"); Mayer, 940 F. Supp. at
1480 (concluding that Congress enacted the ADA "pursuant to a valid exercise of its author-
ity to enforce the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment").
42. 521 U.S. 507 (1997). It appears that some, lacking a proper Texas education, may
have mispronounced the name of the city, Boerne, Texas. The academic literature aids the
uninformed by explaining that the proper pronunciation is "Bernie." See Michael IV. Mc-
Connell, Institutions and Interpretation: a Critique of City of Boerne v. Flores, 111 HARry. L
REv. 153. 161-62 (1997); Douglas Laycock, Conceptual Gulfs in City of Boerne v. Flores, 39
WM. & MARY L. REv. 743, 743 (1998).
43. Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA) of 1993, ch. 21B, codified at 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000bb (1994).
44. Cole, supra note 18, at 39.
45. 494 U.S. 872 (1990). For many years prior to Sinith, facially neutral laws of general
application that imposed a substantial burden on the free exercise of religion were consid-
ered unconstitutional unless justified as necessary to advance a compelling state interest.
See Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963) (holding denial of claimant's unemployment
benefits for refusing employment requiring work on the Sabbath to be unconstitutional);
Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972) (barring state from compelling public school at-
tendance by Amish school children as inconsistent with Free Exercise Clause of the First
Amendment). See also Boerne, 521 U.S. at 513 (reasoning that under Sherbert, the Court
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application of facially neutral laws of general application.46 After Smith,
laws that burdened religious expression could be challenged on Free Exer-
cise grounds only if they were "specifically targeted at or intended to bur-
den religious practices. '47 RFRA reversed that outcome by prohibiting
laws that "substantially burden[ed]" the exercise of religion unless they ad-
vanced a "compelling governmental interest" and were "the least restric-
tive means of furthering that compelling governmental interest. 48 In
Boerne, the Court concluded that Congress violated the principles of sepa-
ration of powers and state sovereignty when it deployed Section 5 to enact
RFRA.49
Broadly speaking, the Court in Boerne had available several options to
resolve the issue concerning Congress's Section 5 authority. The most re-
strictive, prominently staked out by Justice Harlan in his dissent in Katzen-
bach v. Morgan,5" would suggest that Section 5 authorizes Congress to
proscribe only conduct the Court would conclude violates the Fourteenth
Amendment.5 Under this posture RFRA clearly would be unconstitu-
tional. The Court rejected this constricted view of Section 5. The Section 5
power is preventative in the sense that Congress may prevent legislatively
what the Court concludes the Constitution prohibits,5 but the power also
is "remedial."53 The Court stated: "Legislation which deters or remedies
"would have asked whether [a state's] prohibition substantially burdened a religious prac-
tice and, if it did, whether the burden was justified by a compelling interest"). For a discus-
sion of the "freedom protective interpretation" of the Free Exercise Clause prior to the
Court's decision in Smith and the effect of Smith, see McConnell, supra note 42, at 158-159.
46. In Smith, members of the Native American Church claimed that a state law barring
the use of peyote violated their religious freedom since for them peyote was a sacrament.
494 U.S. at 872.
47. Cole, supra note 18, at 38. See also Boerne, 521 U.S. at 513-14 (noting that "Smith
held that neutral, generally applicable laws may be applied to religious practices even when
not supported by a compelling governmental interest").
48. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb 1(a), (b).
49. See Boerne, 521 U.S. at 536 (maintaining that "[biroad as the power of Congress is
under the Enforcement Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, RFRA contradicts vital
principles necessary to maintain separation of powers and the federal balance").
50. 384 U.S. 641, 659 (1966) (Harlan, J., dissenting). The majority upheld Section 4(c)
of the 1965 Voting Rights Act. The Court found that Section 4(e) was appropriate legisla-
tion to enforce the Fourteenth Amendment although previously it had held that literacy
tests do not per se violate the Fourteenth Amendment.
51. See, e.g., Stephen Gardbaum, Reflections on City of Boerne v. Flores: The Federal-
ism Implications of Flores, 39 WM. AND MARY L. REv. 665, 675 (1998) (arguing that "it
seems likely (though not certain) that Justice Harlan believed that the legislative remedy for
a recognized violation may not impose congressional limitations on state power beyond the
constitutional prohibitions contained in Section 1 of the Amendment").
52. See Boerne, 521 U.S. at 519 (observing that "Congress can enact legislation under
[Section] Five enforcing the constitutional right"); id. at 525 (reasoning that Congress can
pass legislation "'such as may be necessary and proper for counteracting such laws as the
States may adopt or enforce, and which, by the amendment, they are prohibited from mak-
ing or enforcing .... "' (quoting The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 13-14 (1883))).
53. See Boerne, 521 U.S. at 524 (finding that Section 5 power is "remedial and
preventive").
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constitutional violations can fall within the sweep of Congress's enforce-
ment power even if in the process it prohibits conduct which is not itself
unconstitutional and intrudes into 'legislative spheres of authority previ-
ously reserved to the states."' 54 The Section 5 question thus is not con-
cerned with whether Congress may ban both constitutional and
unconstitutional state action, but rather with the breadth of Congress's Sec-
tion 5 authority to prohibit state action that is constitutional as a means of
preventing or remedying that which is unconstitutional.
One option interprets Section 5 as providing Congress with the au-
thority to expand constitutional rights by defining for itself what the Four-
teenth Amendment prohibits and legislating against it, even if the Court
were not prepared to find the Fourteenth Amendment so sweeping in its
prohibitions.5 5 Justice Brennan's majority opinion in Morgan has been
characterized as the "launching pad for this view of congressional
power."56 In what has been described by one commentator as an expres-
sion of "umbrage '5 7 and by another as an effort "to put down what it saw
as a congressional rebellion,""8 the Court in Boerne held that "Congress
has [no] power to decree the substance of the Fourteenth Amendment's
restrictions of the States. 59 It continued, "[legislation which alters the
meaning of the Free Exercise Clause cannot be said to be enforcing the
54. Boerne, 521 U.S. at 518 (quoting Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445, 455 (1976)).
This conclusion was unexceptional since in four prominent voting rights cases, the Court
had upheld congressional Section 5 power to limit state authority to enforce various voting
practices, none of which violated the Constitution. Furthermore, voting practices were un-
derstood to be uniquely within the peculiar prerogative of the states. See generally South
Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301 (1966) (upholding several provisions of the Voting
Rights Act of 1965); Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641 (1966) (upholding ban on literacy
tests that had the effect of prohibiting certain people schooled in Puerto Rico from voting);
Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112 (1970) (upholding five-year nationwide ban on literacy
tests and similar voting requirements for registering to vote); City of Rome v. United States,
446 U.S. 260 (1980) (upholding seven-year extension of the Voting Rights Act's requirement
that certain jurisdictions pre-clear certain changes in their voting practices).
55. See, e.g., Archibald Cox, Constitutional Adjudication and the Promotion of Human
Rights, 80 HAgv. L. Rlv. 91, 107 (1966) (stating that "Congress, in the field of state activi-
ties and except as confined by the Bill of Rights, has the power to enact any law which may
be viewed as a measure for correction of any condition which Congress might believe in-
volves a denial of equality or other fourteenth amendment rights.").
56. See Fallon, supra note 18, at 129 n.447.
57. Cole, supra note 18, at 76. Cole argues that:
RFRA was an unusual statute-it marked virtually unanimous congressional disa-
greement with the Court on a constitutional matter. The Court in [Boerne] ap-
peared to take umbrage at Congress's critical assessment, and treated the statute
as a challenge to the Court's power to interpret and enforce the Constitution, vir-
tually akin to Arkansas Governor Orville Faubus's blocking the schoolhouse door
in Little Rock in defiance of a federal court desegregation decree.
58. Gardbaum, supra note 51, at 669.
59. Boerne, 521 U.S. at 519.
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Clause."60 Unsurprisingly, the Court declined to entertain a vision of con-
gressional legislative authority that would undercut its supremacy to deter-
mine what the Constitution means.
In much of the literature interpreting the Boerne Court's strongly
worded disavowal of Congress's power to create new substantive constitu-
tional fights, commentators have referred to Boerne as little more than mis-
direction, or as some have called it, a "red herring,"'" a "straw man"'6 and
a "makeweight."63 This judgment seems both accurate and somewhat
overstated. Nothing on the face of RFRA purports to deprive the Court of
its final say on what the Constitution means. 6' But that alone does not
eliminate all separation of powers concerns when Congress exercises its
Section 5 power to prohibit state behavior that is not unconstitutional.65
60. Id. "Congress does not enforce a constitutional right by changing what the right is.
It has been given the power 'to enforce' not the power to determine what constitutes a
constitutional violation." Id. Congress's power is "corrective or preventive, not defini-
tional." Id. at 525.
61. See Gardbaum, supra note 51, at 666 (arguing that though ... its separation-of-
powers argument was the more central of the two grounds in driving the Court's analysis, it
was, in reality, a red herring in the case"); Cole, supra note 18, at 40 (calling the separation-
of-powers argument "a red herring-whatever else one might say about RFRA, it did not
violate the separation of powers").
62. McConnell, supra note 42, at 174 (commenting that "the 'substantive' interpreta-
tion of Section Five... is... something of a straw man").
63. Cole, supra note 18, at 43 (maintaining that "[a]s an analytical matter, the separa-
tion of powers portion of [Boerne] is a makeweight. But it is more than that. The Court's
separation of powers analysis is driven ultimately by what appears to be an intuitive sense
that it is improper or disrespectful for Congress to disagree with the Court's view of the
Free Exercise Clause.").
64. The Court's essential function to determine finally the meaning of the Fourteenth
Amendment was neither challenged in the petitioner's briefs in Boerne nor at oral argument
to the Court. See Brief for Petitioner, City of Boerne v. Flores, 1996 WL 689630, 521 U.S.
507 (1997) (No. 95-2074); Brief for Respondent at 7, City of Boerne v. Flores, 1997 WL
13201, 521 U.S. 507 (1997) (No. 95-2074). In addition, the history of Section 5 and the
Court's Section 5 precedents all reserve for the Court final review of legislation enacted
pursuant to the Section 5 power. Douglas Laycock, RFRA, Congress, and the Ratchet, 56
MONT. L. REv. 145, 165-67 (1995). See also Cole, supra note 18, at 47-48 & n.44 (discussing
the United States' arguments in Boerne before the United States Circuit Court of Appeals
that RFRA was merely an attempt to deter constitutional violations, uncover hidden unlaw-
ful purpose, and protect religious adherents from discrimination).
65. The Civil War Amendments were "specifically designed as an expansion of federal
power and an intrusion on state sovereignty, City of Rome v. United States, 446 U.S. 156,
179 (1980), bestowing on the federal government "responsib[ility] for the protection of lib-
erty in the states." Laycock, supra note 42, at 757 (citing JAMES MCPHERSON, ABRAHAM
LINCOLN AND THE SECOND AMERICAN REVOLuTION, 141-43 (1990)). Yet they also pro-
voked a fear of centralization from the time of their enactment. See Rachel Toker, 7ying the
Hands of Congress: City of Boerne v. Flores (1997), 33 HARV. C.R. - C.L. L. REv. 273, 285
(1998) (reviewing the congressional debates over the enactment of Section 5). By providing
both the federal courts and the Congress with concurrent authority to provide for liberty in
the states, the Fourteenth Amendment provides a built-in check and built-in conflict. Lupu
explains it this way:
Marbury licenses the Court; McCulloch charters the Congress. McCulloch defer-
ence softens the Court's Marbury grip. [However,] a broad reading of Section 5...
representing maximum elasticity of implied power is in stark tension with the
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Judicial review of such legislation is still necessary to test whether its aim
really is to deter the states' unconstitutional behavior, or whether it actu-
ally is intended to expand the Fourteenth Amendment's substantive sweep.
If the Court's review of such legislation becomes too attenuated, the Court
will have surrendered its preeminent role as interpreter of the Constitution.
In other words, the separation of powers discussion in Boerne was hardly a
red herring because choosing an appropriate standard of judicial review in
Section 5 cases raises important separation of powers issues.
The final two options that were available to the Court in Boerne differ
in the degree of deference, built into the standard of judicial review, that is
appropriate when Congress proscribes constitutional state behavior as a
means of deterring or preventing Fourteenth Amendment violations. What
showing of necessity will the Court insist upon? The most deferential op-
tion is the rational basis test,66 originating in the late Nineteenth Century
reconstruction cases. In Ex parte Virginia,67 the Court defined "appropri-
ate legislation" in Section 5 as those means "adapted to carry out the 'ob-
jects' the amendments have in view... if not prohibited."'  In The Civil
Rights Cases,69 the Court equated the scope of Section 5 power with that
Court's Marbury function. When Congress legislates broadly to prevent what it
perceives as violations of Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment, it strikes at the
Court's dominance in law declaration as well as at autonomy of state operations.
Ira C. Lupu, Why the Congress Was Wrong and the Court Was Right-Reflecting on City of
Boeme v. Flores, 39 W. & MARY L. RFv. 793, 811-12 (1998).
As a consequence, the history of Section 5 has been one of vacillation, at times ex-
panding and at other times contracting Congress's Section 5 power, leaving "both sides with
talking points from history." Laycock, supra note 42, at 762. Cole has argued that "[t]he root
cause of the difficulty presented by the Fourteenth Amendment is that unlike most provi-
sions in the Constitution, it empowers two branches with concurrent authority to enforce its
guarantees: the Court and the Congress." Cole, supra note 18, at 34. This "peculiar delega-
tion of concurrent authority," (id. at 44-45), has posed the persistent questions of "[w]ho has
the final say, and what standard of review should the branch with the final say apply to the
other's actions?" Id at 35. With the emergence of incorporation of the Bill of Rights into
the Fourteenth Amendment, "Congress's Section 5 authority [became] potentially quite ex-
pansive .... The potential sweep of Section 5, when combined with the effects of incorpora-
tion, is dramatic." Cole, supra note 18, at 54-55. With these forces and counter forces at
play, Laycock may have captured the essence when he writes that Boerne "was ultimately a
case about the meaning of the Civil War." Laycock, supra note 42, at 757. "The debate over
the meaning of the Civil War, or from another perspective, the struggle to secure the fruits
of the Civil War, can continue forever." Id. at 762.
66. This option has been characterized as providing Congress "limitless deference."
Christopher L. Eisgruber & Lawrence G. Sager, Congressional Power and Religious Liberty
After City of Boerne v. Flores, 1987 Sup. CT. R.Ev. 79, 94 (1997) (arguing that "[o]ne expla-
nation [of Section 5 power] that has found great favor [holds that] when Congress is enlarg-
ing rights, typically the only objection sounds in enumerated powers, and the all but
limitless deference traditionally granted Congress with regard to its enumerated powers
should apply.").
67. 100 U.S. 339 (1879).
68. Id. at 346.
69. 109 U.S. 3 (1883).
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associated with the "necessary and proper" clause.7" The Court in Katzen-
bach v. Morgan,7 quoting McCulloch v. Maryland,72 stated that "consistent
with 'the letter and spirit of the Constitution,"' Congress's Section 5 role is
"to exercise its discretion in determining whether and what legislation is
needed to secure the guarantees of the Fourteenth Amendment. '7 3 As
Professor Gardbaum has summarized this option:
This test translates into the following division of labor: Congress is
to "assess and weigh" the various conflicting considerations in-
volved in a decision to displace state law and authority, including
the nature and significance of state interests affected; the Court is
to determine whether it "perceive[s] a basis" upon which Con-
gress might decide that such action on its part is necessary to se-
cure the goals of the amendment.74
The Court in Boerne rejected the rational basis test, so conspicuously
animated by a "spirit of generous deference to congressional judgment,' 75
notwithstanding its firm foundation in precedent. In fact, not once did the
Court in Boerne even mention the Necessary and Proper Clause. The
Court recognized that the "line between measures that remedy or prevent
unconstitutional actions and measures that make a substantive change in
the governing law is not easy to discern."'76 Moreover, the Court acknowl-
edged that "Congress must have wide latitude in determining where [the
line] lies."" Citing Morgan, the Court emphasized that "[i]t is for Con-
gress in the first instance to 'determine whether and what legislation is
needed to secure the guarantees of the Fourteenth Amendment,' and its
conclusions are entitled to much deference.""8 Notwithstanding these con-
ciliatory nods directed to Congress, the Court declared RFRA unconstitu-
tional, concluding
70. Id. at 13-14. For a summary of the legislative history of Section 5 and the early
cases see Cole, supra note 18, at 49-52; Toker, supra note 65, at 276-79.
71. 384 U.S. 642 (1966).
72. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 421 (1819).
73. Morgan, 384 U.S. at 641, 650-51.
74. Gardbaum, supra note 51, at 681-82 (quoting Morgan, 384 U.S. at 653). For a dis-
cussion of other modem cases equating the Section 5 power to the broad powers under the
Necessary and Proper Clause, see id. at 680-82 nn.68 & 76 (discussing Oregon v. Mitchell,
400 U.S. 112, 142-44 (1970) (separate opinion of Douglas, J.); South Carolina v. Katzenbach,
383 U.S. 301,325-27 (1966); City of Rome v. United States, 446 U.S. 156, 176 (1980)); Toker,
supra note 65, at 279-84.
75. Eisgruber & Sager, supra note 66, at 86.
76. Boerne, 521 U.S. at 519.
77. Id.
78. Id. at 537 (quoting Morgan, 384 U.S. at 651). The Court also accepted that
"[j]udicial deference, in most cases, is based not on the state of the legislative record Con-
gress compiles but 'on due regard for the decision of the body constitutionally appointed to
decide .... ' As a general matter, it is for Congress to determine the method by which it will
reach a decision." Boerne, 521 U.S. at 531-32.
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RFRA cannot be considered remedial, preventive legislation, if
those terms are to have any meaning. RFRA is so out of propor-
tion to a supposed remedial or preventive object that it cannot be
understood as responsive to, or designed to prevent, unconstitu-
tional behavior. It appears, instead, to attempt a substantive
change in constitutional protections.79
In so holding, the Court introduced what is now called the "congru-
ence and proportionality" test. It states, "[t]here must be congruence and
proportionality between the injury to be prevented or remedied and the
means adopted to that end. Lacking such a connection, legislation may
become substantive in operation and effect."'  This approach is more de-
manding than the rational basis test.81 The "congruence and proportional-
ity" test permits the Court to probe more deeply the telic relationship
between the legislation that regulates constitutional conduct by the states
and the Fourteenth Amendment violations to be prevented or remedied.'
The ADA and other civil rights and labor legislation applicable to the
states must now meet this more demanding "congruence and proportional-
ity" test. The real challenge lies in determining what the Court meant by
"congruence and proportionality." Commentators disagree about how
much Congressional deference is involved.83 Although I would readily
79. Id.
80. Id- at 520. The Court suggested the "congruence and proportionality" test follows
from the reasoning of The Civil Rights Cases. See Boerne, 521 U.S. at 532 (asserting that
"[r]emedial legislation under [Section] 5 'should be adapted to the mischief and wrong
which the [Fourteenth] Amendment was intended to provide against' (quoting The Civil
Rights Cases, 109 U.S. at 13)).
81. It does not entail a court merely determining if it can "perceive a basis" for Con-
gress's conclusion regarding "whether and what legislation is needed to secure the guaran-
tees of the Fourteenth Amendment." Morgan, 384 U.S. at 651, 656.
82. This test "reset the federal-state balance [and] confirmed in unambiguous terms
just how serious [the Court] is about federalism." Gardbaum, supra note 51, at 666.
83. Douglas Laycock, lead appellate lawyer for Archbishop Flores in the Boerne case,
has reflected:
If the assumptions about RFRA and religious liberty dominated the decision, then
[Boere] may be a special ticket, good for this day and this train only .... [But if
Boerne] mean[s] what it says, [then Boerne] is by far the most important of the
recent round of federalism decisions. Several statutes that were previously uncon-
troversial are now subject to serious constitutional attack .... [Niothing is over-
ruled, but everything is changed.
Laycock, supra note 42, at 744.
Marci Hamilton, the lawyer for the city of Boerne, Texas, has argued that "RFRA's
invalidation is a victory for the people [because Boerne] is a strong message to Congress to
act with responsibility, accountability, and independent judgment." Marci Hamilton, City of
Boerne v. Flores: A Landmark for Structural Analysis, 39 WVhi. & MARY L REV. 699, 722
(1998).
Those less directly involved in the litigation are somewhat more circumspect. Borrow-
ing a line from Charles Fried, Richard Fallon concludes that "whether Boerne %ill prove to
be a 'mule' or a 'mustard seed' remains to be seen." Fallon, supra note 18, at 133 (citing
Charles Fried, Fonvard: Revolutions?, 109 HIv. L. REv. 13, 42-45 (1995)). As Fallon ex-
plains, Fried "distinguish[ed] 'mustard seeds,' or decisions from which large and important
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concede that Boerne is the product of a clash of different conceptions of
religious freedom,' 4 I align myself with those who warn against thinking of
Boerne only in those terms.8 5 As Chemerinsky has observed, Boerne not
only "speaks to basic issues concerning the powers of Congress and the
Supreme Court in interpreting the Constitution [but in addition, it ad-
dresses] the scope of Congress's authority under an increasingly important
constitutional provision-Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. '8 6
Lupu made a closely-related point when he observed that "[i]f Seminole
Tribe is to have any bite, there must be real limits imposed on the Section 5
power.""7 In other words, for all these reasons, Boerne is a case to be
taken seriously. It contains all the analytical tools needed to put real teeth
into Seminole Tribe's constriction of Congress's authority to abrogate the
states' Eleventh Amendment immunity from suit in federal court.
That said, how seriously, if at all, does Boerne call into question Con-
gress's authority under Section 5 to enact the ADA? Put another way, are
the ADA's proscriptions congruent and proportional to preventing and
remedying the states' unconstitutional treatment of persons with disabili-
ties? Unfortunately, none of the lower courts that have considered this
question to date have provided a convincing assessment.
doctrines ultimately grow, from 'mule[s],' or decisions that prove unable to spawn the prog-
eny needed for ultimate doctrinal significance." Id. at 127 n.429.
84. See Eisgruber & Sager, supra note 66, at 97-105 (stating that RFRA embraced a
conceptually different vision of religious liberty from that held by the Court, and this largely
explains the outcome in Boerne).
85. See Erwin Chemerinsky, Reflections on City of Boerne v. Flores: The Religious
Freedom Restoration Act is a Constitutional Expansion of Rights, 39 Wm. & MARY L. REv.
601, 603 (1998) (concluding that "[b]y any measure, [Boerne] is an enormously important
decision."); Eisgruber & Sager, supra note 66, at 83 (affirming that Boerne "may well be the
most important statement by the Court about Congress's power under the Reconstruction
Amendments since Katzenbach v. Morgan in 1966.").
86. Chemerinsky, supra note 85, at 603-04. This insight deserves emphasis. Surely
Chemerinsky is right when he claims that Section 5's scope has become increasingly critical
following Seminole Tribe, since Section 5 remains the sole source of congressional abroga-
tion authority. Moreover, in light of cases such as United States v. Lopez that truncated the
scope of Congress's commerce power, Section 5 emerges as an important alternative source
of congressional power. Id. at 603-04 & n.14.
87. Lupu, supra note 65, at 815 n.109. This observation applies equally to Congress's
power to compel a state to waive sovereign immunity from suit in federal court as a condi-
tion of its engaging in commercial activities in interstate commerce. For example, in College
Savings Bank II, Justice Scalia candidly admitted that "[r]ecognizing a congressional power
to exact constructive waivers of sovereign immunity through the exercise of Article I powers
would..., as a practical matter, permit congress to circumvent the antiabrogation holding
of Seminole Tribe .... [Cjonstructive waiver is little more than abrogation under another
name." College Savings Bank 11, 119 S. Ct. at 2230. In addition, "when one recalls that
Section 5 power exercises are aimed typically at states qua states in their governance activi-
ties, it is not difficult to see [Boerne] as a first cousin of the state sovereignty principle of
New York v. United States." Lupu, supra note 65, at 815 n.110. For a discussion of New
York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992), see supra note 17. It is worth adding to Lupu's
"first cousin" observation that Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997) was decided two
days before Boerne. It relies on and expands the intergovernmental immunity principles
developed in New York v. United States. See discussion infra note 17.
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The Current Judicial Response to the Constitutional Attack on the ADA
Soon after the Court's decision in Boerne, states initiated a counterat-
tack against the ADA based on various interpretations of Boerne. An ini-
tial argument put forth was that Congress lacked Section 5 power to enact
legislation except with respect to suspect classifications. Because disability
is not considered a suspect classification, Congress lacked the authority to
enact the ADA. This argument is premised on the assumption that individ-
uals with disabilities derive no protection from the Equal Protection
Clause. Such an assertion is easily refuted.8 9 The fact that a legislative
classification is not suspect means only that a lower standard of review will
be applied to state action rather than principles of strict scrutiny. Thus,
88. In Clebume v. Cleburne Living Center, 473 U.S. 432 (1985), the court held that
legislative classifications of the mentally disabled are not quasi-suspect classifications. How-
ever, the Court's reasoning applies equally to the physically disabled. In finding no height-
ened scrutiny for mentally disabled individuals, the Court in Cleburne focused on the
difficulty of "distinguish[ing] a variety of other groups who have perhaps immutable disabil-
ities setting them off from others, who cannot themselves mandate the desired legislative
responses, and who can claim some degree of prejudice from at least part of the public at
large." Id. at 445. The Court then listed a variety of groups, including those with physical
disabilities. Id. at 446. See also Hansen v. Rimel, 104 F.3d 189, 190 n.3 (8th Cir. 1997)
(agreeing that "[a]lthough protected by statutory enactments such as the [ADA], the dis-
abled do not constitute a 'suspect class' for purposes of equal protection analysis."); Suffolk
Parents of Handicapped Adult v. Wimgate, 101 F.3d 818, 824-27 (2d Cir. 1996) (applying
rational basis standard to claims of handicapped individuals who challenged a state's denial
of funding), cert. denied, 520 U.S. 1239 (1997); Does v. Chandler, 83 F.3d 1150, 1155 (9th
Cir. 1996) (concluding that "[flor the purposes of equal protection analysis, the disabled do
not constitute a suspect class."); Spragens v. Shalala, 36 F.3d 947, 950 (10th Cir. 1994) (hold-
ing that "a classification applying to blind persons is not suspect, or even quasi-suspect, and
we therefore apply the 'rational basis' standard, rather than some more strict one"); More v.
Farrier, 984 F.2d 269,271 (8th Cir. 1993) (holding that the wheelchair-bound are not a sus-
pect class). See also Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 686 (1973) (plurality opinion)
(arguing that what "differentiates sex from such nonsuspect statuses as intelligence or physi-
cal disability... is that the sex characteristic frequently bears no relations to ability to
perform or contribute to society.").
89. See, e.g., Clark v. California, 123 F.3d 1267, 1271 (9th Cir. 1997) (concluding that
"[t]he State does not explain why the Court's choice of a level of scrutiny for purposes of
judicial review should be the boundary of the legislative power under the Fourteenth
Amendment, nor have we found any case to so hold. The levels of scrutiny in equal protec-
tion cases are 'standards for determining the validity of state legislation or other official
action that is challenged as denying equal protection.' City of Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 439-40.
The State cites no case which holds that these levels of scrutiny define the limits of Con-
gress's power to enforce the Fourteenth Amendment."); Lamb v. John Umstead Hosp., 19
F. Supp. 2d 498,504 (E.D.N.C. 1998) (proposing that "[t]he levels of scrutiny do not define
the limits of Congress's power to enforce the Fourteenth Amendment."). Accord Cool-
baugh v. Louisiana, 136 F.3d 430, 433-34 (5th Cir. 1998) (rejecting this reason for challeng-
ing Section 5 power to enact the ADA); Goshtasby v. Board of Trustees of the Univ. of Ill.,
141 F.3d 761, 770 (7th Cir. 1998) (rejecting this reason for challenging Section 5 power to
enact the ADEA); Young v. Pennsylvania House of Representatives, Republican Caucus,
994 F. Supp. 282 (M.D. Pa. 1998) (same); Hines v. Ohio State Univ., 3 F. Supp. 2d 859,872-
73 (S.D. Ohio 1998) (same).
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disabled individuals do derive some level of equal protection, albeit less
than classifications considered suspect. 90
A variation of this interpretation-that the ADA is unconstitutional
because disability-based discrimination does not receive strict judicial scru-
tiny-focuses on Boerne's holding that Congress may not legislatively rede-
fine the substantive rights afforded by the Fourteenth Amendment.91 The
district court in Brown v. North Carolina Division of Motor Vehicles,92 re-
lied upon this argument to find the ADA unconstitutional, arguing that the
Act has substantively altered the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment
by creating more protections than the Fourteenth Amendment provides.93
But this argument fails. To the extent that the ADA prohibits behavior not
already prohibited by the Fourteenth Amendment, such prohibitions still
fall within Congress's Section 5 power if they are congruent and propor-
tional to remedying or preventing unconstitutional behavior by the states.
90. The Supreme Court has defined the Equal Protection Clause to mean "that no
State shall deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws, which
is essentially a direction that all persons similarly situated should be treated alike."
Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 439 (internal quotations omitted). See id. at 446 (clarifying that "[ojur
refusal to recognize the retarded as a quasi-suspect class does not leave them entirely un-
protected from invidious discrimination."). See discussion supra notes 154-168 and accom-
panying text.
91. See Boerne, 521 U.S. at 520 (noting the "Fourteenth Amendment's history confirms
the remedial, rather than substantive, nature of the Enforcement Clause ... "); id. at 519
(stating that "Congress does not enforce a constitutional duty by changing what the right
is.").
92. 987 F. Supp. 451 (E.D.N.C. 1997), aff'd, 166 F.3d 698 (4th Cir. 1999).
93. See id. at 458 (finding Congress acted "outside... its Enforcement Clause author-
ity" because it "declar[ed]" that "disabled people are ... a class entitled to increased Four-
teenth Amendment protection .... ").
Congress cannot force the courts to adopt a new regime vis-a-vis the classification
of individuals with disabilities .... Because the Supreme Court held in Cleburne
that disabled people are not a class entitled to increased Fourteenth Amendment
protection, the Court cannot now decide that Congress had the power to declare
otherwise in the ADA.
Id. The ADA contains one finding that requires clarification, as it might seem to provide
credibility for the argument that in the ADA Congress intended to add a new level of scru-
tiny enforceable in the federal courts. Congress found: "Individuals with disabilities are a
discrete and insular minority who have been faced with restrictions and limitations, sub-
jected to a history of purposeful unequal treatment, and relegated to a position of political
powerlessness in our society, based on characteristics that are beyond the control of such
individuals." 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(7). Professor Robert Burgdorf, who was closely involved
in the drafting of the ADA, writes:
This wording is an amalgam of various phrasing used by the Court to denote the
qualifications of a constitutionally "suspect" classification for equal protection pur-
poses. The finding is, in effect, a congressional endorsement that classifications
that disadvantage people with disabilities should be subject to heightened judicial
scrutiny under the Equal Protection Clause .... While not a direct statutory rever-
sal of the Court's rejection of heightened scrutiny in Cleburne, the congressional
finding in the ADA may be used by plaintiffs with disabilities to seek heightened
equal protection scrutiny in future litigation.
BURGDORF, DISABILrTY DISCRIMINATION, supra note 13, at 11.
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Other courts have also failed to analyze the ADA properly, according
to the demands of the Boerne decision. The thoughtful but erroneous dis-
sent of Judge Jerry E. Smith in Coolbaugh v. Louisiana9 deserves attention
in this respect because it attempts to demonstrate that the Court's finding
that RFRA is unconstitutional compels a finding that the ADA is also un-
constitutional. Judge Smith concluded that Congress exceeded its Section 5
power in enacting the ADA by "increas[ing] the level of judicial scrutiny
for states' actions that incidentally burden disabled persons."' s Falling into
the same trap as did the district court in Brown, Judge Smith reasoned that
Congress had essentially told the judiciary "what is, or is not, constitutional
conduct ... "96
Judge Smith began his argument by referring to the Court's statement
in Boerne that "in enacting RFRA, Congress had impermissibly attempted
to expand the scope of substantive constitutional rights under the Four-
teenth Amendment by subjecting generally applicable laws that had the
effect of burdening religion to a higher level of judicial scrutiny than what
had been deemed appropriate in [Smith]."97 This is exactly, he continued,
what the ADA does in the context of disability rights under the Equal Pro-
tection Clause. The ADA alters the Supreme Court's conclusion in
Cleburne that "state legislation having incidental burdens on the disabled
[is to be considered] constitutional if 'rationally related to a legitimate gov-
ernmental purpose"' 98 The ADA
purport[s] to establish greater rights for individuals against the
states by increasing the measure of judicial scrutiny for conflicting
state actions to a level higher than the Supreme Court has found
appropriate under the Fourteenth Amendment .... [T]he ADA,
by its very terms "remedies" more than "arbitrary" local govern-
mental actions against the disabled.99
94. 136 F.3d 430, 439 (5th Cir. 1998) (Smith, J., dissenting).
95. Id.
96. Id. at 432 n.1.
97. Id. at 440.
98. Id. (quoting Clebume, 473 U.S. at 446).
99. Id. at 440-41. The judge creatively interlineated references to the ADA into one of
Boeme's central holdings to demonstrate how closely the ADA parallels RFRA.
The stringent test--RNA [the ADA] demands of state laws reflects a lack of pro-
portionality or congruence between the means adopted and the legitimate end to
be achieved. If an objector can show a substantial burden-en hirse-e-o ,er [on
his rights under the ADA], the State must dcmo."trateta m,,go cnn-
inteestand0ho.A. thait the Inv, i. the -e~ r .itv *.. n o f uting ks~ nteCrc4
[show that it cannot reasonably accommodate him] .... Laws valid under Sith
[Cleburne] would fall under RERA [the ADA] without regard to whether they had
the ,bj .t Gf tiffi.g Gr P RiShing 40- c:--rcrc [were rationally related to a legiti-
mate governmental purpose]. We make these observations ... to illustrate the
substantive alteration of ISmith4] [Cleburne's] holding attempted by AFZA-[the
ADA]. Even assuming PERA [ADA] would be interpreted in effect to mandate
Imaged with the Permission of N.Y.U. Review of Law and Social Policy
1998]
REVIEW OF LAW & SOCIAL CHANGE
To summarize Judge Smith's argument: in enacting RFRA, Congress
attempted to provide individuals with greater protection from the inciden-
tal burdens of generally applicable laws than the Constitution provides; the
ADA similarly provides persons with disabilities greater protections than
the Constitution provides; the Court found RFRA to exceed congressional
Section 5 power; therefore the ADA also exceeds congressional Section 5
power. Unfortunately, this argument misses the point of the Boerne deci-
sion, which is that Congress may enact legislation that provides greater pro-
tection than the Constitution provides so long as the legislation satisfies the
two-pronged test from Boerne. Namely, it must be congruent-acting to
remedy or prevent violations of equal protection-and the means must be
proportional to the evil sought to be remedied or prevented.
Others challenging the constitutionality of the ADA have adopted a
different analytical strategy, focusing on the reasonable accommodation
provisions of the ADA rather than the fact that persons with disabilities
raising equal protection claims do not receive heightened judicial scrutiny.
The most prominent of the decisions adopting this approach is Nihiser v.
Ohio Environmental Agency.10 That case involved a claim that the state
employer had failed to accommodate an employee's back injury by either
restructuring his job or reassigning him to a vacant position. The court
held that Congress lacked Section 5 power to require states to reasonably
accommodate their employees' disabilities because the reasonable accom-
modation provisions of the ADA do not vindicate any right judicially rec-
ognized by the Fourteenth Amendment. 101
This reasoning had previously been adopted by the court in Pierce v.
King, 0 2 and was subsequently adopted in the dissenting opinion in Kimel
some lesser test, say one equivalent to intermediate scrutiny, the statute neverthe-
less would require searching judicial scrutiny of state law with the attendant likeli-
hood of invalidation. This is a considerable congressional invasion into the States'
traditional prerogatives and general authority to regulate for the health and wel-
fare of their citizens. Id. (interlineating changes in Boerne, 117 S. Ct at 2171).
100. 979 F. Supp. 1168 (S.D. Ohio 1997).
101. The reasoning proceeds as follows:
[T]he accommodation provisions of the ADA... demand unequal treatment for
disabled employees .... [A]n employer who treats a disabled employee the same
as a non-disabled employee may violate the ADA. By requiring reasonable ac-
commodations, the ADA shifts away from similar treatment to different treatment
of the disabled by accommodating their disabilities .... The accommodation provi-
sions may require an employer to provide special equipment or other benefits,
such as changes in working arrangements, to which non-disabled employees are
not entitled. "Nothing in the United States Constitution requires [an employer] to
accommodate [a disabled person's] condition." Welsh v. City of Tulsa, Oklahoma,
977 F.2d 1415, 1420 (10th Cir. 1992). Thus in enacting the accommodation provi-
sions, Congress created a substantive right to preferential treatment where no such
right previously existed under the Equal Protection Clause.
Nihiser, 979 F. Supp. at 1173-74.
102. 918 F. Supp. 932 (E.D.N.C. 1996). That court held "the [ADA's] operative reme-
dial provisions demand not equal treatment but special treatment tailored to the claimed
disability.... This the Fourteenth Amendment cannot authorize." Id. at 940.
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v. State of Florida Board of Regents.103 The dissent in Kimel reasoned that
"the ADA provides much greater protection for the disabled than does the
Equal Protection Clause," including "distinctions built on generaliza-
tions-even if rational. It prohibits discrimination for practically any rea-
son that does not reflect a business necessity .... It requires assessment of
each employee's abilities and reasonable accommodation to the point of
undue hardship."'1 Most recently, the Fourth Circuit has championed this
idea in Brown v. North Carolina Division of Motor Vehicles.105 There the
Court found it is beyond Congress's Section 5 power to prohibit states from
charging for handicapped parking permits. Such a proscription is an "at-
tempt to create a positive entitlement to a free handicapped parking
space.
10 6
The Kimel dissent argued that the ADA's reasonable accommodation
provisions provide rights in excess of those provided by the Constitution,
whereas the decisions in Brown, Nihiser, and Pierce argued in terms of spe-
cial rights and entitlements. They share, however, the faulty syllogism that
the Constitution promises equality; the ADA provides more than equality;
the ADA provides more than the Constitution; and, therefore, the ADA
has made a substantive alteration of constitutional rights. In other words,
the courts have repackaged the same analytical mistake made in the deci-
sions that relied upon the fact that persons with disabilities do not consti-
tute a group enjoying heightened judicial scrutiny.10 7 These courts
mistakenly reason that because Congress legislatively creates rights that
are not found in the Fourteenth Amendment, it has made an unconstitu-
tional substantive alteration to the Fourteenth Amendment. This argu-
ment misses everything that is interesting, important, and complex in
Boerne.
10 8
103. 139 F.3d 1426, 1444 (11th Cir. 1998) (Cox, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part), cert. granted sub non. Florida Dep't of Corrections v. Dickson, No. 98-829, 67
U.S.L.W. (U.S. Jan. 20, 2000).
104. Id. at 1449.
105. 166 F.3d 698 (4th Cir. 1999).
106. Id. at 707.
107. See discussion supra notes 88-90 and accompanying text.
108. Two courts have argued a variation on this theme-that Congress may not create
rights beyond those already provided by the Fourteenth Amendment unless the state action
regulated is unconstitutional most of the time. For example, the court in Brown v. North
Carolina Division of Motor Vehicles found that it was unconstitutional for the ADA to pro-
scribe charging disabled individuals a fee for parking placards because there is no "support
in the legislative record... that state surcharges for handicapped programs are motivated
by animus toward the class." 166 F.3d 698,707 (4th Cir. 1999). Congress could prohibit the
surcharges only if their use could be shown to be "pervasivelly] discriminatory." Id. Simi-
larly, the district court in Kilcullen v. New York State Departnent of Transportation, 33 F.
Supp. 2d 133 (N.D.N.Y. 1999), argued that Section 5 permits Congress to bar only "that...
type of conduct [that] is significantly likely to be unconstitutional." Id. at 145. Accordingly,
the court held that Congress lacks Section 5 authority to require state employers to provide
disabled employees a reasonable accommodation because there is no evidence that "failure
to accommodate will often have no rational relation to any legitimate purpose. [Indeed,]
the record lacks even one cited instance where a refusal to accommodate was actually found
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If the decisions finding no Section 5 power to enact the ADA lack
persuasive force, the same is true of those upholding congressional power.
They generally rely on assertion or generality in place of close examination
of: 1) Congress's aim; 2) the legislative theory of how the ADA attempts to
advance those aims; and 3) whether the means chosen to advance the
ADA's aims are narrowly tailored. 09 These tasks are taken up next.
to be unconstitutionally irrational." Id. at 146, 148. This reading of Boerne eliminates "pro-
portional" from the decision, for all practical purposes, substituting it with a simple rule:
Congress only may prohibit through Section 5 that which is unconstitutional always or usu-
ally. If the Supreme Court had intended that result, it certainly need not have so exten-
sively elaborated the congruence and proportionality test.
109. See, e.g., Clark v. California, 123 F.3d 1267 (9th Cir. 1997) (upholding, within days
following the announcement of the Boerne decision, the district court's denial of defend-
ant's motion to dismiss, finding that the ADA was a valid exercise of Congress's Section 5
power). The court in Clark reasoned: 1) the Equal Protection Clause prohibits discrimina-
tion against the disabled, citing Cleburne; 2) in the ADA Congress explicitly found that
persons with disabilities have suffered discrimination; and therefore, 3) the ADA is within
the scope of appropriate legislation under the Equal Protection Clause. Moreover, the
court found that the remedies offered by the ADA were not "so sweeping that they exceed
the harms that they are designed to redress." Id. at 1270. Accord Autio v. AFSCME, Local
31397, 140 F.3d 802, 805 (8th Cir. 1998), vacated, reh'g en banc granted, affd by an equally
divided court, 157 F.3d 1141 (1998); Kimel v. State of Florida Bd. of Regents, 139 F.3d 1426,
1433 (11th Cir. 1998); Crawford v. Indiana Dep't of Corrections, 115 F.3d 481, 487 (7th Cir.
1997) (decided three weeks prior to the announcement of the Boerne decision).
But see Kimel, 139 F.3d at 1442 (Hatchett, C.J., concurring) (finding that "[lit is for
Congress in the first instance to 'determin[e] whether and what legislation is needed to
secure the guarantees of the Fourteenth Amendment' and its conclusions are entitled to
much deference" (quoting Boerne, 521 U.S. at 526). Accord Coolbaugh v. Louisiana, 136
F.3d 430, 436 (5th Cir. 1998). True enough, but Boerne insists that there be a basis for
concluding that Congress's true aim was an evil prohibited by the Fourteenth Amendment,
and also a basis for concluding that the means used were proportional to that evil.
Although some judicial opinions have acknowledged Boerne's congruence and propor-
tionality requirement, only a few have put it into practice. For example, Chief Justice
Hatchett's concurring opinion in Kimel tried to base the constitutionality of the ADA on the
fact that it is different from RFRA. He pointed out that RFRA, unlike the ADA, "prohib-
ited official actions of almost every description and regardless of subject matter." See Ki-
mel, 139 F.3d at 1443 (Hatchett, C.J., concurring) (quoting Boerne, 521 U.S. at 532). Also,
unlike the ADA, RFRA set a "standard of review that was 'the most demanding test known
to constitutional law."' Kimel, 139 F.3d at 1443 (quoting Boerne, 521 U.S. 534). Therefore,
the ADA "is [not] so out of proportion to a supposed remedial or preventive object that it
cannot be understood as responsive to, or designed to prevent, unconstitutional behavior."
Kimel, 139 F.3d at 1443 (quoting Boerne, 521 U.S. at 532).
Finally, Chief Justice Hatchett argued that in contrast to RFRA, in the ADA, "Congress
included no language attempting to offset the balance of powers and usurp the Court's func-
tion of establishing a standard of review by establishing a standard different from the one
previously established by the Supreme Court." Id. (quoting Coolbaugh, 136 F.3d at 438).
Just as RFRA provides relief from state action that exceeds constitutional protections, as
interpreted by the Court in Smith, so also the ADA provides greater relief than the constitu-
tion provides, as interpreted in Cleburne. See discussion infra notes 154-168 and accompa-
nying text.
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Boerne Revisited: A More Nuanced Inquiry
A plausible explanation for the superficial analysis of Boerne is that
the decision rests on several perplexing distinctions. As Cole has observed,
it may have been the "understatement of the term" when the Court stated
that it would be difficult to distinguish measures that remedy or prevent
unconstitutional actions from measures that make a substantive change in
the governing law.110 Several judges have recognized this problem. " Co-
herence resides in the proper application of the congruence and propor-
tionality test, which in turn requires that a reviewing court both inquire
into the legislative process used to enact Section 5 legislation such as the
ADA and analyze each statute's specific provisions.
The Boerne Court's perceived malfunction in the legislative process that
produced RFRA
The dilemma in Boerne was that the Respondents represented RFRA
as merely a congressional effort to check the states' habit of targeting reli-
gious beliefs and practices." 2 The Court could not simply reject this repre-
sentation, yet RFRA appeared to redefine constitutional rights. To resolve
this apparent inconsistency, the Court deployed a technique, used in similar
contexts, of deferring to the majoritarian political process, except when
110. Cole, supra note 18, at 46. In a similar vein, Gardbaum has noted that since "valid
exercises of Section 5 power may, result in the trumping of otherwise constitutional state
laws or the preemption of constitutionally granted state authority[] .... [Congress can]
expand[ ] federal legislative rights against the states beyond those contained in Section 1 [of
the Fourteenth Amendment]" notwithstanding the Court's insistence that -Congress does
not have power to enact legislation that expands the rights contained in Section 1 .... "
Gardbaum, supra note 51, at 675 & n.44.
111. Judge Flaum put it well in Varner v. Illinois State University, 150 F.3d 706 (7th Cir.
1998), vacated and remanded on other grounds, No. 98-1117, 67 U.S.L.V. 3469 (U.S. Jan. 18,
2000), a case challenging Congress's Section 5 power to enact the Equal Pay Act of 1963
(EPA). See discussion infra note 339 and accompanying text. There, the court explained,
the University had argued that:
the Equal Pay Act, by not requiring proof of discriminatory intent, necessarily
proscribes some state action that is constitutional. Because of this feature, the
University argues that the Equal Pay Act constitutes "substantive" legislation.
This contention is not -without some appeal [citing to the split decision in the Kimel
case]. The Supreme Court's recognition that Congress's "remedial" power -ex-
tends only to enforcing the provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment" is difficult
to reconcile with the Court's statement that remedial legislation may be appropri-
ate "even if in the process it prohibits conduct which is not itself unconstitutional"
(citing Boeme). The Supreme Court recognized this difficulty, stating that "the
line between measures that remedy or prevent unconstitutional actions and meas-
ures that make a substantive change in the governing law is not easy to discern."
Nonetheless, "the distinction exists and must be observed."
Id. at 716 (citations omitted).
112. Boerne, 521 U.S. at 529. "Respondent contends that RFRA is a proper exercise
of Congress's remedial or preventive power. The Act, it is said, is a reasonable means of
protecting the free exercise of religion as defined by Smith. It prevents and remedies laws
which are enacted with the unconstitutional object of targeting religious beliefs and prac-
tices." Id.
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there is a persuasive reason for approaching legislation skeptically. 113 That
persuasive reason in Boerne was the inadequacy of the legislative process
that produced RFRA.
In Cleburne, the Court explained that although "the Constitution
presumes that even improvident decisions will eventually be rectified by
the democratic processes," trust in the majoritarian political process some-
times attenuates." 4 This occurs when the Court perceives that prejudice,
antipathy or other prejudicial factors motivate legislation. In such cases,
the Court concludes that improvident legislation is "unlikely soon to be
rectified by legislative means.""' 5 It is then that judicial intervention is
most justified. 116 As I show next, the Court in Boerne perceived a malfunc-
tion in the legislative process that would ordinarily protect the states from
excessive federal regulation. For the Court, this justified greater judicial
scrutiny of Congress's judgment that RFRA was needed to prevent or rem-
edy unconstitutional state action.
For almost a decade, the Court checked congressional overreaching
through the doctrine developed in National League of Cities v. Usery,117
until that case was overruled as unworkable in Garcia v. San Antonio Met-
ropolitan Transit Authority" 8 by a 5-4 vote. The states, the Court reasoned,
could adequately rely on the "safeguards inherent in the structure of the
federal system." 1 9 But some justices have expressed doubt in the efficacy
113. See discussion infra notes 115-16 and accompanying text.
114. 473 U.S. at 440.
115. Id. In the case of suspect legislative classifications, that loss of confidence in the
efficacy of the democratic process's self-righting forces arises from the reality that classifica-
tions by race, alienage, or national origin, rely on distinguishing "factors [that] are so seldom
relevant to the achievement of any legitimate state interest that laws grounded in such con-
siderations are deemed to reflect prejudice and antipathy-a view that those in the bur-
dened class are not as worthy or deserving as others." Id. The Court expressed the same
idea in Massachusetts Board of Retirement v. Murgia, reasoning that skepticism arises when
there is reason to believe that a group burdened by legislation is in need of "'extraordinary
protection from the majoritarian political process."' 427 U.S. 307, 313 (1976) (quoting San
Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 28 (1973)).
116. John Hart Ely has compressed this description by the Court of its judicial process
into the phrase, "Democracy and Distrust." He argues that the foundations of heightened
judicial scrutiny in individual rights cases are "akin to what might be called an 'antitrust' as
opposed to a 'regulatory' orientation to economic affairs-rather than dictate substantive
results [the Court] interferes only when the 'market[,]' in our case the political market, is
systematically malfunctioning." JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 102-03
(1980). See also Fallon supra note 18, at 88-90 & n.91 (citing Ely's antitrust analogy and
concluding that Ely's thesis is a "plausible explanation for the prominence of suspect-con-
tent tests in Equal Protection... law.").
117. 426 U.S. 833, 851 (1976) (holding Congress's commerce power to enact regulatory
legislation applicable to the states may not be employed to interfere with performance by
states of traditional governmental functions integral to their sovereignty, such as
employment).
118. 469 U.S. 528 (1985).
119. Id. at 552. Accord South Carolina v. Baker, 485 U.S. 505, 512 (1988) (noting that
"[s]tates must find their protection from congressional regulation through the national polit-
ical process, not through judicially defined spheres of unregulable state activity."). In this
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of the national political process to protect states from congressional ag-
grandizement. Twenty years before the Court's decision in Garcia, Justice
Harlan's dissent in Morgan1' warned against undue reliance on the struc-
tural protections inherent in the federal system. He argued that the Court
should defer to Congress's legislative judgments only when the deliberative
processes producing those judgments are adequate. Ideally, before enact-
hag new legislation, Congress should assess and weigh the competing legiti-
mate state and federal interests thoroughly. In the absence of such analysis
Congress cannot expect deference.' 2 '
The Court's confidence in the "safeguards inherent in the structure of
the federal system" appears to have waned since Garcia, supplanted by a
sense of distrust more akin to Justice Harlan's admonition. For example,
the Court has resurrected the League of Cities limits on Congress's regulat-
ing states as states. 22 It also has eliminated all sources of congressional
regard, the Court cited Herbert Weschler's The Political Safeguards of Federalism: The Role
of the States in the Composition and Selection of the National Government, 54 COLUM. L.
REv. 543 (1954). The Court argued, through reference to Weschler's work, that Congress is
a representative body whose work is controlled by lawmakers from each state, whose re-
elections depend on local centers of power and authority. Accordingly, this political reality
causes sober reflection on the respective federal-state interests and checks unwarranted
congressional aggrandizement of its own authority. See also JESSE CHOPER, JUDICIAL RE-
VIEw AND THE NATIONAL POLrrICAL PROCESS: A FUNCTIONAL RECO'SIDERATION OF THE
ROLE OF THE SUPREMN COURT (1980).
McConnell has more recently added that the "structural safeguard[s] against congres-
sional overreaching" are especially substantial with respect to Section 5 legislation interpret-
ing the Bill of Rights more protectively than do the courts:
Unlike enactments under the Commerce Clause or most other sources of congres-
sional power, interpretations of the Bill of Rights under Section Five limit the pow-
ers of Congress and the federal government to precisely the same extent that they
limit the power of the states .... [Tihe federal government will bear no less cost
and inconvenience than the states .... This makes it exceedingly unlikely that
Congress will act from anything other than a genuine interest in enforcement of
constitutional freedoms.
McConnell, supra note 42, at 188. See also Cole, supra note 18, at 58 (taking the position
that the Court is a greater threat to state autonomy than Congress because "[t]he Court,
unlike Congress, is not structurally suited to consider state interests" and there exists no
institutional reason to expect courts to protect state prerogatives). Cole has concluded that
although Wechsler has been challenged, citing Lewis B. Kaden, Politics, Money, and State
Sovereignty: The Judicial Role, 79 COLUM. L. REv. 847 (1979), "it is certainly fair to say that
Congress is, as an institutional matter, more likely to be sensitive to states' interests than is
the Court." Cole, supra note 18, at 58.
120. See Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 669 (1966) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (finding -we have
here not a matter of giving deference to a congressional estimate, based on its determina-
tion of legislative facts, bearing upon the validity vel non of a statute, but rather what can at
most be called a legislative announcement that Congress believes a state law to entail an
unconstitutional deprivation of equal protection.").
121. Justice Harlan's dissent in Morgan argues that "legislative facts" are due respect
when they are built on "empirical foundations," and are the product of a legislative process
punctuated by serious and earnest reflection and consideration of the evidence. By con-
trast, unsupported ipse dixit is unworthy of deference. Id. at 668, 671.
122. See Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997) (holding unconstitutional the
Brady Act amendment to the Gun Control Act of 1968 for temporarily obligating state law
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abrogation authority from the Constitution-other than Section 5.123 In
United States v. Lopez, moreover, the Court enforced limits on Congress's
power under the Commerce Clause to protect the regulatory prerogatives
of state and local governments, noting Congress had failed to make any
findings that the presence of handguns near schools has an adverse effect
on interstate commerce.
124
In his concurring opinion in Lopez, Justice Kennedy, the author of the
Boerne opinion, explicitly stated that malfunctions in the legislative process
call for heightened judicial scrutiny of legislation affecting the states' au-
tonomy to govern.125 He observed that federalism presents the Court with
the most difficult challenges among all the structural relationships in the
Constitution.1 26 On the one hand, all members of Congress are sworn to
uphold the "constitutional design." But, on the other hand, there exists no
"structural mechanism to require [government] officials to undertake this
principled task, and the momentary political convenience often attendant
upon their failure to do so, argue[s] against a complete renunciation of the
judicial role."' 27 In short, substantial evidence suggests that a majority of
the Court has lost confidence in Congress's capacity to restrain itself when
presented with the option to include or exclude the states when enacting
regulatory legislation.1
21
The Court's reasoning in Boerne evidences the Court's lack of confi-
dence in Congress's restraint. In Boerne, the Court juxtaposed the com-
mendable legislative process that produced the voting rights statutes with
the inadequate legislative process that produced RFRA. The federal vot-
ing rights statutes became the subject of considerable litigation from the
1966 decision in Morgan until the 1980 decision in City of Rome.12 9 In
enacting those statutes, Congress traced the historic experience of racial
enforcement officials to execute federal law); New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144
(1992) (holding unconstitutional under the Tenth Amendment a provision in the federally-
enacted Low-Level Radioactive Waste Policy Amendments Act of 1985 obligating states to
either accept ownership of waste or regulate according to congressionally-enacted
standards).
123. See discussion supra notes 36-38 and accompanying text.
124. 514 U.S. 549, 562-63 & n.14 (1995).
125. Id. at 568-83 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
126. Id. at 575 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
127. Id. at 578 (Kennedy, J., concurring). See also Vicki C. Jackson, Seminole Tribe,
The Eleventh Amendment, and the Potential Evisceration of Ex parte Young, 72 N.Y.U.L.
REv. 495, 500 n.22 (1997) (suggesting recent federalism cases "may be informed by a mis-
trust of the institutional capacity for self restraint of the political branches (and of the lower
federal courts).").
128. In a somewhat caustic response to the dissent's argument in College Savings Bank
11 that federalism requires an acknowledgment of Congress's need for flexibility-to some-
times include and sometimes exclude the states in federal regulation of the economy-Jus-
tice Scalia answered, "[1]egislative flexibility on the part of Congress will be the touchstone
of federalism when the capacity to support combustion becomes the acid test of a fire extin-
guisher." College Savings Bank II, 119 S. Ct. at 2223.
129. See generally Boerne, 521 U.S. at 518, 524-27, 532-33.
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discrimination in voting and accumulated evidence that states used facially-
neutral voting procedures to perpetuate racial discrimination.'30 The legis-
lative process in RFRA, by comparison, failed to establish any contempo-
rary evidence of state-sponsored targeting of religious practices in
American society.' 3' Without a rational basis upon which to hold that
Congress's purpose in enacting RFRA was in fact to challenge state-spon-
sored attacks on religious freedom-the evil that Smith found the Free Ex-
ercise Clause addresses-the Court could not uphold RFRA.
Thus the congruence prong of the Boerne "congruence and propor-
tionality" test assays the legislative record to ascertain whether it can sup-
port the representation that Congress proscribed constitutional behavior as
a means to remedy or prevent unconstitutional behavior. As the Court
explained in Boerne, federal laws prohibiting constitutional state action
"are sometimes appropriate remedial measures, [but] there must be con-
gruence between the means used and the ends to be achieved. The appro-
priateness of remedial measures must be considered in light of the evil
presented."' 32 In Boerne, the claim that Congress's concern was the eradi-
cation of religious bigotry was implausible on the record before the Court.
The opinion left as the only rational conclusion that "Congress's concern
was with the incidental burdens imposed, not [, as represented,] the object
or purpose of the [state] legislation [RFRA actually made unlawful]." 3 -
130. See id. at 525. The Boerne majority stated that "'[t]he constitutional propriety of
[legislation adopted under the Enforcement Clause] must be judged with reference to the
historical experience... it reflects."' (quoting South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301,
308 (1966) (omissions in original)). The majority then approvingly summarized each of its
voting rights cases. As to each, the Court emphasized that the legislative record Congress
had developed and relied on demonstrated an "historic[ ] experience" revealing racial dis-
crimination in voting that was real and substantial. See id. at 525-27.
131. To the contrary, the Court found that "[t]he history of [religious] persecution in
this country detailed in the hearings mentions no episodes occurring in the past 40 years."
Id at 530. "In contrast to the record which confronted Congress and the judiciary in the
voting rights cases, RFRA's legislative record lacks examples of modem instances of gener-
ally applicable laws passed because of religious bigotry." Id.
The legislative record did contain what the Court characterized as -anecdotal evi-
dence" of legislation burdening religious practice. However, none of this evidence rose to
the level of demonstrating "animus or hostility to the burdened religious practices or...
some widespread pattern of religious discrimination in this country." Id.
One appraisal of the Boerne decision commented that RFRA effected a "wholesale
alteration in free exercise jurisprudence... erected on the flimsiest of foundations: a hand-
ful of anecdotes and dated stories of religious persecution." Hamilton, supra note 83, at
712-13. See also Robert F. Drinan, S.J., Reflections on the Demise of the Religious Freedom
Restoration Act, 86 GEO. LJ. 101, 104 (1997) (reflecting that "[i]n retrospect, it may be that
the lack of opposition to RFRA as it went through Congress turned out to be a weakness.
Some basic premises of RFRA were not subjected to the ordinary adversary system that
accompanies the enactment of almost any law in Congress. The overwhelming support of a
phalanx of religious and civil liberties groups almost drowned out any opposition that might
have and probably should have emerged.").
132. Boere, 521 U.S. at 530.
133. Id. One must also note the poignancy in the Court's characterization of the legisla-
tive process used to enact RFRA as one contesting the Court's understanding of the scope
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The Court hastened to add that the formal legislative record is not
determinative on the question of congressional intent; the Court simply re-
quired some basis in evidence to justify giving due regard to the decisions
of Congress. 3 That basis need not always be formal legislative findings.
When, as in Boerne, the record insufficiently supports representations
made to the Court, other factors may warrant giving Congress's conclu-
sions "due regard.' 35 With respect to RFRA, however, the evidence did
not persuade the Court that Congress's aim was preventing or deterring
religious bigotry.
The Court's subsequent decision in College Savings Bank 1136 illus-
trates the requirement that something in the legislative process must sup-
port representations made to the Court. In that case, the Court invalidated
Congress's attempted abrogation of state sovereign immunity from suit in
federal court in suits alleging patent infringement. Specifically, the Court
rejected the argument that Congress possessed Section 5 authority to pro-
hibit states' infringement of patents as a means of preventing or remedying
states' deprivation of property without due process of law. The Court rea-
soned that deprivation occurs only when infringement is intentional and a
deprivation violates due process requirements only when state laws provide
no remedy or an inadequate remedy.137 The patent laws are not limited to
intentional infringements nor do they apply only when state law provides
an inadequate remedy. Moreover, the legislative history "provides little
support for the proposition that Congress sought to remedy a Fourteenth
Amendment violation in enacting the Patent Remedy Act. ' 138 As the
Court observed, "Congress... barely considered the availability of state
remedies for patent infringement [and] identified no pattern of patent in-
fringement by the states let alone a pattern of constitutional violations.' 1 39
of the Free Exercise Clause, not one calculated to produce legislation to deter or prevent
constitutional violations as defined in Smith. Id. at 515 (concluding that "points of constitu-
tional interpretation were debated by Members of Congress in hearings and floor debates.
Many criticized the Court's reasoning [in Smith], and this disagreement resulted in the pas-
sage of RFRA.").
134. "This lack of support in the legislative record ... is not RFRA's most serious
shortcoming. Judicial deference, in most cases, is based not on the state of the legislative
record Congress compiles but 'on the due regard for the decision of the body constitution-
ally appointed to decide.' As a general matter, it is for Congress to determine the method by
which it will reach its decision." Id. at 531-32 (internal citations omitted). Cf. Fullilove v.
Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 503 (1980) (Powell, J., concurring) (noting that "forc[ing] Congress
to make specific factual findings with respect to each legislative action... would mark an
unprecedented imposition of adjudicatory procedures upon a coordinate branch of
Government.").
135. See, e.g., Boerne, 521 U.S. at 532 (allowing that "[p]reventative measures ... may
be appropriate when there is reason to believe that many of the laws affected by the con-
gressional enactment have a significant likelihood of being unconstitutional.").
136. 119 S. Ct. 2199 (1999).
137. Id. at 2208, 2209.
138. Id. at 2207, 2209.
139. Id.
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The Court thus rejected the representation that the aim of the challenged
statute was to protect patent holders from deprivations of property without
due process of law. Instead, the Court concluded that "[t]he statute's ap-
parent and more basic aims were to provide a uniform remedy for patent
infringement and to place States on the same footing as private parties
under [the patent law] regime."'"
In sum, congruence plumbs the legislative process for evidence that a
statute's purpose is to prevent or remedy constitutional violations. This
serves a separation of powers function-to verify that Congress is not at-
tempting to expand the substantive scope of the Fourteenth Amendment.
It also serves a federalism function-to ensure that a sufficiently significant
constitutional infringement exists to compel Congress's abridgement of
state governing autonomy through Section 5 legislation. 141
The Boerne Court's perception of RFRA as exacting an unacceptably high
social cost
The other facet of RFRA that captured the Court's attention was its
high cost-to-benefit ratio. The Court analyzed this facet using the propor-
tionality prong of the congruence and proportionality test, which addresses
the specific provisions of each piece of Section 5 legislation.
In Boerne, the Court determined that RFRA's aggregate costs sub-
stantially outweighed its benefits, rendering it not proportional. According
to the Court, RFRA threatened an "intrusion at every level of government
displacing laws and prohibiting official actions of almost every description
and regardless of subject matter,"' 42 and created "universal coverage
143
by providing a federal claim for "any individual who alleges a substantial
140. Id. at 2211.
141. See Hamilton, supra note 83, at 713 (arguing that "Congress bears a responsibility
to show to a reasonable degree that its solution is in fact aimed at an existing problem");
Gardbaum, supra note 51, at 686 (asserting that
the [Boerne] majority drew attention to the issue of the sufficiency of the congres-
sional record and findings .... [1it seems desirable from both a constitutional and
a public policy perspective that the principle of federalism-no less than that of
deliberative democracy-should entitle the states to serious and genuine congres-
sional consideration before their primary authority is abolished.).
See also Reynolds v. Alabama Dep't of Transp., 4 F. Supp. 2d 1092, 1108 (M.D. Ala. 1998)
(finding that
[t]he teaching of Boerne is that there must be a substantial constitutional hook:
The principal object of the legislation must be to address rights that are judicially
recognized; Congress can prohibit conduct that is not unconstitutional, but such
legislation must be nothing more than incidental to a primary effort of prohibiting
conduct that is unconstitutional .... IT]he prohibited constitutional conduct must
be, at most, always a bridesmaid and never the bride; the bride must always be the
unconstitutional conduct.).
142. Boerne, 521 U.S. at 532.
143. Id. at 516.
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burden on his or her free exercise of religion."' 144 The Court also found
that because of "the stringent test RFRA demands of state laws," it would
be highly unlikely that state and local governments sued under RFRA
could prevail. 45 The Court concluded: "The substantial costs RFRA ex-
acts, both in practical terms of imposing a heavy litigation burden on the
States and in terms of curtailing their traditional general regulatory power,
far exceed any pattern or practice of unconstitutional conduct under the
Free Exercise Clause .... 146
RFRA's costs also included a challenge to the Court's vision of reli-
gious freedom. The Court had abandoned the previously-controlling Sher-
bert "balancing test"'147 in favor of Smith's intent test 148 because of the
"anomaly" that the Sherbert rule permits one to disobey a law of general
application that substantially burdens one's religious practice if the govern-
ment is unable to demonstrate a compelling interest.14 9 In addition, the
pre-Smith regime had required the judiciary to execute the unappealing,
144. Id. at 532. Additionally, RFRA lacked a "termination date or termination mecha-
nism." Id. However,
[t]his is not to say, of course, that [Section] 5 legislation requires termination limits,
dates, geographic restrictions, or egregious predicates. Where, however, a con-
gressional enactment pervasively prohibits constitutional state action in an effort
to remedy or to prevent unconstitutional state action, limitations of this kind tend
to ensure Congress's means are proportionate to ends legitimate under [Section] 5.
Id. at 533.
145. See id. at 533-34 (arguing that given "[t]he stringent test RFRA demands of state
laws[,]... 'many laws will not meet the test .... ' Even assuming RFRA would be inter-
preted in effect to mandate some lesser test,... the statute nevertheless would require
searching judicial scrutiny of state law with the attendant likelihood of invalidation.").
146. Id. at 534. Accordingly, the Court determined that RFRA "reflects a lack of pro-
portionality or congruence between the means adopted and the legitimate ends to be
achieved." Id. at 533. One can see from the Court's proportionality discussion in Boerne
that proportionality, like congruence, serves a federalism function (guarding against costs
that far exceed benefits) as well as a separation of powers function (again testing Congress's
real aim in enacting Section 5 litigation). See id. at 532 (finding "RFRA is so out of propor-
tion to a supposed remedial or preventive object that it cannot be understood as responsive
to, or designed to prevent, unconstitutional behavior. It appears, instead, to attempt a sub-
stantive change in constitutional protections." (emphasis added)).
147. Id. at 513 (characterizing the test for determining violations of the Free Exercise
Clause set out in Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963)). For an explanation of the Sher-
bert test see supra, note 45.
148. See Boerne, 521 U.S. at 513. Explaining the change, Justice Kennedy wrote:
The application of the Sherbert [effects] test, the Smith decision explained, would
have produced an anomaly in the law, a constitutional right to ignore neutral laws
of general applicability. The anomaly would have been accentuated, the Court
reasoned, by the difficulty of determining whether a particular practice was central
to an individual's religion .... [It "is not within the judicial ken to question the
centrality of particular beliefs or practices to a faith, or the validity of particular
litigants' interpretations of those creeds."
(citing Employment Div., Dep't of Human Resources of Or. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 887
(1990)).
149. Such a rule grants religious adherents, but not others, the right to "ignore neutral
laws of general applicability." Id.
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and perhaps unworkable, task of inquiring into "whether a particular prac-
tice was central to an individual's religion."' a 0 Smith had attempted to
avoid these twin costs: RFRA reintroduced and exacerbated them,151 to
the Court's dismay.152
150. Id. at 513. See Smith, 494 U.S. at 889 n.5 & 890 (intimating the undesirability of
the task of determining the impact of laws on religious practice necessitated by the Sherbert
effects test).
151. The Court observed that RFRA "'restore[s] the compelling interest test as set
forth in [Sherbert]' [but also requires that] the 'government... demonstrate the burden ...
is the least restrictive means of furthering that compelling governmental interest.'" Boerne,
521 U.S. 515-16 (quoting RFRA's stated purpose and a provision from RFRA, 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000bb-1). This change would constrict states' freedom to govern much more dramati-
cally than during the Sherbert era when "the only instances where a neutral, generally appli-
cable law had failed to pass constitutional muster . . . were cases in which other
constitutional provisions were at stake." I& at 513-14. See, e.g., Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406
U.S. 205 (1972) (holding invalid compulsory school attendance law as applied to Amish
parents who refused on religious grounds to send their children to school based on free
exercise of religion, but also the right of parents to control their children's education).
Other laws dealing with unemployment compensation that burdened religious practice
were invalidated, the Court said, because they were not neutral to religion-they provided
"a system of individual exemptions" but not religious exemptions without a compelling rea-
son. See Boerne, 521 U.S. at 514 (quoting Smith, 494 U.S. at 884). Accord Eisgruber &
Sager, supra note 66, at 101 (finding "[t]he marked collapsibility of the Sherbert 'rule' in the
Supreme Court was the norm in other courts as well. The pattern was simple and constant:
Free Exercise claimants seeking exemptions from generally applicable laws virtually never
prevailed. In other constitutional contexts, the compelling state interest test was 'strict in
theory and fatal in fact'; in Free Exercise jurisprudence, it was strict in theory and feeble in
fact....").
152. With respect to questions of religious belief, the majority suggested that resolution
of such questions may lack judicially cognizable standards. "What principle of law or logic
[the Court asked] can be brought to bear to contradict a believer's assertion that a particular
act is central to his personal faith?" Boerne, 521 U.S. at 534 (quoting Smith, 494 U.S. at 887)
(internal quotation marks omitted). The Court previously had concluded in Smith that
questions of centrality and sincerity of religious belief were "not within the judicial ken."
Smith, 494 U.S. at 887. Congress might "announce" as it did in RFRA, that "the compelling
interest test... is a workable test for striking sensible balances between religious liberty and
competing prior governmental interests" (Boerne, 521 U.S. at 515), but as a co-equal branch
charged with the responsibility of adjudicating alleged violations of RFRA, the Court could
legitimately reject this legislative determination. After all, the federal judiciary, not Con-
gress, would have to administer RFRA's test and survive any resulting crossfire. See also
Lupu, supra note 65, at 807-08 (noting that Boeme "eliminates the costs of defending
RFRA claims against state and local government, and the antireligious resentment and
skepticism that such claims may have fueled .... Over time, I expect that RFRA's disap-
pearance will leave religious liberty in no worse, and perhaps better, condition than RFRA
would have produced.")
With respect to RFRA reintroducing a "constitutionally required religious exemption[]
from civic obligations of almost every conceivable kind," Boerne, 521 U.S. at 534, the Court
seems to view this as an "anomaly" because it represents an unacceptable vision of religious
liberty. Eisgruber and Sager argue that "even if [RFRA] does not rise to the level of an
Establishment Clause violation, it works at cross-purposes with the Court's understanding
of religious liberty and other elements of constitutional justice." Eisgruber & Sager, supra
note 66, at 97. RFRA, they argue, represents a view that "religious commitments [should]
receive better treatment than other, comparably serious commitments." Id. at 104. The
other view argued is that used by the Court in Smith and Boerne- that "the only sound
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In conclusion, a careful appraisal of Boerne reveals more nuance than
courts currently recognize but less intrusion into Congress's legislative pre-
rogatives than some commentators have suggested.1 53 Boerne did not ad-
vance an overarching right for the federal judiciary to determine
independently the necessity or wisdom of Section 5 legislation. Boerne in-
sists on: 1) congruence: some basis in legislative process to support the
claim that the aim of Section 5 legislation is, as represented, preventing or
remedying unconstitutional behavior; and 2) proportionality: a convincing
basis for concluding that the benefits of the legislation are not so out of
proportion to the costs as to make incredulous the claim that Congress's
purpose was to remedy and prevent unconstitutional behavior. In short,
the Court in Boerne, held that it will defer to Congress's legislative judg-
ments when they are a product of legislative processes rooted in empirical
analysis rather than assertion, and when the resulting legislation evidences
sensitivity to the federalism mandate that states' autonomy not be impaired
unnecessarily. As the following discussion demonstrates, Congress fully
met these twin prerequisites when enacting the ADA.
The Aim of the ADA Was to Prevent or Remedy Unconstitutional
Disability-Based Discrimination
To say that Congress's aim in enacting the ADA was to remedy or
prevent unconstitutional disability-based discrimination presupposes con-
sensus regarding constitutional limits. The starting point is Cleburne, in
which the Court held: "The general rule is that legislation is presumed to
be valid and will be sustained if the classification drawn by the statute is
conception of religious liberty is founded upon protecting religious exercise against persecu-
tion, discrimination, insensitivity, or hostility." Id. See also Jed Rubenfeld, Antidisestablish-
mentarianism: Why RFRA Really Was Unconstitutional, 95 MIcH. L. REv. 2347,2350 (1997)
(finding
RFRA was the first-ever direct effort by Congress to proscribe a regulatory frame-
work governing church-state relations for the country. It marked a massive, un-
precedented shift in the triangular relation among the federal government, the
state governments, and religion .... RFRA was a congressional effort to dictate
the terms of religious neutrality to which state law must conform .... RFRA
would therefore have been unconstitutional even if it had fallen within Congress's
Section 5 powers .... ).
153. Asserting the judiciary's right and duty to examine the efficacy of legislative pro-
cess and the scope of the resulting legislation is very different from saying that the Boerne
majority declared an a priori right to "ma[ke] independent judgments regarding the risk and
frequency of [constitutional violations], the fit between the constitutional evil and the statu-
tory remedy, and the degree of impact on traditional state functions." McConnell, supra
note 42, at 166 (citations omitted). See also Laycock, supra note 42, at 746 (clarifying that
"[the proportionality part of [the Boerne] standard seems to require an empirical judgment:
Congressional enforcement legislation is valid only if violations of the Constitution, as inter-
preted by the Court, appear in a sufficiently large proportion of all cases presenting viola-
tions of the statute."); id. at 770 (asserting "a test of congruence and proportionality [invites
outcomes] based on the Court's view of whether the statute was necessary.... For the first
time since 1937, the Court is second-guessing Congress on questions of degree in the inter-
pretation of delegated powers.").
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rationally related to a legitimate state interest."'" The ends must be "legit-
imate"-not "rooted in considerations that the Constitution will not toler-
ate."155 It is clear that one legislative end the Constitution will not tolerate
is malice or animus, such as "'a bare... desire to harm a politically unpop-
ular group."1
56
The Constitution prohibits any state action irrationally based on preju-
dice, whether conscious or not. 15 7 In this regard, suspect and nonsuspect
classifications differ not in what the Constitution will tolerate, but rather in
methods of proof.'58 The facts in Cleburne are illustrative. There, the
Court found the denial of a special use permit to a residential home for the
mentally retarded unconstitutional because it rested on "an irrational prej-
udice against the mentally retarded. ' 159 That conclusion was not based on
any finding of conscious malice against persons with disabilities by govern-
mental officials.' 6 As the Court explained, "mere negative attitudes, or
fear, unsubstantiated by factors which are properly cognizable... are not
permissible bases for treating [persons with disabilities] differently."
1 61
The Equal Protection Clause prohibits legislative classifications harming
the disabled that are based on "vague, undifferentiated fears." 6
154. Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 440.
155. Id. at 446.
156. Id. at 447 (citing United States Dep't of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 534
(1973)). Accord Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996).
157. See Michael Selmi, Proving Intentional Discrimination: The Reality of Supreme
Court Rhetoric, 86 GEo. L. J. 279, 288 (1997) (concluding that "definitional attempts to
equate intent with animus, malice, or a conscious awareness ... represent a misunderstand-
ing of how the Court has defined intent.").
158. As the Court explained in Cleburne, the laws regarding suspect classifications are
"deemed" to "reflect prejudice and antipathy-a view that those in the burdened class are
not as worthy or deserving as others." Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 440. With nonsuspect classifica-
tions, proof of such prejudice and antipathy, conscious or unconscious, is required.
159. Id. at 450.
160. In Cleburne, the city "was concerned with the negative attitude of the majority of
property owners located within [close proximity] to the [residential home] as well as the
fears of elderly residents of the neighborhood." Id. The city also said its concern over po-
tential conflict between residents of the home and others in the surrounding community
justified rejecting the special use permit. These proffered explanations were rejected.
161. Id. at 448. "'Private biases may be outside the reach of the law, but the law
cannot, directly or indirectly, give them effect."' Id. (quoting Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S.
429, 433 (1984)).
162. Id. at 449. In Cleburne, the city also attempted to justify refusing the special use
permit because the residential facility was situated on a 500-year flood plain and because of
population density concerns. These also were rejected as pretextual because others simi-
larly situated were not required to obtain a special use permit. This left the earlier explana-
tion of the surrounding community's irrational prejudice as the surviving explanation. Id. at
449-50. In Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996), the Court similarly was unconcerned
whether the animus that underlay the state constitutional provision denying homosexuals
equal access to government processes was conscious or not. As the Court explained, "its
sheer breadth is so discontinuous with the reasons offered for it that the amendment seems
inexplicable by anything but animus toward the class it affects; it lacks a rational relation-
ship to legitimate state interests." Id. at 632.
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As Robert Burgdorf correctly stated, "[tlhe Supreme Court has struck
down governmental restrictions upon persons with mental retardation
under the equal protection clause on the ground that these restrictions
were based upon 'negative attitudes,' 'fear,' and 'irrational prejudice.'-
163
There is no rational basis to a decision based on erroneous beliefs: 1) that
are the product of "negative attitudes, or fear, unsubstantiated by factors
which are properly cognizable,"'" 2) when the decision directly or indi-
rectly gives effect to "private biases, '  or 3) when the state harms the
disabled because of "vague, undifferentiated fears."'16 6 The Constitution
certainly permits the government to take disability into consideration, un-
like race, which is almost never a relevant consideration. If, however, the
disabled individual can perform a job, a state may not offer its ignorance of
the facts as a defense when the mistake is based on myths, fears, or stereo-
types. One cannot find a rational basis in an incorrect belief based on an
irrational foundation.167 Cleburne has greatly contributed to the constitu-
tional principles that inform disability-based discrimination by denying the
government the right to rely on honestly held but mistaken myths, fears,
and stereotypes about persons with disabilities.
68
Many of the ADA's employment provisions simply ban unconstitu-
tional conduct. The ADA prohibits discrimination "against a qualified in-
dividual with a disability because of the disability."' 69 The Act then
describes the prohibited behavior in seven subsequent paragraphs.1 70
Three of these seven definitions of discrimination and a subpart of another
prohibit unconstitutional behavior.
163. Burgdorf, Analysis and Implications, supra note 8, at 518. Professor Karlan's ob-
servation also is accurate that "[a] disabled individual who could perform the job in its
present form, but whom the employer refuses to hire because of a mistaken belief that she
cannot perform the requisite tasks or out of revulsion against the worker's disability (such
as a disfiguring cosmetic condition), is simply a victim of traditional [unconstitutional] dis-
crimination." Pamela S. Karlan, Disabilities, Discrimination, and Reasonable Accommoda-
tion, 46 DUKE L.J. 1, 8 (1996). See Vande Zande v. Wisconsin Dep't of Admin., 44 F.3d
538, 541 (7th Cir. 1995) (excluding or segregating persons because of impairments that in-
correctly are believed to be disabling is "analogous to [being] discriminated against because
of... skin color or some other vocationally irrelevant characteristic.").
164. Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 448.
165. Id. (quoting Palmore, 466 U.S. at 433 (1984)).
166. Id. at 449.
167. Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 635 (1996) (finding the constitutionality of "status-
based enactment[s]" depends on a "factual context from which we could discern a relation-
ship to legitimate states interests.. . .") (emphasis added).
168. Thus, for example, if a state refused to hire a lawyer with mental illness because of
an unsubstantiated and inaccurate fear that she would not withstand the stress of the work,
that "undifferentiated fear" and "negative attitude.., unsubstantiated by factors which are
properly cognizable," even if honestly held, would be no defense to a constitutional chal-
lenge. The same applies to an honestly held, but erroneous belief, that a cosmetic condition
will so upset co-workers or others that state functions will be impaired were the person with
the condition to be hired.
169. ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a).
170. See ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b).
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For example, Section 12112(b)(1) of the Act proscribes "limiting, seg-
regating, or classifying an applicant or employee in a way that adversely
affects the opportunities or status of such applicant or employee because of
the disability of such applicant or employee." The EEOC has suggested
that this section prohibits covered entities from "restricting the employ-
ment opportunities of qualified individuals with disabilities on the basis of
stereotypes and myths about the individual's disability. Rather, the capa-
bilities of qualified individuals with disabilities must be determined on an
individualized, case by case basis.' 17 1 The exclusion or segregation of per-
sons with a disability, due to their status as disabled individuals, is unconsti-
tutional. As the Court stated in Cleburne, disability distinctions are
"largely irrelevant unless the [regulated behavior by the disabled] would
threaten legitimate interests of the [government] in a way that other per-
mitted [behavior] would not."' 1"l Differential treatment because of the sta-
tus of being disabled, as opposed to differentiation because of the
limitations created by one's disability, do not meet this test. For example,
segregating or limiting all cancer survivors, because of that status, may re-
flect "prejudice and antipathy-a view that [they] are not as worthy or de-
serving as others,"'73 or it may result from "mere negative attitudes, or
fear, unsubstantiated by factors which are properly cognizable,' 174 or the
"vague, undifferentiated fears" of others,17S or some other irrational preju-
dice. Certainly, not all cancer survivors possess traits that "threaten legiti-
mate interests of the [government] in a way that [an]other permitted
[status] would not."176
Section 12112(b)(4) of the Act prohibits "excluding, or otherwise de-
nying equal jobs or benefits to a qualified individual because of the known
disability of an individual with whom the qualified individual is known to
have a relationship or association." This section also prohibits unconstitu-
tional behavior for the same reasons as discussed above with respect to
Section 12112(b)(1). The Court in Cleburne struck down governmental re-
strictions based on "negative attitudes," "fear" or "irrational prejudice."'
It is these irrational motives that explain discrimination against an individ-
ual for his or her association with a disability. In any event, absent evi-
dence of some specific risk of harm to state interests, a state could never
171. EEOC Interpretive Guidance on Title I of the ADA, 29 C.F.R. § 1630.5 app.
(1998) [hereinafter EEOC Interpretive Guidance].
172. Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 447-48. See also Mark C. Weber, Beyond te Americans
With Disabilities Act A National Employment Policy for People with Disabilities, 46 Burr.
L. REv. 123, 132 n.46 (1998) (demonstrating "[t]he essence of invidious discrimination is
being treated worse than others because of a trait that one has no control over and that has
no just relation to the entitlement at issue.").
173. Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 440.
174. Id. at 448.
175. Id. at 449.
176. Id. at 447-48.
177. See discussion supra notes 154-168 and accompanying text.
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demonstrate that an adverse employment action-taken because one asso-
ciated with a disabled individual-threatens legitimate government inter-
ests in a way another permitted status would not."' 78
Section 12112(b)(2) of the Act prohibits a covered entity from partici-
pating in contractual or other arrangements that effectively subject a quali-
fied employee with a disability to the discrimination prohibited by the
ADA. Section 12112(b)(3)(B) prohibits methods of administration "that
perpetuate the discrimination of others who are subject to common admin-
istrative control." These provisions also address unconstitutional behavior
when, for example, the contractual arrangement or method of administra-
tion referred to results in discrimination that would be unconstitutional if
the state itself had caused it.179 A state's indifference to the discrimination
by its agents would provide no defense. 80
The remaining sections of the ADA that define prohibited discrimina-
tion primarily limit constitutional behavior-the incidental effects of ad-
ministration of facially neutral policies. 81 The Act bans this behavior
because it effectively impedes the integration of persons with disabilities
into the workforce. 82 The current constitutional attack on the Act focuses
on these remaining sections. Their constitutionality depends on whether
they are an appropriate means for preventing or remedying unconstitu-
tional state action as required by Boerne. The first task is to establish that
Congress's aim in enacting them and applying them to the states was to
eradicate unconstitutional disability-based discrimination. That task begins
with an examination of the ADA's legislative process.183
The literature concerning the ADA has examined the ADA's legisla-
tive process exhaustively."8 I shall not attempt to repeat that effort here.
178. Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 447-48. And, as discussed above, even if a state official
holds an honest but mistaken belief that association with a person with a disability threatens
legitimate state interests, Cleburne makes plain that such mistaken belief, based on myths,
fears, and stereotypes, is no defense to a constitutional challenge. See discussion supra
notes 154-168 and accompanying text.
179. See also Arizona Governing Comm'n v. Norris, 463 U.S. 1073, 1086 (1983) (find-
ing employer liable for sex discrimination under Title VII due to acts of agent administering
fringe benefits plan).
180. See discussion supra notes 154-168 and accompanying text.
181. ADA, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12112(b)(3)(A) and 12112(b)(6) prohibit the use of standards,
employment criteria, or methods of administration that have discriminatory effects, unless
they are job-related and consistent with business necessity. Section 12112(b)(7) requires
that employment tests be administered to applicants or employees with disabilities in such a
way as to reflect accurately their essential skills. Section 12112(b)(5) makes it illegal for a
covered entity to refuse to make reasonable accommodations except for undue hardship, or
to deny employment opportunities to an individual on the basis of her need for reasonable
accommodations.
182. See discussion infra notes 235-251 and accompanying text.
183. See discussion infra notes 184-234 and accompanying text.
184. For a history of legislative efforts prior to the introduction of legislation that be-
came the ADA see BURGDORE, DisArLrrY DISCRIMINATION, supra note 13, at 23-43. For a
discussion of the legislative history of the ADA itself, see id. at 43-48. See also R. Bales,
Libertarianism, Environmentalism, and Utilitarianism: An Examination of Theoretical
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Rather, drawing freely from it, I shall demonstrate that it fully supports
three conclusions: 1) that the ADA's legislative process uncovered a persis-
tent pattern of societal discrimination, including discrimination by state and
local governments, of the type the constitution condemns; 2) that Congress
found this disability discrimination to be pervasive; and 3) that Congress
enacted the ADA, inter alia, to prevent or remedy this unconstitutional
discrimination.
The process that resulted in the 1990 enactment of the ADA began in
the early 1970s with an effort to amend Titles VI and VII of the 1964 Civil
Rights Act, by adding disability as a protected class.18s Concurrently, in
1969 and throughout the 1970s, persons with disabilities brought many suc-
cessful constitutional attacks in courts throughout the United States, chal-
lenging disability discrimination in education, employment, transportation,
guardianship, medical services, sterilization, voting, and confinement in res-
idential treatment centers.'8 6 These individuals brought this litigation
against regional transportation authorities, public housing authorities,
school systems, state governments, and state residential treatment cen-
ters,187 uncovering considerable government involvement in unconstitu-
tional disability-based discrimination. Congress responded by enacting
legislation prohibiting disability-based discrimination in state and local
governmental activities and services, public education, employment, air
transportation, housing, institutionalization, and voting.18s In short,
throughout the late 1970s and the 1980s, Congress accumulated considera-
ble evidence of state-sponsored unconstitutional discrimination against in-
dividuals with disabilities.
Three important Supreme Court decisions during the years immedi-
ately preceding the enactment of the ADA substantiated the presence of
society-wide discrimination against persons with disabilities and state cul-
pability. In 1985, the Court decided Alexander v. Choate,189 in which it
acknowledged for the first time the "well-cataloged instances of invidious
Frameworks for Enforcing Title I of The Americans With Disabilities Act, 1993 DEr. C.L
REv. 1163, 1167-1174 (1993); Burgdorf, Analysis and Implications, supra note 8, at 426-34;
Timothy M. Cook, The Americans With Disabilities Act: The Move to Integration, 64 Ttp.
L. REv. 393, 399-415 (1991); Lowell P. Weiker, Historical Backgromd of the Americans
With Disabilities Act, 64 TEmp. L. REv. 387, 387-390 (1991).
185. BURGDORF, Disa.Bmrry DISCRIMINATION, supra note 13, at 26-27; Bales, supra
note 184, at 1167. Actually federal legislation predates efforts to amend Title VII. As early
as 1948, to assist disabled World War II veterans, Congress enacted legislation to prohibit
discrimination based on physical handicaps within the United States Civil Service. Weiker,
supra note 184, at 387.
186. BURGDORF, DisAanjrY DISCRIMINATION, supra note 13, at 24-25.
187. Id. at 24-25 & nn.152-164.
188. Id. at 27-33; Weiker, supra note 184, at 389. In 1968, Congress also enacted legis-
lation requiring "buildings constructed, altered, or financed by the federal government to be
accessible to and usable by people with disabilities." Id. at 387.
189. 469 U.S. 287 (1985).
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discrimination against the handicapped."' 90 Alexander also cited testimony
to Congress that persons with disabilities historically had been excluded
and segregated. 191 That same year, as Burgdorf has written, "[i]n separate
opinions in the Cleburne case, five justices acknowledged the 'history of
unfair and often grotesque mistreatment' arising from 'prejudice and igno-
rance."1 92 In his dissent in Cleburne, Justice Marshall summarized some of
the worst of the state-sponsored discrimination against persons with disa-
bilities, concluding that "[flor the retarded, just as for Negroes and women,
much has changed in recent years, but much remains the same; outdated
statutes are still on the books, and irrational fears or ignorance, traceable
to the prolonged social and cultural isolation of the retarded, continues."19 3
Two years later in School Board of Nassau County, Florida v. Arline1 94
the Court reviewed the legislative history of Section 504 of the Rehabilita-
tion Act of 1973.19 The case arose when a state agency refused to continue
the employment of a teacher afflicted with tuberculosis. The Court found
that Congress enacted the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 to counter "society's
accumulated myths and fears about disability and disease," its "prejudiced
attitudes or the ignorance of others," its "public fear and misapprehen-
sion," and its "irrational fear"' 96 -the very things which the Court in
Cleburne had found to violate the constitution when motivated by state
action.
Meanwhile, in 1983, the United States Commission on Civil Rights
published an influential study entitled Accommodating the Spectrum of In-
dividual Abilities.'97 It documented the similarity between discrimination
against racial minorities and discrimination against persons with disabili-
ties. In both cases, "active hostility, ignorance, indifference, and miscon-
ceptions about the abilities of the group" motivated discriminatory
actions.' 98 In one of its most important findings, the Commission stated
that "[h]istorically, society has tended to isolate and segregate handicapped
190. Id. at 296 n.12.
191. Id. at 296.
192. See BURGDORF, DISABILITY DISCRIMINATION, supra note 13, at 11-12. In his par-
tial dissent in Cleburne, Justice Thurgood Marshall, writing for himself and two other jus-
tices, wrote of a "regime of state-mandated segregation and degradation." Cleburne, 473
U.S. at 462 (Marshall, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). In addition, "Justice
Stevens, joined by Chief Justice Berger, similarly acknowledged 'the history of unfair and
often grotesque treatment' by government officials of persons with disabilities as a result of
ignorance and prejudice." Cook, supra note 184, at 400 (citing Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 454
(quoting Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc. v. Cleburne, 726 F.2d 191, 197 (5th Cir. 1984))).
193. Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 467 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
194. 480 U.S. 273 (1987).
195. 29 U.S.C. § 759 (1994).
196. Arline, 480 U.S. at 284, 285 n.13.
197. BURGDORF, DISABILITY DISCRIMINATION, supra note 13 at 44-45, citing U.S.
COMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, ACCOMMODATING THE SPECTRUM OF INDIVIDUAL ABILITIES
(1983) [hereinafter ACCOMMODATING THE SPECTRUM].
198. Bales, supra note 184, at 1167. See id. at 1167 n.8 (citing Jeffrey 0. Cooper, Over-
coming Barriers to Employment: the Meaning of Reasonable Accommodation and Undue
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people. Despite some [recent] improvements,... discrimination against
handicapped persons continues to be a serious and pervasive social prob-
lem."199 Following the publication of the Commission's study, the National
Council on the Handicapped published one report to the President and the
Congress in 1986, and another in 1988 that further substantiated the persis-
tence of society-wide discrimination against persons with disabilities and
the need for remedial legislationYm°
On April 28, 1988, legislation was introduced in the 101' Congress that
would later become the ADA. Over the next several years, as Burgdorf
has reported, "[a]fter conducting 63 public forums in all 50 states, the Dis-
trict of Columbia, Guam, and Puerto Rico, and meeting with more than
32,000 people, a congressional task force made a formal finding in 1990 of
'massive, society-wide discrimination.""' The House of Representatives
held eleven public hearings and the Senate three." 2
The ADA's legislative history abounds in testimony of discriminatory
activities engaged in by state and local governments. After reviewing this
legislative history, Mikochik has written that "[t]he record before Con-
gress ... evidenced that discrimination against disabled people persisted in
government programs [including] conditions [that] impede access to state
and municipal employment for the 43 million disabled Americans."2°3
Cook, reviewing the record of governmental hostility to persons with disa-
bilities, has concluded that "state and local officials, consciously and inten-
tionally, out of animus and ignorance, segregated persons with disabilities
Hardship in the Americans With Disabilities Act, 139 U. PA. L. REv. 1423, 1427 (1991) (ob-
serving that the sources of discrimination were parallel)).
199. ACCOMMODATING THE SPECTRUM, supra note 197, at 159 (quoted in BURGDORF,
DisABirrY DISCRIMNATION, supra note 13, at 9-10). For a summary of the major congres-
sional and executive branch reports substantiating the persistence of discrimination against
persons with disabilities, see Burgdorf, Analysis and Implications, supra note 8, at 416 n.15.
200. See BURGDORF, DisABn:rrY DIsca MUNATION, supra note 13, at 44-45. "The
Council, which was composed of 15 presidential appointees, had been established as an
independent federal agency in 1984 and was charged, inter alia, with issuing, by February
1986, a report to the President and Congress analyzing federal laws and programs and
presenting legislative recommendations to enhance the productivity and quality of life of
Americans with disabilities." Id. at 45. "In [consumer] forums, Council members heard
repeatedly that the primary problem facing individuals with disabilities was discrimination."
Weiker, supra note 184, at 390.
201. BURGDORF, DisAu.n DISCRIMINATION, supra note 13, at 10 (citing TASK
FORCE ON THE RIG=rs AND EMPOWERMENT OF AmaEANs WIH DjsALmEs, EOUAL-
iTY FOR 43 MILioN A.MRiCNs NVIT- DIsAILrriEs: A MORAL AN'D EcoNOMIc IMPERA-
TrvE 8 (1990), quoted in HousE CoMi. ON EDUCATION AND LABOR, RE-P. ON THE
AMERICANs WITH DisABn.rmEs Acr, H.P. REP. No. 101-485, Pt. 2 at 32 (1990)).
202. Cook, supra note 184, at 393-94. For an extensive listing of the evidence of the
pervasive discrimination against persons with disabilities, see Coolbaugh v. State of Louisi-
ana, 136 F.3d 430, 436-37 (5th Cir. 1998).
203. Mikochik, supra note 13, at 623 & n.33.
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and denounced [them] as not only inferior, but also as dangerous, and un-
worthy of the quality of life accorded other citizens.12 °4 He continues,
"Congress was aware [of this] regime of segregation and degradation...
[and] therefore took strong action in the ADA to eliminate disability segre-
gation in this country.
2 °5
In addition to the evidence gathered by Congress when it considered
the ADA, the public record contains evidence of state-sponsored unconsti-
tutional disability-based discrimination. For instance, many state and local
laws segregate the disabled. Cook concluded that "persons with disabilities
continue to be forcibly and officially segregated throughout this nation by
public officials who refuse to provide essential services in an integrated
fashion."2 6 Marcia and Robert Burgdorf's research has uncovered that as
recently as the late 1950s, twenty-eight states provided for sterilization of
the disabled, and "at least" seventeen for epilepsy and mental retarda-
tion.2°7 States also proscribed marriage, even among the physically dis-
abled.2 °8 Voting rights were denied to persons who were "under some
204. Cook, supra note 184, at 397. Cook's research concludes that "state legislatures
put a system of apartheid into place, and the courts enforced it [and] these official forms of
segregation and discrimination remain with us today because of continued fear, ignorance,
hostility, and the inertia supplied by a long history of disability segregation."
205. Id. at 397-98. In addition to the numerous field and congressional hearings noted
at supra notes 197-202 and accompanying text, Congress was provided with "hundreds of
discrimination diaries submitted for the legislative record by persons with disabilities." Id. at
408.
The Senate Report on the ADA concluded that "'[o]ur society is still infected by an
ancient, now almost subconscious assumption that people with disabilities are less than fully
human and therefore are not fully eligible for the opportunities, services, and support sys-
tems which are available to other people as a matter of right. The result is massive, society-
wide discrimination."' Cook, supra note 184, at 409 (quoting SENATE COMM. ON LABOR
AND HUMAN RESOURCES, REP. ON THE AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES AcT, S. REP. No.
101-116, (1990) [hereinafter SENATE REPORT]). Accord Erickson v. Board of Governors,
No. 95 C 2541, 1998 WL 748277 *1, at *4 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 30, 1998) (demonstrating that
"[ulnlike RFRA, Congress did incorporate into the ADA modem instances of persistent
discrimination by individuals with disabilities"); Lamb v. John Unstead Hosp., 19 F. Supp.
2d 498, 506 (E.D.N.C. 1998) (reasoning Congress found a "significant likelihood of uncon-
stitutional action with respect to the disabled"); id. at 509 (finding "the ADA was specifi-
cally designed with the overall and explicit purpose of prohibiting, preventing, and
remedying the irrational classification of and intentional discrimination against the
disabled").
206. Cook, supra note 184, at 412. Cook assembled examples of "eugenic-based laws
from the earlier historical era requiring segregated treatment [that] remain in effect still."
Id. at 412 & n.134 (citing marriage restrictions for retarded people still in effect in Kentucky,
Michigan, and Mississippi as of 1985).
207. Marcia Pearce Burgdorf and Robert Burgdorf Jr., A History of Unequal Treat-
ment: The Qualifications of Handicapped Persons as a "Suspect Class" Under the Equal Pro-
tection Clause, 15 SANTA CLARA L. REv. 855, 861 (1975).
208. Id.
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form of guardianship."2 9 The Burgdorfs also found that government-spon-
sored homes for the mentally retarded had "little regard for the constitu-
tional rights of those in the institution. 210 At the time of the enactment of
the ADA, persons with disabilities in Mississippi could not even obtain a
hunting or fishing license on an equal basis with nondisabled persons 1 1
As recently as 1973, Chicago still had "ugly laws" that prohibited appear-
ance in public by those whom the law deemed unsightly or disgusting.
212
Other cities with similar laws enforced them as late as 1974.213 Weber also
found that "there are numerous examples of private enterprises and gov-
ernment officials refusing to serve individuals because they felt the persons'
disabilities made their appearance upsetting to others. 2 1 4
Listed below are some of the examples of invidious discrimination
against persons with disabilities considered by Congress or in the public
record when the ADA was enacted:
" Child confined to a wheelchair refused admission to public
school "because the principal ruled that [she] was a fire
hazard."215
" Applicant for a teaching position denied employment "because
of paralysis of both lower extremities [because of]
poliomyelitis. 216
" "[A]pplicant with cerebral palsy told she was not qualified for
job in metropolitan hospital because fellow employees [were]
not comfortable working with her.
'217
" "[A] woman 'crippled by arthritis' denied a job... because col-
lege trustees [thought] 'normal students shouldn't see her.'"
2 1 8
" Children with Down's Syndrome refused admission to zoo be-
cause zoo keepers were concerned they might upset the
chimpanzees.219
209. Id. at 906.
210. Id. at 866 n.83. One court found that mental patients in a state hospital had "suf-
fered a history of unequal treatment [and had been] subjected to discrimination." Id. More-
over, individuals involuntarily institutionalized in mental hospitals were found to have been
denied their constitutional right to treatment. Id. at 891-92.
211. Id. at 863 & n.52. A search in the winter of 1999 showed that this continues to be
the case.
212. Id. at 864.
213. Id. (reporting enforcement in Omaha, Nebraska). Airlines also had prohibitions
against serving customers with "gross disfigurement or other unpleasant characteristics so
unusual as to offend fellow passengers" and applied the proscription to persons with epi-
lepsy. Airlines also required wheelchair bound passengers to fly with an attendant
"whether or not these passengers are capable of caring for themselves in flight." Id. at 865.
214. Weber, supra note 172, at 132 n.43.
215. SENATE REPORT, supra note 205, at 7.
216. Id.
217. Cook, supra note 184, at 408 n.103.
218. SENATE REPORT, supra note 205, at 7 (quoting 118 CONG. Risc. 36761 (1972) (re-
marks of Sen. Mondale)).
219. Id.
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" Child with cerebral palsy denied admission to a public school
because "his teacher claimed his physical appearance 'produced
a nauseating effect' on his classmates. '"22 0
" Wheelchair-bound hospital patient refused a ride home by a
public transit service upon release from a hospital although a
reservation had been made three weeks previously.
22'
" Plaintiffs who suffered birth defects that created visible defor-
mities excluded from the courtroom in their own mass products
liability litigation on the ground that they were unfit to be pres-
ent in the courtroom because their "appearance might excite
passions against the defendant.
222
" Polio victim in a wheelchair denied teaching license because
public officials concluded the person was "physically and medi-
cally unsuited for teaching.
' 22
" Victim of paralysis testified that "being paralyzed has meant far
more than being unable to walk-it has meant being excluded
from public schools, being denied employment opportunities
and being deemed an 'unfit parent.'
224
" Blind rehabilitation counselor denied job because the person
could not "drive to see... clients.
' 225
* Person with epilepsy denied counseling position at a juvenile
correction facility "because he lacked a driver's license.
'226
" Blind person refused permission by Philadelphia public school
officials to take a qualifying examination to demonstrate teach-
ing competence.227
Aware that persons with disabilities suffered from persistent state-
sponsored unconstitutional discrimination, Congress exercised its full con-
stitutional authority to prevent and remedy this situation.228 In its state-
ment of findings, Congress concluded: 1) "historically, society has tended
220. Id. (quoting 117 CONG. REc. 45974 (1971) (statement of Rep. Vanik)).
221. Id.
222. Weber, supra note 172, at 132 n.44 (referencing In re Bendectin Litig., 857 F.2d
290 (6th Cir. 1988)).
223. Mikochik, supra note 13, at 624 & n.33.
224. SENATE REPORT, supra note 205, at 15-16 (testimony by Arlene Mayerson of the
Disabilities Rights Education and Defense Fund).
225. Mikochik, supra note 13, at 624 n.33.
226. Id.
227. Gurmankin v. Costanzo, 556 F.2d 184 (3d Cir. 1977) (holding that "[t]he refus-
als . . . to permit her to take the examination violated due process by subjecting Ms.
Gurmankin to an irrebuttable presumption that her blindness made her incompetent to
teach sighted students").
For other anecdotal accounts of unconstitutional discrimination prior to the enactment
of the ADA, see Burgdorf, Analysis and Implications, supra note 8, at 420 n.33.
228. See Cook, supra note 184, at 415-16 (stating that Congress understood "that public
officials historically have been among the major perpetrators of segregated services in this
country," and acted "to reverse the regime of official discrimination and segregation on the
basis of disability.").
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to isolate and segregate individuals with disabilities, [and this] continue[s]
to be a serious and pervasive social problem";. 9 2) "discrimination against
individuals with disabilities persists in such critical areas as employment,
housing, public accommodations, education, transportation, communica-
tion, recreation, institutionalization, health services, voting, and access to
public services;' and 3) the discrimination suffered by persons with disa-
bilities includes "a history of purposeful unequal treatment,"'- 1 as well as
"outright intentional exclusion,... segregation, and relegation to lesser
services, programs, activities, benefits, jobs, or other opportunities." - Ac-
cordingly, the Congress enacted the ADA to "provide a... national man-
date for the elimination of discrimination against individuals with
disabilities. '
This synopsis of ADA's legislative process demonstrates that the ADA
is sufficiently distinct from RFRA in this respect. As the Court found in
Boerne, "[t]he history of [religious] persecution in this country detailed in
the [RFRA] hearings mentions no episodes occurring in the past 40
years." -4 To the contrary, as the discussion above shows, Congress accu-
mulated abundant evidence of society-Nvide discrimination against persons
with disabilities as of the enactment date of the ADA and found that state-
sponsored disability-based unconstitutional discrimination was a prevalent
form of that problem. The ADA's legislative record and statement of find-
ings and purposes show that Congress was aware of the state-sponsored
unconstitutional discrimination prevalent in society at the time of the
ADA's enactment. Furthermore, they show that Congress enacted the
ADA to prevent or remedy such discrimination. In other words, the legis-
lative processes of the ADA identified discrimination sufficient to satisfy
Boerne's congruence requirement.
The ADA also satisfies Boerne's proportionality prong. As discussed
next, when enacting the ADA Congress fully satisfied its obligation under
federalism not to infringe unnecessarily on the states' autonomy to govern.
First, the ADA regulates certain constitutional state action in order to inte-
grate persons with disabilities into mainstream society and thereby prevent
future unconstitutional discrimination by attacking its cause-the prejudice
229. ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(2).
230. ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(3).
231. ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(7).
232. ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(5).
233. ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12101(b)(1).
234. Boerne, 521 U.S. at 530. As the Court said, "[a] comparison between RFRA and
the Voting Rights Act is instructive. In contrast to the record which confronted Congress
and the judiciary in the voting rights cases, RFRA's legislative record lacks examples of
modem instances of generally applicable laws passed because of religious bigotry." Id.
RFRA's supporters acknowledged that this "absence of more recent episodes" was ex-
plained by the contemporary reality that "deliberate persecution is not the usual problem
in this country" and "[l]aws targeting religious practices have become increasingly rare." Id.
Cf. College Savings Bank I, 119 S. Ct. at 2214 (finding "Congress identified no pattern of
patent infringement by the States, let alone a pattern of constitutional violations.").
Imaged with the Permission of N.Y.U. Review of Law and Social Policy
1998]
REVIEW OF LAW & SOCIAL CHANGE
arising from isolation of the disabled. In addition, the methods Congress
chose to eliminate social segregation are measured to accommodate the
competing legitimate federal and state interests.
Congress's strategy in the Act for preventing future invidious discrimi-
nation was to integrate persons with disabilities into the economic, polit-
ical, and social mainstream, as the ADA's legislative history,235 academic
literature," 6 and the Act itself2 37 each demonstrate. Cook has summarized
235. The Report from the Senate's Committee on Labor and Human Resources could
not have been more explicit: "The purpose of the ADA is to... bring persons with disabili-
ties into the economic and social mainstream of American life." SENATE REPORT, supra
note 205, at 2. This purpose was a response to legislative testimony, reports from several
Presidential commissions, and poll data, showing that "individuals with disabilities have
been isolated and subjected to discrimination and such isolation and discrimination is still
pervasive in our society." Id. at 6. U.S. Attorney General Dick Thornburgh, who testified
before the Committee, agreed, pointing out that "many persons with disabilities in this Na-
tion still lead their lives in an intolerable state of isolation and dependence." Id. at 9.
The ADA's legislative history in the House of Representatives similarly demonstrates a
legislative concern for eliminating the segregation experienced by persons with disabilities.
See e.g., Report of the House Committee on Public Works and Transportation, H.R. REP.
No. 101-485(I), at 2-3 (1996); Report of the House Committee on Energy and Commerce
H.R. REP. No. 101-485(IV), at 25 (1990) (stating "[tihe ADA renews the commitment made
by Congress in enacting Section 504 to promote the mainstreaming of individuals with disa-
bilities ... by ensuring that the Federal government plays a central role in enforcing...
standards"). See also 136 CONG. REc. H2413 (daily ed. May 17, 1990) (statement of Sen.
Bennett) (asserting that the "[ADA] is a compassionate and useful tool to bring into the
mainstream of life many who otherwise must suffer on the edges or in the shadows of real
life.") 136 CONG. REC. H4621 (daily ed. July 12, 1990) (statement of Rep. Fish) (declaring
that "[i]n... his acceptance speech for the Republican nomination, President Bush pledged
to 'do whatever it takes to make sure the disabled are included in the mainstream.' Today
we are in the final stages of the effort to fulfill that promise.").
236. See, e.g., BURGDORF, DISABILInT DISCRIMINATION, supra note 13, at 15 (arguing
"full participation and integration [and] the concept of independent living provide[ ] a sig-
nificant frame of reference for interpreting laws that address discrimination against people
with disabilities"); Burgdorf, Substantially Limited, supra note 2, at 515 & n.556 (referencing
examples from many different statutes of Congress's endorsement of integration as the "na-
tional policy regarding individuals with disabilities"); Cook, supra note 184, at 422 (asserting
that "[n]umerous statements in the [ADA's] legislative history specifically endorse the pro-
hibition of segregated public services . . .. [Tihe House Judiciary Committee Report
stressed, '[I]ntegrated services are essential [to] eradicat[e] the invisibility of the handi-
capped."') (quotations omitted); id. at 424 (stating that the argument made on the Senate
floor was that the ADA "will roll back the unthinking and unacceptable practices by which
disabled Americans today are segregated, excluded, and fenced off from fair participation in
our society by mindless biased attitudes and senseless physical barriers.") (quoting the re-
marks of Sen. Edward Kennedy). See also John J. Sarno, The Americans With Disabilities
Act. Federal Mandate to Create an Integrated Society, 17 SETON HALL LEcis. J. 401, 414-15
(1993) (noting "[t]he ADA clearly acknowledges the myths and fears [about disability] and
adopts [the] reasoning [that they) are as handicapping as are the physical limitations that
flow from actual impairment").
237. See, e.g., ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(1)(2) (finding "historically society has tended
to isolate and segregate individuals with disabilities"); ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(5) ("indi-
viduals with disabilities continually encounter various forms of discrimination, including...
exclusionary qualification standards and criteria, [and] segregation"); ADA, 42 U.S.C.
§ 12101(a)(8) ("the Nation's proper goals regarding individuals with disabilities are to as-
sure ... full participation, independent living, and economic self-sufficiency"); ADA, 42
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this congressional strategy as follows: 8
[As] Representative Schroeder observed: "The attitudes nondis-
abled persons have toward fellow citizens are often the most im-
portant factor leading to segregation, exclusion, discrimination,
and unemployment." Congress understood that "[t]o be segre-
gated is to be misunderstood, even feared. If we have learned any
lessons in the last 30 years, it is that only by breaking down barri-
ers between people can we dispel the negative attitudes and myths
that are the main currency of oppression," [quoting Representa-
tive Collins]. The whole idea behind the ADA was to "help break
down the psychological barriers which disabled Americans face
by fostering a spirit of familiarity and cooperation," [quoting Rep-
resentative Levine].
The Bush administration endorsed this strategy to reshape prejudicial
attitudes by integrating persons with disabilities into the mainstream. As
the Attorney General testified before Congress: 9
Attitudes can only be reshaped gradually. One of the keys to this
reshaping process is to increase contact between and among peo-
ple with disabilities and their more able-bodied peers. And an
essential component of that effort is the development of a com-
prehensive set of laws supported by a helpful set of regulations
that all work together to promote the integration of people with
disabilities into our communities.
Integrating persons with disabilities into mainstream society is a ra-
tional means of eliminating prejudice against them. The academic litera-
ture overwhelmingly substantiates the rationality of that strategy. Weber's
work, for example, shows the pervasiveness of unconscious attitudes, unex-
amined stereotypes, and prejudices regarding persons with disabilities2 40
He has written: "Stereotypes and prejudices grow easily in the absence of
day-to-day contact with human beings who are different. Research shows
that employers who have no employees with disabilities have more nega-
tive attitudes towards workers with disabilities than those who have moder-
ate or large numbers."241  He continues: "attitudinal changes among
U.S.C. § 12101(b)(1) ("li]t is the purpose of this chapter... to provide a clear and compre-
hensive national mandate for the elimination of discrimination against individuals with
disabilities").
238. Cook, supra note 184, at 440-41.
239. See id. at 441 & n335 (quoting statement of Att'y Gen. Dick Thornburgh).
240. Weber, supra note 172, at 133 & n.48 (citing Sara D. Watson, Applying Theory to
Practice: A Prospective and Prescriptive Analysis of the Implementation of fie Americans
With Disabilities Act, 5 J. DisABLITY Po' Y STUD. 1, 7 (1994) (collecting and evaluating
attitudinal surveys)).
241. Weber, supra note 172, at 133 & nA9 (citing Sharon E. Waiters & Clora Mae
Baker, Title I of the Americans With Disabilities Act: Employer and Recruiter Attitudes To-
ward Individuals with Disabilities, 20 J. REHABILIrATION ADMIN. 15,20 (1996) (contrasting
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employers take time.... Stereotyping is particularly hard to overcome ....
If prejudices keep individuals with disabilities away from those without
them, the very stereotypes that led to the exclusion are unlikely to be chal-
lenged." '42 Furthermore, the presence of persons with disabilities in the
workplace "is crucial to dispelling myths about individuals with disabilities"
because by working with such individuals, non-disabled persons can learn
to recognize persons who are disabled as human beings who "do not in all
ways conform to the norm. 
''
243
Summarizing an extensive body of research, Cook reports:
The research shows, without doubt, what should be obvious, that
prejudice is lessened through integration. When individuals, espe-
cially young people, associate with one another, learn one an-
other's attributes, and are able to use those perceptions and facts,
prejudice is lessened. The effect is increased the longer and
greater the interaction between persons who are and are not dis-
abled is.2
44
Integration erodes prejudice by improving the attitudes toward disa-
bility by the nondisabled-including teachers, employers, neighbors, and
parents of persons with disabilities. 45 It also works by helping persons
with disabilities to form bonds with other persons outside the disability
community. These bonds may help persons with disabilities to conform to
the cultural norms of mainstream society: enhancing skills, preparing for
employment, and generally learning adaptive behavior.2 4 6
Moss and Malin also stress that integration is a valuable way to cir-
cumvent the self-reinforcing nature of prejudice. They have written:
[O]ur extrapolations from what we know are not just randomly
imperfect, but are systematically imperfect in particular directions
that overstate certain risks, including those perceived via stere-
otypical proxies .... [E]xcessive use of stereotypes stems partially
from [the reality that] stereotypical views [are] self-reinforcing.
score on test instrument of employer representatives with varying degrees of contact with
employees with disabilities)).
242. Weber, supra note 172, at 136-37.
243. Id. at 129 (citing the views of Sen. Robert T. Stafford). After reviewing the aca-
demic literature, Weber concluded it demonstrates that people who are isolated from work
"are not part of the consciousness of those who are there. In a real sense, people with
disabilities who are not integrated into society are invisible to the rest of society. This invisi-
bility fosters social attitudes of fear and condescension. Integration fosters realistic atti-
tudes, demonstrating that persons with disabilities are not threatening, helpless, or evil.
Society at large benefits when false fears die out and truth prevails." See id. at 130.
244. Cook, supra note 184, at 441-42 & nn.336-338.
245. See id. at 448 & nn.375-80 (finding "when peers with and without disabilities re-
ceive accurate information about one another and are provided with opportunities to inter-
act with one another on an ongoing basis, social acceptance occurs.") (citing extensive
authority).
246. Id. at 450-55.
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Employers who believe persons with disabilities to be less produc-
tive workers hire fewer of them and thus see fewer productive
disabled workers and effective accommodations. As is often the
case, perception precedes reality, but then creates it.
4 7
A related theory is what Moss and Malin call "confirmation bias." As
they have explained, one thing that "insulates bigotry" is that "[p]eople are
not equally open to all information, but more open to that which comforta-
bly confirms their [pre-existing] views, more inclined to spin disconfirming
evidence to fit those views, and more apt to seek confirmatory facts and
opinions actively. '' 248 Because of confirmation bias theory and the self-
reinforcing nature of prejudice, the "much-vaunted marketplace of ideas
does not fully dispel stereotypes, but reinforces them."249 Creating legal
obligations that require the integration of qualified persons with disabilities
into the workplace may challenge the very stereotypes that led to exclusion
in the first place and that were likely to remain unchallenged without the
aid of law.
Integration also breaks down prejudice through increasing the overall
work performance of persons who are disabled. Discrimination lowers the
performance of its victims with the self-fulfilling effect of reinforcing nega-
tive stereotypes. °50 Therefore, disability-based discrimination has the
power to perpetuate negative stereotypes of disabled people by creating
self-fulfilling predictions of inadequate performance. Bales argues that use
of stereotypes is pernicious in several ways for members of the class who
247. Scott A. Moss & Daniel A. Malin, Public Funding for Disabilit, Accommodations:
A Rational Solution to Rational Discrimination and the Disabilities of the ADA, 33 HARV.
C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 197, 207 (1998).
248. Id. at 208.
249. Id.
250. Moss and Malin have explained the process this way:
Workers in a group that is discriminated against... face... indirect costs due to
their reduced labor market opportunities. Discrimination induces exits: those en-
countering discrimination learn to avoid situations in which they are likely to face
it, which causes them to bear opportunity costs for foregoing otherwise profitable
activity. [An employee who is discriminated against] spends less time, effort, and
money amassing human capital, as discrimination lowers the rate of return on that
capital. [Short of total exit from the labor market, discrimination induces other
harmful market strategies;] low-risk behavior by creating a fear of making mis-
takes that could give a discriminatory employer an excuse for termination [or ]
induce[ment] of high-risk behavior aimed at maximizing the odds of a stellar,
standout performance that could beat the odds. Either option, however, is a deia-
tion from risk-neutrality, the risk orientation that maximizes expected outcome.
Thus, to the extent that discrimination induces its victims to alter their ap-
proach to risk, it actually decreases their expected outcomes, and thus the average
success of their group. This creates a cycle in which discrimination, however moti-
vated, induces worker strategies that strengthen the basis for statistical discrimina-
tion by diminishing the group's average success.
Moss & Malin, supra note 247, at 205-06.
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do not possess the negative attributes of the stereotype: 1) the discrimi-
nated-against group will underinvest in things such as education and train-
ing, verifying the premise of the stereotype and encouraging it; 2) assigning
persons with disabilities to dead-end jobs hinders their skill development,
reinforcing the stereotype that they cannot do the job or that persons with
disabilities work less diligently; and 3) employers are more likely to "focus
on substandard performance of some disabled individuals and disregard
above-average performance of other disabled."'" In sum, by requiring
that persons with disabilities be integrated into the workplace, the law dis-
rupts the self-perpetuating nature of disability-based discrimination.
The ADA sections that prohibit constitutional state action either ban
conduct that screens out individuals with disabilities in various ways252 or
requires, under certain circumstances, that the employer provide reason-
able accommodation to an otherwise qualified individual with a disabil-
ity.-53 In either case, the common denominator is that these sections are
designed to integrate persons with disabilities into the mainstream. 54
These ADA sections balance the goal of integration with the state gov-
ernments' competing interest in governing autonomously and maintaining
discipline and efficient operations. For example, nothing in the ADA re-
quires employers to hire unqualified individuals or to hire individuals with
disabilities over others who are equally or more qualified2-5" Rather, the
ADA prohibits only discrimination on the basis of disability and then only
with regard to "qualified individuals with disabilities." 6 The Act defines
this phrase as "an individual with a disability who, with or without reason-
able accommodations, can perform the essential functions of the employ-
ment position that such individual holds or desires. 257  The EEOC
Interpretive Guidance has suggested that to be "qualified," an individual
251. Bales, supra note 184, at 1211-12.
252. See ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(3)(A) (banning the use of discriminatory stan-
dards, criteria, or methods of administration); 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(6) (banning the use of
qualification standards, employment tests or other selection criteria that tend to screen out
individuals with disabilities unless job-related and consistent with business necessity); and
42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(7) (requiring that tests concerning employment be selected and ad-
ministered to reflect only the essential qualifications of the applicant or employee).
253. See ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5). This Section also prohibits denying employ-
ment opportunities to such a person because the person may need a reasonable
accommodation.
254. See also Lamb v. John Umstead Hosp., 19 F. Supp. 2d 498, 508 (E.D.N.C. 1998)
(finding "Congress's imposition of affirmative conduct, such as reasonable accommoda-
tion... requirements[,] constitute only one of the means chosen by Congress to effectuate a
substantive equal protection right-freedom from discrimination-to which the disabled
are entitled.").
255. See EEOC Interpretive Guidance, Background, 29 C.F.R. § 1630 (1998) (finding
"[the ADA seeks to ensure access to equal employment opportunities based on merit. It
does not guarantee equal results, establish quotas, or require preferences favoring individu-
als with disabilities over those without disabilities.").
256. ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 121122(a).
257. ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8).
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must "satisf[y] the prerequisites for the position, such as possessing the ap-
propriate educational background, employment experience, skills, licenses,
etc." 8 Moreover, by requiring that the disabled employee perform the
"essential functions" of the job, the Act guarantees the employer auton-
omy to exercise independent "business judgment with regard to production
standards, whether qualitative or quantitative, [and does not] require em-
ployers to lower such standards." s9 In short, the Act predicates the notion
of "reasonable accommodation" on a need to balance the goal of integra-
tion with the employer's need to maintain an efficient operation. Accord-
ingly, "[a]n employer.., is not required to reallocate essential functions"
to other employees.260 Nor is the accommodation required if it would pro-
duce an "undue hardship" for the employer, defined to include:
an action requiring significant difficulty or expense, when consid-
ered in light of... the nature and cost of the accommodation...,
the overall financial resources of the facility or facilities involved
in the provision of the reasonable accommodation..., the overall
financial resources of the [employer],... [and] the type of opera-
tion or operations of the [employer]." 26'
Moreover, the law does not require an employer to hire an individual
with a disability who "pose[s] a direct threat to the health or safety of him-
self/herself or others." '262 To be a direct threat, the risk must "pose[ ] a
significant risk, Le., high probability of substantial harm; a speculative or
remote risk is insufficient. ' '263 This provision illustrates again Congress's
attempt to balance the competing interests of integration with the state's
legitimate interests.
The ADA's measured attempts to accommodate competing state and
federal interests sharply distinguish it from RFRA. Recall that RFRA cre-
ated "universal coverage" 2" that threatened "intrusion at every level of
government, displacing laws and prohibiting official actions of almost every
description and regardless of subject matter, ' 265 by providing a federal
claim to "any individual who alleges a substantial burden on his or her free
258. EEOC Interpretive Guidance, 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(m) (1998). See also Burgdorf,
Substantially Limited, supra note 2, at 438 (clarifying that "the 'qualified individual with a
disability' language of the... ADA... was to make crystal clear that it is not unlawful
discrimination to exclude people with disabilities if they are unqualified to perform safely
and efficiently.").
259. 29 C.F.R. at § 1630.2(n).
260. Id. at § 1630.2(o).
261. ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12101(10).
262. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(r).
263. Id. Important factors are "[tihe duration of the risk; [tihe nature and severity of
the potential harm; [t]he likelihood that the potential harm will occur;, and [t]he imminence
of the potential harm." Id.
264. Boerne, 521 U.S. at 532.
265. Id. at 516.
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exercise of religion." '266 The ADA, in contrast, provides a cause of action
to a narrowly defined class of "qualified" individuals with a disability who
must be provided an accommodation only if it is "reasonable" and does not
create an "undue hardship." 67 As demonstrated, the ADA is limited to
furthering the integration of the disabled while including provisions that
guarantee state employers the right to enforce policies that promote legiti-
mate interests.2 68
Another distinction between the two statutes is that in RFRA, intru-
sions into states' autonomy were not offset by the benefit of preventing
unconstitutional behavior. 69 As shown above, exactly the opposite is true
with respect to the ADA, which is animated by empirical evidence of per-
vasive societal discrimination against persons with disabilities, including
unconstitutional state-sponsored disability-based discrimination. In short,
the ADA satisfies both the congruence and proportionality prongs of the
Boerne test that RFRA failed. Congress possesses Section 5 power both to
266. Id. at 532.
267. See discussion supra notes 255-56 and accompanying text.
268. See discussion supra note 261 and accompanying text. See also Driesse v. Florida
Bd. of Regents, 26 F. Supp. 2d 1328 (M.D. Fla. 1998) (discussing ADA provisions preclud-
ing the award of punitive damages for claims brought under the ADA against a state).
In Boerne, moreover, the Court noted the unlikelihood of litigation success by state and
local governments sued under RFRA. The Court reasoned that given "[tihe stringent test
RFRA demands of state laws[,] ... 'many laws will not meet the test' [and] [e]ven assuming
RFRA would be interpreted in effect to mandate some lesser test,. the statute neverthe-
less would require searching judicial scrutiny of state law with the attendant likelihood of
invalidation." Boerne, 521 U.S. at 533-34. By contrast, the ADA's litigation record to date
has been a resounding success for employers, public and private. For example, Peter Blanck
and Mollie Marti report that "more than half of all Title I charges filed with the EEOC are
dismissed because, among other reasons, the plaintiff alleging discrimination failed to show
that he or she was qualified for the position." Peter David Blanck & Mollie Weighner
Marti, Attitudes, Behavior and the Employment Provisions of the Americans with Disabilities
Act, 42 VILL. L. REv. 345, 376 (1997). The most extensive study to date of ADA litigation
results is John Parry, Ed., American Bar Association Survey on Court Rulings Under Title I
of the Americans With Disabilities Act, 119 Daily Lab. Rep. 1 at AA-1 & E-1, 1998 (BNA)
(June 22, 1998). That survey examined every reported and unreported ADA court case be-
tween FY 1992 through 1997. Of 1200 ADA court cases examined, the study found that
employers prevailed in 92% of the cases where a final decision had been rendered. It also
found that of the 83,000 ADA charges resolved by the EEOC during that period, 86.4%
were resolved in the employer's favor. The primary reasons for the employer prevailing in
the vast majority of cases were the "substantive and procedural provisions that are built into
the Act... to prevent employers from being sued for specious reasons." Id. at E-1. Specifl-
cally, most cases are never considered on the merits either because an employee's impair-
ment is not sufficiently limiting to qualify as a disability, or is so substantially limiting that
the employee was not "otherwise qualified." The report characterized this as a "Catch-22."
Id.
269. See Boerne, 521 U.S. at 534 (finding "[tihe substantial costs RFRA exacts, both in
practical terms of imposing a heavy litigation burden on the States and in terms of curtailing
their traditional general regulatory power, far exceed any pattern or practice of unconstitu-
tional conduct under the Free Exercise Clause as interpreted in Smith.").
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enact it and provide for a private damage remedy against the states in fed-
eral court to enforce it.27
THE NEw FEDERALISM AND THE ADA - STATE SOVEREIGN IMMTJNJTY
FROM WHAT?
What legal consequences would follow if the above conclusions are
erroneous and Congress lacks Section 5 authority to extend all of the ADA
to the states? In other words, immunity Congress may not abrogate when
enacting the ADA, or other regulatory statutes, is immunity from what?
With respect to the ADA, clearly some private damage actions against the
states in federal court could continue; some of what the ADA prohibits is
unconstitutional behavior by states and Section 5 empowers Congress to
prohibit unconstitutional state action.271 But what about the ADA's prohi-
bition of constitutional state action?
Were Congress not to possess Section 5 power to enact the ADA's
proscription of state action that is constitutional, a plaintiff's initial task
would be to establish an alternative source of constitutional authority, such
as the power granted to Congress under the Commerce Clause. The argu-
ment that Congress exercised its commerce power in enacting the ADA272
is supported by congressional findings that "the continuing existence of un-
fair and unnecessary discrimination and prejudice denies people with disa-
bilities the opportunity to compete on an equal basis... and costs the
United States billions of dollars in unnecessary expenses resulting from de-
pendency and nonproductivity. 273 Providing that a rational basis exists for
them, courts will defer to such findings.274 No question has been raised in
the lower courts that these congressional findings lack a rational basis 75
270. The above analysis has concentrated on Title I, the employment provisions of the
ADA. The Section 5 analysis of the other three substantive titles, Title H (public services),
Title Im (public accommodations), and Title IV (telecommunications), is almost identical.
The aim (congruence) is elimination of constitutionally impermissible discrimination and
the means (proportionality) are to integrate persons with disabilities into the mainstream.
The other titles differ from Title I only in focus, not in aim or strategy.
271. See Nihiser v. Ohio Envtl. Protection Agency, 979 F. Supp. 1168, 1173 (S.D. Ohio
1997) (holding the ADA unconstitutional to the extent that it provides persons with disabili-
ties a right to a reasonable accommodation, but "[t]o the extent that these provisions [of the
ADA] prohibit intentional discrimination based on a person's disability in hiring, termina-
tion and other conditions of employment, these provisions meet th[e] goal [of prohibiting
unconstitutional discrimination against the disabled].).
272. See ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12101(b)(4).
273. ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(9).
274. See Hodel v. Virginia Surface Min. & Reclamation Ass'n, 452 U.S. 308,311 (1981)
(upholding Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act of 1977 against pre-enforcement
challenge to its constitutionality under the Commerce Clause by finding Congress to have a
rational basis for its belief that surface coal mining has substantial effects on interstate
commerce.)
275. See, eg., Pinnock v. International House of Pancakes Franchisee, 844 F. Supp. 574,
579 (S.D. Cal. 1993) (Congressional enactment of Title III of the ADA was well within
Congress's power to regulate interstate commerce under the Commerce Clause).
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Therefore, a successful challenge to Congress's authority to enact the ADA
under its commerce powers, and to extend its provisions to the states,
would need to be based on some theory grounded in federalism, limiting
the reach of the commerce power. Two such theories offer themselves.
There exists a developing view that legislation enacted under the Nec-
essary and Proper Clause "is not 'proper' if it violates the principle of state
sovereignty reflected in various constitutional provisions." '76 Language in
the Court's decision in Printz v. United States277 lends some support to this
interpretation.27 Gardbaum summarizes the argument as follows: "if Sec-
tion 5 imports such heightened protection for federalism as expressed in
[Boerne's] more rigorous proportionality test, it is not easy to understand
why the Necessary and Proper Clause would not."2 79 Under that interpre-
tation, Boerne explicitly constricted Section 5 and implicitly constricted the
commerce power.
A related theory is the doctrine of intergovernmental immunity, which
once flourished, 8° then floundered, 28' and is now in resurgence. That re-
surgence began in New York v. United States, where the Court reaffirmed
intergovernmental immunity to the extent that "Congress may not 'com-
mandee[r] the legislative process of the States by directly compelling them
to enact and enforce a federal regulatory program .... Congress [lacks] the
ability to require the States to govern according to Congress's instruc-
tions."'2 2 Five years later, in Printz, the Court extended its prohibition of
Congressional commandeering to include commandeering state executive
officers. It held in Printz that Congress may not "direct state law enforce-
ment officers to participate... in the administration of a federally enacted
regulatory scheme." 3
276. Gardbaum, supra note 51, at 684 (citing Gary Lawson & Patricia B. Granger, The
"Proper" Scope of the Federal Power: A Jurisdictional Interpretation of the Sweeping Clause,
43 DuKE L.J. 267, 271-72, 289-97 (1993)).
277. 521 U.S. 898 (1997).
278. Id. at 923-34 (suggesting that "[w]hen a 'law... for carrying into execution' the
Commerce Clause violates the principle of state sovereignty reflected in the various consti-
tutional provisions ... it is not a 'Law... proper for carrying into Execution the Commerce
Clause,' and is thus, in the words of The Federalist, 'merely [an] act of usurpation' which
'deserves to be treated as such."').
279. Gardbaum, supra note 51, at 685; (arguing that "[i]n the context where federal law
threatens to displace primary state authority, affording state interests such increased weight
in Congress's decision-making process seems a reasonable interpretation of the federalism
principle that, at least as part of the 'spirit' of the Constitution, constrains the exercise of the
power according to McCulloch").
280. See National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976) (reasoning Congress
lacks commerce power to displace states' "'freedom to structure integral operations in areas
of traditional governmental functions,' id. at 852, or 'to force directly upon the States [Con-
gress's] choices as to how essential decisions regarding the conduct of integral governmental
functions are to be made."' Id. at 854.
281. See Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 557 (1985) (holding
"National League of Cities is overruled.").
282. New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 161, 162 (1992).
283. Printz, 521 U.S. at 904.
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Cases such as Boerne, New York, and Printz signal a judicial overhaul
of federalism doctrine. This development, however, does not seem likely
to deny Congress the commerce power to enact a statute such as the ADA.
Reformulating the Necessary and Proper Clause into a Section 5 clone-by
limiting the commerce power as Boerne has limited Section 5-would nul-
lify the Court's guidance in Printz that Congress retains authority to regu-
late the states as part of "a program that affects States and private parties
alike."'  This problematic reversal of policy would, in effect, reverse Gar-
cia and return federalism to the National League of Cities quagmire s
Congress's ability to apply the ADA to the states through its com-
merce power becomes more precarious, however, the more the courts view
the ADA as a cost-shifting and entitlement-producing mechanism. In
Printz, the Court declared a federal law unconstitutional, in part, because
its burden on the states undermined federal accountability.3. 6 In Nihiser v.
Ohio Environmental Protection Agency, the district court applied this con-
cern for accountability to the ADA, reasoning that the Act's accommoda-
tion provisions essentially create entitlements and shift costs to the
states 7 In addition, viewing the ADA as creating entitlements and an
284. Id. at 898 (citing New York v. United States, 505 U.S. at 160).
285. Compare Pryor v. Reno, 171 F.3d 1281 (11th Cir. 1999), vacated and remanded,
No. 99-61, 2000 WL 29249, at *1 (U.S. Jan. 18,2000) petition for cert. filed, (No. 99-61) (July
6, 1999) (relying on recent intergovernmental immunity cases to find the federal Driver's
Privacy Protection Act (DPPA) unconstitutional because the statute, which regulates the
dissemination and use of information contained in state motor vehicle records, is not a law
of general applicability but rather applies only to the states); and Condon v. Reno, 155 F.3d
453, 461-62 (4th Cir. 1998), rev'd, No. 98-1464, 2000 WL 16317, at *1 (U.S. Jan. 12, 2000);
with Oklahoma v. United States, 161 F.3d 1266 (10th Cir. 1998), cert. denied, No. 98-1760,
2000 WL 29326, at -1 (U.S. Jan. 18, 2000), (No. 98-1760) (May 3, 1999) (holding DPPA
constitutional because it imposes restrictions directly on state activity rather than requiring
states to enact or administer a federal regulatory program designed to address problems
created by third persons); and Travis v. Reno, 163 F.3d 1000 (7th Cir. 1998), cert. denied sub
nom. Wisconsin Dep't of Transp. v. Reno, No. 98-1818, 2000 WL 29345, at *1 (U.S. Jan. 18,
2000) (finding "states and private parties may be the object of regulation, although states
may not be compelled to become regulators of private conduct."). See also Brzonkala v.
Virginia Polytechnic Inst. and State Univ., 169 F.3d 820 (4th Cir. 1999) (en banc) (finding
1994 Violence Against Women Act's creation of a civil cause of action for victims of gender-
motivated crimes of violence beyond Congress's commerce power, since statute regulates
activities not substantially affecting interstate commerce), cerL granted sub nom. United
States v. Morrison, 120 S. Ct. 11 (1999).
286. "By forcing state governments to absorb the financial burden of implementing a
federal regulatory program, members of Congress can take credit for 'solving' problems
without having to ask their constituents to pay for the solutions with higher federal taxes."
Printz, 521 U.S. at 930.
287. Nihiser v. Ohio Envtl. Protection Agency, 979 F. Supp. 1168 (S.D. Ohio 1997).
The court explained:
[the ADA is] the product of a determination by Congress that, regardless of
whether discrimination is present, employers, not disabled individuals, are better
equipped financially to incur the costs of integrating disabled employees with spe-
cial needs into the workplace .... [T]he court is troubled by the concept that
Congress could transfer the costs of any social program to the states by the simple
and circular expedient of defining as discrimination the failure on the part of the
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unfunded federal mandate to the states could lead courts to conclude that
the ADA commandeers the state's treasury, and governmental processes,
contrary to the proscriptions of the intergovernmental immunity doc-
trine.2 88 That would be an extension of the Printz, principle but hardly one
that defies defense under Printz's rationale.
But viewing the ADA as simply an entitlement-creating federal statute
is a grievous misreading of the Act. Congress enacted the ADA to inte-
grate persons with disabilities into the mainstream of American life as a
means of both preventing invidious discrimination 289 and of unburdening
interstate commerce from the exorbitant costs of discrimination. 90 Of
course, ADA compliance necessitates financial expenditures by the states,
as is true of many other federal regulatory programs whose constitutional-
ity the Court has upheld. Examples include the Fair Labor Standards Act
(FLSA),291 railroad safety legislation,2 2 civil rights legislation,293 and labor
relations legislation.294 The ADA falls within the mainstream of these
Commerce Clause-based statutes. 295 The ADA does not create an entitle-
ment for a special group any more than does legislation providing for over-
time pay, or assurances that state employees' chosen bargaining
state employer to provide benefits to members of special interest groups ...
Congress has not only created substantive rights on the part of the disabled, but
has charged the states as employers with the responsibility of bearing the costs of
these newly-created entitlements. These provisions constitute a substantial in-
fringement on a traditional area of state sovereignty ....
Id. at 1175-76.
288. See Thompson v. Ohio State Hosp., 5 F. Supp. 2d 574, 580-81 (S.D. Ohio 1998)
(holding that the Family Medical Leave Act (FMLA) does not abrogate states' sovereign
immunity because, inter alia, it "creates an entitlement... which is to be borne by employ-
ers [by] impos[ing] a significant financial burden. It would be the state employer which
would either have to absorb the cost of decreased productivity or expend its resources in an
attempt to replace absent employees while they enjoy their leave benefits under the
FMLA .... This would be an inappropriate interference into a traditional area of state
sovereignty ....").
289. See discussion supra notes 235-251 and accompanying text.
290. See discussion supra note 273 and accompanying text.
291. See Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528 (1985) (upholding
application of the minimum-wage and overtime requirements of the FLSA to a municipally-
owned transit system).
292. See United States v. California, 297 U.S. 175 (1936) (upholding application of the
federal Safety Appliance Act to a state-owned railroad).
293. See EEOC v. Wyoming, 460 U.S. 226 (1983) (upholding the applicability of Age
Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA) to the states).
294. See United Transp. Union v. Long Island R.R., 455 U.S. 678 (1982) (upholding
application of the Railway Labor Act to the state-owned Long Island Railroad).
295. For example, in a study of the experience of Sears, Roebuck, and Co. from 1978-
92, the average cost of providing a reasonable accommodation was $121.42 and 69% of the
accommodations required no cost. See RuTH COLKER, THE LAW OF DISABILITY: CASES
AND MATERIALS 86 (1995). Even these costs must be discounted by the substantial savings
in workers' compensation benefits achieved by rapidly returning workers to their jobs after
providing some accommodation. See Weber, supra note 172, at 136 n.61 (citing a study by
James G. Frierson, The Legality of Medical Exams and Health Histories of Current Employ-
ees Under the Americans with Disabilities Act, 17 J. REHABILITATION ADMIN. 83, 86 (1993),
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representative will be recognized as the exclusive bargaining representative
of a particular craft or class.
Assuming that Congress's commerce power is sufficient to enact the
ADA, the United States government could sue the states in federal court to
redress ADA violations, even if Congress lacked Section 5 power to abro-
gate the states' Eleventh Amendment immunity. The Eleventh Amend-
ment does not apply to suits against the states brought by the United
States.2 96 But what about the option of bringing a private ADA action for
damages against a state in the state's own court?
Several lower federal courts, in dicta, had assumed that state court liti-
gation survived even when Seminole Tribe precluded Congress from abro-
gating state sovereign immunity in federal court2 97 Clearly, a state may
authorize its courts to hear ADA actions against the state in its own
courts.2 98 A more complex question arises when a state refuses to author-
ize its courts to hear private ADA damage suits against the state in state
court.
The Eleventh Amendment itself only speaks to the judicial power of
the United States, not to the judicial power of state courts. Moreover, the
Supreme Court has clearly stated that "the Eleventh Amendment does not
apply in state courts."2 99 But the question cannot be dispatched so simply
which described a $310,000 annual workers' compensation savings by one company, and $4
million savings by another). See also, Bales supra note 184, at 1194 (stating that
"[indications of cost-benefit analysis pervade both the [ADA] and its legislative history."
This "is a far cry from the 'Thou shall' or 'Thou shall not' mandate of a [typical civil rights]
statute ... .
296. United States v. Mississippi, 380 U.S. 128 (1965).
297. See Coolbaugh, 136 F.3d at 441 (5th Cir. 1998) (Smith, J., dissenting) (holding that
Congress lacks Section 5 authority to enact the ADA will not "eviscerate the basic protec-
tions the ADA gives disabled individuals against discriminatory state action [because] the
plaintiff could still sue a state in state court to enforce the obligations the state owes the
disabled under the ADA."). Accord Chavez v. Arte Publico Press, 157 F3d 282, 291 (5th
Cir. 1998) (finding that while copyright suits against the states cannot be brought in federal
court because Congress lacks Section 5 power to enact the copyright laws, the Eleventh
Amendment does not shield states from being sued in state court).
298. Since the "Court begins with the presumption that state courts enjoy concurrent
jurisdiction" to hear federal questions, there is no reason to believe that state courts may
not hear ADA suits if they choose. Gulf Offshore Co. v. Mobile Oil Corp., 453 U.S. 473,
478 (1981). The presumption of concurrent federal and state court jurisdiction to hear fed-
eral questions can be rebutted only "by an explicit statutory directive, by unmistakable im-
plication from legislative history, or by a clear incompatibility between state-court
jurisdiction and federal interests." Id. Accord Tafflin v. Levitt, 493 U.S. 455 (1990) (estab-
lishing the concurrent jurisdiction of state courts to hear civil RICO claims). See also Yel-
low Freight Sys. v. Donnelly, 494 U.S. 820 (1990) (establishing the concurrent jurisdiction of
state courts to hear claims under Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act). Nothing in the
ADA remotely suggests that state courts may not hear ADA claims. To the contrary, the
ADA states that "[a] state shall not be immune under the eleventh amendment.., in
Federal or State court of competent jurisdiction," clearly signaling a congressional expecta-
tion that ADA suits may be brought in state court. 42 U.S.C. § 12202 (emphasis added).
299. Hilton v. South Carolina Pub. Rys. Comm'n, 502 U.S. 197,204-05 (1991) (quoting
Vll v. Michigan Dep't of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 63-64 (1989)).
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since the Court now interprets the Constitution as reaffirming an overarch-
ing sovereign immunity principle that transcends the literal language of the
Eleventh Amendment. °°
Until quite recently state courts had taken opposing viewpoints con-
cerning a state's ability to refuse to be sued in its own court system. For
example, in Alden v. State3 ' (Alden I) a state employee filed an FLSA
claim against the state of Maine in state court. A federal court had dis-
missed the identical claim because the FLSA does not abrogate the state's
Eleventh Amendment sovereignty immunity.3 2 In Alden I, the Maine
Supreme Judicial Court also dismissed the state court claim, holding that
"sovereignty immunity... protect[s] the State from suit by private parties
in its own courts without its consent, even when the cause of action derives
from federal law."3 3 The court reasoned: "If Congress cannot force the
states to defend in federal court against claims by private individuals, it
similarly cannot force the states to defend in their own courts against the
same claims."3 °4 Impetus for this view is that "[t]o hold otherwise, by con-
cluding that a state, immune from suit in federal court, must defend the
same suit in its own courts, would effectively vitiate the Eleventh Amend-
ment. ' 30 5 Or, as another court has put it, "[i]t would be anomalous if the
'States' rights' justices who authored Seminole Tribe and who had vigor-
ously dissented in Garcia, acted to uphold [the] States' Eleventh Amend-
ment immunity from suit but, at the same time, affirmed congressional
300. See discussion supra note 31 and accompanying text.
301. 715 A.2d 172 (Me. 1998), affd, 119 S. Ct. 2240 (1999).
302. The FLSA was enacted solely pursuant to the commerce power; since Seminole
Tribe, the commerce power has been unavailable to Congress to abrogate states' sovereign
immunity. See discussion supra notes 35-38 and accompanying text. The courts uniformly
agree that FLSA minimum wage and overtime claims against the state may not be brought
in federal court. See, e.g., Powell v. Florida, 132 F.3d 677 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct.
2297 (1998); Aaron v. Kansas, 115 F.3d 813 (10th Cir. 1997); Close v. New York, 125 F.3d 31
(2d Cir. 1997); Mills v. Maine, 118 F.3d 37 (1st Cir. 1997); Quillin v. Oregon, 127 F.3d 1136
(9th Cir. 1997); Raper v. Iowa, 115 F.3d 623 (8th Cir. 1997); Wilson-Jones v. Caviness, 99
F.3d 203 (6th Cir. 1996). See also Varner v. Illinois State Univ., 150 F.3d 706, 711 n.5 (7th
Cir. 1998) (noting that "all of the circuits to have addressed the issue following Seminole
Tribe have held that the minimum wage and overtime provisions of the FLSA do not validly
abrogate the States' Eleventh Amendment immunity"). Cf. id. at 712-17 (holding Equal
Pay Act amendment to the FLSA to be a valid abrogation of states' Eleventh Amendment
immunity); Ussery v. Louisiana, 150 F.3d 431 (5th Cir. 1998) (same); Timmer v. Michigan
Dep't of Commerce, 104 F.3d 833 (6th Cir. 1997) (same).
303. Alden I, 715 A.2d at 174. See also Jackson v. State, 544 A.2d 291, 298 (Me. 1988),
cert. denied, 491 U.S. 904 (1989) (holding that "the State may constitutionally interpose its
sovereign immunity in state court as a bar to an award of damages under... the [federal]
Rehabilitation Act.").
304. Alden I, 715 A.2d at 174. See also Morris v. Massachusetts Maritime Academy,
565 N.E.2d 422, 426 (Mass. 1991) (noting that "[a]lthough the Supreme Court has never
addressed the question whether States may claim immunity in their own courts when the
Eleventh Amendment bars suit in Federal Court, we think that, absent congressional com-
mand to the contrary, they may") (emphasis added).
305. Alden I, 715 A.2d at 174.
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authority to overcome a state's own sovereign immunity under its state
constitution.
30 6
Most state courts that had decided the question took a contrary view.
For example, in Ahern v. State,3 07 plaintiff filed a state court action to en-
force an FLSA claim. In response, the state offered what the court charac-
terized as "its own creative construction of Seminole Tribe."'3"s The State
reasoned that "'[i]f, in the absence [of] a waiver, Congress lacks the power
to abrogate state sovereign immunity from FLSA suits in federal court,
then it must also lack the power to define or expand the conditions of a
State's waiver of immunity to FLSA suits in the State's own courts.'"09
The court disagreed, stating "[i]n Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida, the
U.S. Supreme Court merely held that the 11'h Amendment prevents a pri-
vate party from suing a state in Federal court, not that Federal statutes do
not apply equally to both non-state and state defendants. 31 The sover-
eign immunity principle animating the Eleventh Amendment, the Court
continued, is immunity from federal court jurisdiction, not "immunity from
suit in any forum. '3 1 ' Other states have taken similar positions?
12
306. German v. Wisconsin Dep't of Transp., Case No 96-CV-1261 at 5 n.5 (WIs. Cir. Ct.
Mar. 8, 1997) (cited in Bunch v. Robinson, 122 Md. App. 437, 453, 712 A.2d 585, 592 (Md.
Court. Spec. App. 1998).
The leading academic proponent of the view is Carlos Manuel Vazquez. See, e.g., Car-
los Manuel Vazquez, What is Eleventh Amendment Inmnunityp, 106 YALE L.J. 1683, 1717
(1997) ("summing up its holding overruling Union Gas, the Court in Seminole Tribe stated
that 'even when the Constitution vests in Congress complete law-making authority over a
particular area, the Eleventh Amendment prevents congressional authorization of suits by
private parties against unconsenting states"') (citing Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 71); id. at
1702-03 (noting that in Seminole Tribe, "[t]he majority stated that the Supreme Court may
exercise appellate jurisdiction over suits arising in the state courts 'where a State has con-
sented to suit'") (citing Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 71 n.14); id. at 1717-1720 (discussing the
"[i]ndications in Seminole Tribe of the Shift to the Immunity-from-Liability Interpreta-
tion"). Id. at 1702 n.92 (citing Hess v. Port Auth. Trans-Hudson Corp., 513 U.S. 30,39 (1994)
(finding the effect of shielding states from suit in federal court is to "leav[e] the parties with
claims against a State ... if the State permits, in the State's own tribunals")). But see Jack-
son, supra note 127, at 544 n.176 (declaring that "[w]hile I agree [with Vazquez] that some
language in Seminole Tribe and other opinions suggest that states may have some sovereign
immunity in their own courts, and that these in turn could be read as consistent with an
'immunity from liability' understanding, I disagree that the Court does ... understand the
Eleventh amendment in these terms"); id at 504 & nn.39-41 (same).
307. 676 N.Y.S.2d 232 (N.Y. App. Div. 1998).
308. Id. at 234.
309. Id.
310. Id
311. Id. (citing Bartlett v. Bowen, 816 F.2d 695, 610 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (noting that in
Eleventh Amendment cases, "only the availability of a federal forum is at issue").
312. See Whittington v. State, 966 P.2d 188 (N.M. App. 1998) (FLSA claim); Bunch v.
Robinson, 712 A.2d 585 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1998) (same); Jacoby v. Arkansas Dep't of
Educ., 962 S.W.2d 773 (Ark. 1998) (same), vacated by 119 S. Ct. 2387 (1999) (remanded for
consideration in light of Alden v. Maine, 119 S. Ct. 2240 (1999)); Ribitzki v. School Bd. of
Highlands County, 710 So. 2d 226 (Fla. App. 1998) (same). See also Aaron v. Kansas, 115
F.3d 813, 817 (10th Cir. 1997) (noting in dicta that although FLSA action for damages
against the state may not be brought in federal court, "the employee can sue in state court
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The Supreme Court resolved the issue in Alden v. Maine (Alden II).313
The Court immunized state governments from damage suits brought in
state court by state employees alleging violations of the overtime provi-
sions of the Fair Labor Standards Act. The Court held that "the powers
delegated to Congress under Article I of the... Constitution do not in-
clude the power to subject nonconsenting states to private suits for dam-
ages in state courts.
3 14
Prior to its decision in Alden II, the Court had failed to provide a con-
trolling or particularly compelling decision concerning this issue, although
the Court had addressed related questions in both Hilton v. South Carolina
Public Railways Commission,315 and Howlett v. Rose.316
for money damages under the FLSA as a state court of general jurisdiction is obligated by
the Supremacy Clause to enforce federal law").
313. 119 S. Ct. 2240 (1999).
314. Id. at 2246.
315. 502 U.S. 197 (1991). Plaintiffs Federal Employees Liability Act (FELA) state
court damage claim against a state-operated railway was dismissed. The state court held
Congress had not intended to create such a private right of action in state court. The major-
ity of the Supreme Court in Hilton concluded that the question before it was "a pure ques-
tion of statutory construction," i.e., whether Congress intended to create a cause of action
against state-owned railways. Id. at 205. The Court concluded Congress did intend such
causes of action, but it never addressed the question of whether Congress had the constitu-
tional power to so provide, since that issue was never raised. More importantly, Hilton did
not entail requiring a state to defend in state court a suit that could not be brought in
federal court. When Hilton was decided, FELA suits against the states could not be brought
in federal court, not because Congress was understood to lack power through the Com-
merce Clause to abrogate state sovereign immunity in federal court, see Parden v. Terminal
Ry. Co. of Ala. Docks Dep't, 377 U.S. 184, 192 (1964) (holding that a state could be sued in
federal court under FELA), but because Congress simply had failed adequately to manifest
an intent to do so.
316. 496 U.S. 356 (1990). This case arose out of an action brought against a school
board pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1994). Section 1983 suits can only be maintained
against "persons," and an entity with Eleventh Amendment immunity is not a "person"
within the meaning of the statute. See Will v. Michigan Dep't of State Police, 491 U.S. 58,71
(1989) (stating that neither the state nor its officers sued in their official capacity for dam-
ages are "persons"). But municipalities, counties, and school districts are subject to suit
under § 1983, as they do not enjoy Eleventh Amendment immunity. See Monell v. New
York Dep't of Soc. Serv., 436 U.S. 658, 663 (1978) (concluding that Congress did intend
municipalities and other local government units to be included among those persons to
whom § 1983 applies); Howlett, 496 U.S. at 376 (holding that "municipal corporations and
similar governmental entities are 'persons . . ."'). In Howlett, the state court held that be-
cause, under state law, school boards are the beneficiaries of sovereign immunity, they are
not "persons" under §1983 when sued in state court. Accordingly, the state court dismissed
the § 1983 action against the school board. Writing for the Court, Justice Stevens stated the
issue as "whether a state law defense of 'sovereign immunity' is available to a school board
otherwise subject to suit in a Florida court even though such a defense would not be available
if the action had been brought in a federal forum." Id. at 359 (emphasis added). The
Supreme Court reversed, based on the unexceptional principle that "[t]o the extent that the
Florida law of sovereign immunity reflects a substantive disagreement with the extent to
which governmental entities should be held liable for their constitutional violations, that
disagreement cannot override the dictates of federal law." Id. at 377-78. Howlett thus did
not consider whether a state must entertain a private damage action against it in state court
on a federal cause of action that could not constitutionally be brought in federal court.
Imaged with the Permission of N.Y.U. Review of Law and Social Policy
[Vol. XXIV:481
THE NEW FEDERALISM AND THE ADA
Justice Kennedy's majority opinion in Alden II argued that the history
and structure of the Constitution demonstrate that the Constitution de-
prives Congress of the authority to abrogate the states' sovereign immunity
in their own courts. With respect to history, the majority reasoned that
"[t]he generation that designed and adapted our federal system considered
immunity from private suits central to sovereign dignity,"3 17 and intended
to preserve state sovereign immunity from suit without its consent.-"s The
majority based this conclusion on the constitution's ratification debates,
3 19
the reaction to Chisholm v. Georgia,2° and the Eleventh Amendment's
ratification debates.3 21 This conclusion also emerged from the understand-
ing that states are to be accorded the "dignity and essential attributes in-
hering in [sovereign] status," and are to be sheltered from "'the concept of
a central government that would act upon and through the States' in favor
of 'a system in which the State and Federal governments would exercise
concurrent authority over the people.''  The Court dismissed the
Supremacy Clause as circular,323 and while conceding that the record stood
silent with respect to the specific question of an intent to constitutionalize
state immunity from suit in state court, the majority found support in that
317. Alden I, 119 S. Ct. at 2247. For this proposition, the opinion relies on English
common law as understood from previous Supreme Court decisions and commentators such
as Blackstone. Id. at 2247-48.
318. Id.
319. "The leading advocates of the Constitution assured the people in no uncertain
terms that the Constitution would not strip the States of sovereign immunity." Id. at 2248
(referring to Hamilton, Madison, and Marshall). In addition, the records of the states' rati-
fying conventions were seen to demonstrate that "the Constitution [was] drafted to preserve
the States' immunity from private suits." Id. at 2249 (citing ratification debates in Rhode
Island and New York).
320. 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419 (1793). The Court cited a call by the Massachusetts legislature
to its representatives in Congress to remove from the Constitution any basis for -'a deci-
sion, that, a State is compellable to answer in any suit by an individual or individuals in any
Court of the United States."' Alden II, 119 S. Ct. at 2250 (quoting 15 PAPERS or ALuxAN.
DER HAMiLTON 314 (H. Syrett & J. Cooke eds., 1969)).
321. "The text and history of the Eleventh Amendment ... suggest that Congress acted
not to change but to restore the original constitutional design." Alden II, 119 S. Ct. at 2251.
See also id at 2252 (suggesting "[t]he more natural inference is that the Constitution was
understood, in light of its history and structure, to preserve the States' traditional immunity
from private suits").
322. Id. at 2247 (citing Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 919-20 (1997)). The major-
ity also cited precedent to support its conclusions but none was conclusive. Id. at 2253-54
(citing cases that conclude that states have inherent sovereignty but none that holds such
sovereignty includes immunity from suit in state court that Congress cannot abrogate).
323. "This Constitution and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in Pur-
suance thereof. ., shall be the supreme law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall
be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary
notwithstanding." U.S. CoNsT. art. VI, cl. 2. See also Alden II, 119 S. Ct. at 2255 (stating
that "[t]he Supremacy Clause enshrines as 'the supreme Law of the Land' only those federal
Acts that accord with the constitutional design" (citing Printz, 521 U.S. at 924)). The
Supremacy Clause thus leaves to be decided the issue of which acts of Congress are in
accord with constitutional limits. Id.
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silence.324 The Court concluded that "in light of the historical record it is
difficult to conceive that the Constitution would have been adopted if it
had been understood to strip the States of immunity from suit in their own
courts and cede to the Federal Government a power to subject nonconsent-
ing States to private suits in these fora.
' 3 2
The Kennedy opinion also relied on structure. The opinion found "the
indignity of subjecting a State to the coercive process of judicial tribunals at
the instance of private parties exists regardless of the forum, '326 because a
state may be "thrust, by federal fiat and against its will, into the disfavored
status of a debtor, subject to the power of private citizens to levy on its
treasury." '327 Such a result would result in "substantial costs to the auton-
omy, the decisionmaking ability, and the sovereign capacity of the
States. 328 It also could "threaten the financial integrity of the States, 329
and create the anomaly of the "National Government... wield[ing] greater
power in the state courts than in its own judicial instrumentalities. ' 330 The
fact that this unanticipated intervention in government processes results
from the initiative of individuals only serves to exacerbate the situation.
This sacrifices political accountability, because democratic governance re-
quires that judgments regarding the allocation of scarce resources be made
through each states' political process, "not by judicial decree mandated by
the Federal Government and invoked by the private citizen.
'331
Seminole Tribe, Boerne, and Alden II raise the troubling question
whether their operation, in combination, creates the anomaly of Congress
being authorized to create rights but not federal remedies to enforce them.
As noted, the federal government may enforce federal rights against the
states in federal court.332 But, given Seminole Tribe and Alden II, what
private remedies would be available to enforce the ADA were the Court to
conclude that Congress lacks Section 5 authority to enact it?
Private parties could still bring an ADA action in federal court against
a state officer in his or her official capacity to obtain prospective relief from
324. "[T]he founders' silence is best explained by the simple fact that no one, not even
the Constitution's most ardent opponents, suggested the document might strip the States of
the immunity [from suit in their own courts].... [Silence] suggests the sovereign's right to
assert immunity from suit in its own courts was a principle so well established that no one
conceived it would be altered by the new Constitution." Alden II, 119 S. Ct. at 2260.
325. Id. at 2261.




330. Id. at 2265.
331. Id. The Alden II Court goes on to note that federal governmental assertion of
control "over a State's most fundamental political processes... strikes at the heart of polit-
ical accountability." Id.
332. See discussion supra note 33 and accompanying text.
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continuing violations of the statute,33 3 but such suits may not be used to
bring state law claims pursuant to a federal court's supplemental jurisdic-
tion?3' Nor may private parties bring an ADA suit in federal court against
a state officer in his or her official capacity to obtain money damages. 335
Even though injunctive relief is available, it does not deter violations of the
ADA until litigation is brought and injunctive relief is granted. Nor does it
make plaintiffs whole for past violations of federal rights, an outcome that
seems particularly unacceptable with respect to federal laws that create a
private right of action and provide for damage remedies. Moreover, limit-
ing public employees to injunctive relief while permitting private sector
employees to bring damage actions against employers that violate the
ADA creates two classes of covered employees. Each has identical sub-
stantive federal rights but the two classes have decidedly different remedial
rights. While it has been suggested that federal courts remain available to
private parties to bring damage actions against state officers sued in their
individual capacities,3 3 6 this option is not likely to be available in ADA
litigation against state officers because the ADA's employment provisions
do not provide a cause of action against individual state officers.337 In
short, were the Court to find that Congress is without authority to enact the
ADA pursuant to its Section 5 powers, individuals would continue to have
333. See Armstrong v. Wilson, 942 F. Supp. 1252 (N.D. Cal. 1996) (granting prospective
relief against ADA violation against state official sued in official capacity). See also Chavez
v. Arte Publico Press, 157 F.3d 282,291 (5th Cir. 1998) (holding that even if copyright claim
cannot be brought against a state in federal court because Congress lacks Section 5 author-
ity to enact the copyright laws, "[t]he Exparte Young doctrine [209 U.S. 123 (1908)) permits
suits for prospective injunctive relief").
334. In Pennhurst State Sdz. & Hosp. v. Halderrnan (II), 465 U.S. 89 (1934). the Er
parte Young rule was held also not to apply to prospective relief based on state law. That
outcome is the application of the broader principle that "[t]he Eleventh Amendment fore-
closes ... the application of normal principles of ancillary and pendent jurisdiction where
claims are pressed against the State." County of Oneida, N.Y. v. Oneida Indian Nation of
N.Y., 470 U.S. 226, 251 (1985). See also Pennhurst, 465 U.S. at 121 (dictating that "[a]
federal court must examine each claim in a case to see if the court's jurisdiction over that
claim is barred by the Eleventh Amendment."). Accordingly, in ADA litigation, state
causes of action routinely are dismissed from suits brought in federal court, even when the
ADA claim can be pursued. See, e.g., Kimel, 139 F3d at 1433 n.17; Mayer v. University of
Minn., 940 F. Supp. 1474, 1477-80 (D. Minn. 1996).
335. See Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651 (1974) (confining E parte Young rule to
awards of prospective relief).
336. See Alden I, 119 S. CL at 2267-68 (reasoning that "a suit for money damages may
be prosecuted against a state officer in his individual capacity for unconstitutional or wrong-
ful conduct fairly attributable to the officer himself."); Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232
(1974) (noting that "when a state officer acts under state lav in a manner violative of the
Federal Constitution he 'comes into conflict with the superior authority of the Constitution
and is stripped of his official or representative character and subjected in his person to
consequences of his individual conduct"' (citing Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 159 (1903))).
337. See, e.g., Alsbrook v. City of Maumelle, 156 F.3d 825, 832 (Sth Cir. 1998) (finding
"state officials may not be sued in their individual capacities directly under the provisions of
the ADA... [and] a [§] 1983 remedy against state officials in their individual capacity for
violating the ADA, 'would be inconsistent with the overall legislative scheme'" (quoting
DeYoung v. Patten, 898 F.2d 628, 635 (8th Cir. 1990)).
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the ADA's substantive protections with virtually no effective way to en-
force them against the state.
The gravity of the problem of individuals possessing federal rights with
no remedies depends on how extensively Boerne will curtail Congress's
ability to abrogate through Section 5. Some clarity is emerging from the
lower court decisions, but much remains uncertain. Private FLSA damage
claims against the states no longer may be brought in federal court338 or,
after Alden II, in state court. By contrast, federal courts generally have
upheld Congress's Section 5 power to enact statutes providing protection
from discrimination. That appears to be the trend with respect to the
ADA,339 the Equal Pay Act,34° Title VII of the Civil Rights Act 1964,341
and the federal statutes prohibiting discrimination in federally-financed
338. See discussion supra note 302 and accompanying text.
339. See discussion supra notes 19-24 and accompanying text.
340. The Equal Pay Act of 1963, 29 U.S.C. § 206(d), was enacted in 1963 and extended
to the states in 1974. See Fair Labor Standards Act Amendments of 1974, 29 U.S.C.
§ 663(a) (1999). The Equal Pay Act has survived most, but not all Boerne attacks. Compare
Varner v. Illinois State Univ., 150 F.3d 706 (7th Cir. 1998) (holding EPA abrogates states'
immunity although it does not require proof of intentional discrimination), and Ussery v.
Louisiana, 150 F.3d 431 (5th Cir. 1998) (same, without Boerne analysis), and Timmer v.
Michigan Dep't of Commerce, 104 F.3d 833 (6th Cir. 1997) (same, but decided pre-Boerne),
and Perdue v. City Univ. of N.Y., 13 F. Supp. 2d 326 (E.D.N.Y.1998) (same, without Boerne
analysis), with Timmer, 104 F.3d. at 845-847 (Boggs, J., concurring in part dissenting in part)
(holding federal courts lack jurisdiction to hear Equal Pay Act claims against the states
because Congress did not unequivocally manifest an intent to legislate under its Section 5
power when enacting the EPA); Larry v. Board of Trustees of Univ. of Ala., 975 F. Supp.
1447, 1450 (N.D. Ala. 1997), affd, 996 F. Supp. 1366 (1998) (noting that "it makes no sense
to say that Congress has the power to override the Eleventh Amendment and enforce the
Equal Protection Clause against a state by applying to the state a cause of action under the
Equal Pay Act which does not include the element of intent").
341. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e, et seq. (1994). It might seem unusual that the question of
Congress's power to abrogate state sovereign immunity through enactment of Title VII re-
mains unresolved, given that Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445 (1976), in which the Supreme
Court established the abrogation potential of Section 5, was itself a Title VII case. Fitzpat-
rick only addressed the question of whether the Eleventh Amendment bars a damage rem-
edy against the state. It did not litigate whether Congress had Section 5 power to enact Title
VII's substantive provisions. See Fitzpatrick, 427 U.S. at 456 n.11 (finding that "[a]part from
their claim that the Eleventh Amendment bars enforcement of the remedy established by
Title VII in this case, respondent state officials do not contend that the substantive provi-
sions of Title VII as applied here are not a proper exercise of congressional authority under
[Section] 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment"). Nor did subsequent Title VII cases involving
state defendants litigate the question. See Connecticut v. Teal, 457 U.S. 440 (1982) (finding
under Title VII, employees can establish prima facie case of an employer's racial discrimina-
tion by showing disparate impact, even if the result of the promotional process was "an
appropriate racial balance"); Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321 (1977) (holding that Con-
gress's Title VII legislation prohibits Alabama's minimum height and weight requirements
for prison guards, where requirement has disparate impact upon women; Congress intended
this prohibition to apply to government employers, as well as private ones).
The Courts that have considered the issue of Congress's Section 5 power to enact Title
VII and apply it to the states have found Congress possesses such power. See Reynolds v.
Alabama Dep't of Transp., 4 F. Supp. 2d 1092 (M.D. Ala. 1998) (determining Congress did
not exceed its Section 5 power when it subjected the states to liability for Title VII disparate
impact claims of discrimination); see also Carmen v. San Francisco Unified Sch. Dist., 982 F.
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programs-Title VI of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, 32 the Rehabilitation Act
of 1973,343 Individuals With Disabilities Education Act (IDEA),M4 and Ti-
tle IX of the Education Amendments of 1972. 4 Private litigants in Age
Supp. 1396, 1405 (N.D. Cal. 1997) (concluding Congress possesses Section 5 power to abro-
gate state sovereign immunity from Title VII claims in federal court).
342. 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (1994). See Lesage v. Texas, 158 F.3d 213, 217 (5th Cir. 1998)
(finding Congress validly abrogated the states' Eleventh Amendment immunity from suit in
federal court when enacting Title VI: although enacted as a spending statute, Title VI could
also have been enacted pursuant to the Section 5 power); Sandoval v. Hagan, 7 F. Supp. 2d
1234 (M.D. Ala 1998) (holding Title VI abrogates whether it is enacted pursuant to spend-
ing power or Section 5 power); Bryant v. New Jersey Dep't of Transp., 1 F. Supp. 2d 426
(D.N.J. 1998) (holding Title VI is authorized by Section 5).
343. 29 U.S.C. § 794 (1994). See Clark v. California, 123 F.3d 1267, 1270 (9th Cir 1997)
(finding Congress abrogated states' immunity when it amended § 504 of the Rehabilitation
Act); Armstrong v. Wilson, 942 F. Supp. 1252, 1262-63 (N.D. Cal. 1996) (finding Rehabilita-
tion Act enacted pursuant to both the spending power and Section 5 power). But see
Nihiser, 979 F. Supp. at 1176 (S.D. Ohio 1997) (finding Congress enacted Rehabilitation Act
pursuant to Section 5 power but its accommodation provisions "are not a valid exercise of
Congress's enforcement power under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment [because]
Congress has not legally abrogated the sovereign immunity of states from suit by private
persons.").
344. 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400-1491 (1998). See Little Rock Sch. Dist. v. Mauney, 183 F.3d 816
(8th Cir. 1999) (finding IDEA to be within Congress's Section 5 power based on an analysis
of the Boerne congruence and proportionality test); Board of Educ. v. Illinois State Bd. of
Educ., 979 F. Supp. 1203, 1208 (N.D. Ill. 1997) (same, without Boerne analysis); Peter v.
Johnson, 958 F. Supp. 1383 (D. Minn. 1997), rev'd on other grounds, 155 F.3d 992 (8th Cir.
1998) (same, without Boerne analysis).
345. 20 U.S.C. §§ 1681-1688 (1994). In Franklin v. Gwiinnett County Public Schools,
503 U.S. 60, 75 n.8 (1992), the Supreme Court explicitly reserved the question whether Title
IX was enacted pursuant to the spending or Section 5 power. The prevailing view is that
Title IX is an exercise of the spending power. See Davis v. Monroe County Bd. of Educ.,
120 F.3d 1390, 1397-99 (11th Cir. 1997) (rev'd on other grounds, 526 U.S. 629 (1999));
Rowinsky v. Bryan Indep. Sch. Dist, 80 F.3d 1006, 1012-13 & n.4 (5th Cir.1996); Litman v.
George Mason Univ., 5 F. Supp. 2d 366, 373 (E.D. Va. 1998). The Section 5 authority of
Congress to enact Title IX has been seriously questioned. See id. at 373-74. Yet, Title IX
has been held to abrogate states' sovereign immunity on the theory that by accepting the
federal funds referred to in Title IX, states have unambiguously waived their immunity. Id.
at 375 (declaring the language of Title IX "is a clear and unequivocal expression of Con-
gress's intent to condition the acceptance of federal funds on the states' agreeing to submit
to the jurisdiction of the federal courts"); see also Beasely v. Alabama State Univ., 3 F.
Supp. 2d 1304, 1308 (M.D. Ala. 1998). The Beasely court held that "the fact that [Title IX]
is a spending clause enactment and therefore does not thrust abrogation upon potentially
unwilling states, but rather conditions the receipt of federal funds for education upon the
states' voluntary waiver of sovereign immunity, renders the parties' [Seninole Tribe] ap-
proach inapt. Instead. . . the appropriate approach to the issue involves an assessment of
whether Congress may constitutionally condition the receipt of education funds by states on
such a waiver, [(the Court answers yes)] and, if so, whether it provided the states with
sufficient notice that their acceptance of federal education funds would result in the waiver
of their eleventh amendment immunity for private damages actions brought pursuant to
Title IX [(also answered yes by the Court)] ... " (emphasis in original). Furthermore, the
Beasely court concluded by noting that "the Supreme Court's adequacy-of-notice concerns
apply only to the substantive provisions of the spending clause legislation at issue, where the
conditions governing recipients' conduct are set forth. There is no suggestion in [previous
Supreme Court decisions] that the Court's concerns extend to the adequacy of notice pro-
vided regarding the form of relief .... Moreover, even if such notice were required, the
requirement has been met." Id. at 1322.
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Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA) damage actions against the
states have encountered stiff resistance in overcoming the states' Boerne
challenges, though the majority of courts still sustain Congress's Section 5
power to enact the ADEA.346Enforcement of the Family Medical Leave
Act of 1993 (FMLA) against the states in federal court is problematic, but
there are too few cases at this point to predict an outcome.347 Enforcement
of the patent, trademark and copyright laws against the states in federal
346. 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (1994). In EEOC v. Wyoming, 460 U.S. 226, 243 (1983), the
Supreme Court explicitly left open whether the 1974 amendment extending the ADEA to
the states may be upheld as a valid exercise of the Section 5 power. The circuit courts of
appeal are split on the question. Compare Cooper v. New York State Office of Mental
Health, 162 F.3d 770 (2d Cir. 1998) (upholding Congress's power to abrogate when enacting
the ADEA), and Migneault v. Peck, 158 F.3d 1131 (10th Cir. 1998), vacated and remanded
sub nom. Board of Regents of the Univ. of N.M. v. Migneault, No. 98-1178, 2000 WL 3496
(U.S. Jan. 18, 2000) (same, based on its earlier decision in Hurd v. Pittsburgh State Univ.,
109 F.3d 1540 (10th Cir. 1997)), and Coger v. Board of Regents of Tenn., 154 F.3d 296 (6th
Cir.1998) (finding that ADEA represents a valid exercise of Section 5 authority), and Kee-
ton v. University of Nev. Sys., 150 F.3d 1055 (9th Cir. 1998) (same), and Scott v. University
of Miss., 148 F.3d 493, 503 (5th Cir. 1998) (holding that "the ADEA represents a valid
exercise of Congress's [Section] 5 enforcement power [and] the University is not entitled to
Eleventh Amendment immunity"), and Goshtasby v. Board of Trustees of the Univ. of Ill.,
141 F.3d 761 (7th Cir. 1998) (holding Congress abrogated states' Eleventh Amendment im-
munity when enacting the ADEA), with Humenansky v. Regents of the Univ. of Minn., 152
F.3d 822 (8th Cir. 1998) (determining that the ADEA exceeds Congress's Section 5 power
as defined in Boerne), and Kimel, 139 F.3d 1426 (11th Cir. 1998), cert. granted, 119 S. Ct. 901
(1999) (holding ADEA not a valid exercise of the Section 5 power). See also Scott v. Uni-
versity of Miss., 148 F.3d 493, 499 n.3 (noting "[d]istrict courts have split on the issue, with
the minority reaching the .. result [of no abrogation]" (citations omitted)).
347. 29 U.S.C. §§ 2601 et seq. (1994). The lower courts are in substantial disagreement
over whether the FMLA is a valid exercise of congressional authority to abrogate. Many
lower courts, including most of the recent decisions, have found that FMLA actions against
the state may not be brought in federal court. Some courts cite Congress's lack of a clear
statement in the FMLA of intent to abrogate State's Eleventh Amendment immunity. See,
e.g., Driesse v. Florida Bd. of Regents, 26 F. Supp. 2d 1328, 1332 (M.D. Fla. 1998) ("Con-
gress did not clearly express an intention to abrogate immunity in the FMLA . ... "). A
more persuasive argument rebukes the theory that "an affirmative entitlement to twelve
weeks of leave .. is necessary under the Equal Protection Clause in order to prevent
discrimination." The Court held that "[tihis is patently the sort of substantive legislation
that exceeds the proper scope of Congress's authority under [Section] 5." Id. at 1333 (citing
Thompson v. Ohio State Univ. Hosp., 5 F. Supp. 2d 574,579 (S.D. Ohio 1998)). In addition,
FMLA's cost-shifting to the states is an unconstitutional "interference into a traditional area
of state sovereignty which runs afoul of the spirit of the Constitution and the concepts of
federalism which it contains." Id. at 1334. Accord Sims v. University of Cincinnati, 46 F.
Supp. 2d 736, 739 (S.D. Ohio 1999) (reasoning the FMLA cannot be understood as an ap-
propriate means of preventing or remedying gender discrimination because FMLA "does
not merely make it illegal for employers to treat requests for [family medical] leave differ-
ently on the basis of gender, but instead mandates that employers provide [all] employees
with a new and valuable benefit"); Post v. State, No. 98-1238-JMT, 1998 WL 928677 (D.
Kan. Dec. 10, 1998); McGregor v. Goord, 18 F. Supp. 2d 204 (N.D.N.Y. 1998); Garrett v.
Board of Trustees of the Univ. of Ala., 989 F. Supp. 1409 (N.D. Ala. 1998). But see Jolliffe
v. Mitchell, 986 F. Supp. 339 (W.D. Va. 1997) (finding Congress unequivocally expressed its
intent to abrogate and to enact the FMLA pursuant to a valid exercise of its Section 5
power); Biddlecome v. University of Tex., No. Civ.A.96-1872, 1997 WL 124220 (S.D. Tex.
Mar. 13, 1997); Knussman v. State, 935 F. Supp. 659, 662 (D. Md. 1996).
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court is unavailable."4 There have been some attempts by private litigants
since Seminole Tribe to enforce the bankruptcy lawss 9 and environmental
laws350 against the states in federal court, but none of these efforts has been
successful 35 It appears that any effort to enforce the antitrust laws against
348. The copyright laws clearly are not designed to eradicate violations of the equal
protection guarantees of the Fourteenth Amendment. Therefore, one could not successfully
advance a Boerne "congruence and proportionality" argument focusing on equal protection
to find Section 5 power to enact the copyright laws and apply them to the states. A different
approach reasons that the federal copyright statutes create a property right in one's copy-
right and therefore state infringement constitutes uncompensated deprivations of this prop-
erty right without due process of law. Accordingly, under this theory, Congress's Section 5
power is sufficient to abrogate state sovereign immunity to provide a federal forum to rem-
edy and prevent this Fourteenth Amendment violation. In College Savings Bank 1, 119 S.
Ct. 2199, the Supreme Court rejected this reasoning. There, the Court reasoned that
"[d]eprivation" does not include negligent acts. Denial of due process of law arises only
when state remedies are unavailable or inadequate. Since the federal copyright infringe-
ment statute is not limited to these two contexts, it cannot be seen as a congruent and
proportional method for enforcing the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
In College Savings Bank II, 119 S. Ct. 2219, the Court was presented with a similar theory
with respect to the false advertising provisions of the Trademark Act of 1946 (Lanham Act),
60 Stat. 441, 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a), which was made applicable to the states through the
Trademark Remedy Clarification Act (TRCA), 106 Stat. 3567. In College Savings Bank 11,
the Court did not reach the Boerne issue. The Court held that while the trademark protec-
tions in the TLanham Act "may well contain provisions that protect constitutionally cogniza-
ble property interests-notably, its provisions dealing with infringement of trademarks[,J ...
[t]he Lanham Act's false-advertising provisions [do not create any property interests be-
cause they] bear no relationship to any right to exclude .... [which is the] hallmark of a
protected property interest." College Savings Bank II, 119 S. Ct. at 2224-25.
349. See Sacred Heart Hosp. of Norristown v. Pennsylvania., 133 F.3d 237 (3d Cir.
1998) (rejecting the Bankruptcy Clause as a source of abrogation authority and finding
bankruptcy statutes not enacted pursuant to any other constitutional authority). The other
courts that have considered the question are in accord. See id. at 244 (citations omitted);
United States v. Nebraska Dep't of Revenue (In re Doiel), 228 B.R1 439 (Bankr. D.S.D.
1998). See also Teresa K. Goebel, Obtaining Jurisdiction Over States In Bankruptcy Pro-
ceedings After Seminole Tribe, 65 CHI. L. REv. 911 (1998) (declaring that "Congress's blan-
ket abrogation of Eleventh Amendment immunity in Section 106 of the Bankruptcy Code is
unconstitutional."). But see Mather v. Oklahoma Sec. Comm'n (In re Southern Star Foods,
Inc.), 190 B.R. 419 (Bankr. E.D. Okla. 1995) (finding bankruptcy laws to create liberty in-
terests enforceable through the Fourteenth Amendment); Headrick v. Georgia (In re
Headrick), 200 B.R. 963 (Bankr. S.D. Ga. 1996), aff'd on other grounds, 146 F.3d 1313 (11th
Cir. 1998); Wyoming Dep't of Transp. v. Straight (In re Straight), 209 B.R. 540 (D. Wyo.
1997), aff'd on other grounds, 143 F.3d 1387 (10th Cir. 1998).
350. See Froebel v. Meyer, 13 F. Supp. 2d 843 (E.D. Wis. 1998) (dismissing environ-
mental citizen suit for damages brought under the Clean Water Act (CVA) because the
CWA does not abrogate state sovereign immunity); id. at 849 (finding -after Seminole Tribe
of Florida... the abrogation claim for an environmental statute such as the C\VA appears
difficult, if not impossible, to maintain.").
351. The one business regulation that has fared well against Boerne attacks is the Rail-
road Revitalization and Regulatory Reform Act (RRRRA), Pub. L No. 94-210,90 Stat. 31.
This statute creates federal court jurisdiction to prevent certain burdens and discriminatory
acts against railroads by the states. In Oregon Short Line Railroad, 139 F.3d 1259 (9th Cir.
1998), the court considered a railroad's allegation that a state taxing scheme discriminated
against it in violation of RRRRA. The court stated that "[w]hile the area of taxation might
not immediately leap to mind when one thinks of equal protection problems, there can be
little doubt that discriminatory state taxation can implicate equal protection concerns." Id.
Imaged with the Permission of N.Y.U. Review of Law and Social Policy
1998]
REVIEW OF LAW & SOCIAL CHANGE
the states would similarly fail.35 2 "[I]n the post-Seminole Tribe era, there
[may] exist [some] Article I powers sufficiently powerful to abrogate state
sovereign immunity" '53 but it is difficult to imagine that many, if any, will
escape the combined grip of Seminole Tribe and Boerne.
Who would have guessed that an Indian gaming statute and a zoning
decision regarding a small church in Texas would have come to this?
at 1266. The court held that RRRRA "is a constitutionally sound enactment, which abro-
gated the State's Eleventh Amendment immunity" even though the statute "eliminated
more practices than the Supreme Court itself would have done." Id. at 1267. Accord CSX
Transp., Inc. v. Board of Pub. Works, 138 F.3d 537 (4th Cir.1997).
352. See Susan Beth Farmer, Altering The Balance Between State Sovereignty And
Competition: The Impact of Seminole Tribe on the Antitrust State Action Immunity Doctrine,
23 OHIo N.U. L. REV. 1403, 1404 (1997) (arguing "[t]he Seminole Tribe decision ... immu-
nizes states from private antitrust suits in federal court without any inquiry into whether the
state was acting as a true sovereign or whether application of the antitrust laws would inter-
fere with governmental interests.").
353. Sacred Heart Hosp. of Norristown v. Pennsylvania, 133 F.3d 237, 245 (3d Cir.
1998) (Roth, J., concurring) (citing Diaz-Gandia v. Daapena-Thompson, 90 F.3d 609, 616
(1st Cir. 1996) ("reaffirming that Congress, acting pursuant to its War Powers ... abrogated
state sovereign immunity to damages actions brought under the Veterans' Reemployment
Rights Act")). Accord Peel v. Florida Dep't of Transp., 600 F.2d 1070 (5th Cir. 1979) (hold-
ing that neither the Tenth nor the Eleventh Amendment acts as a bar to remedy under the
Veterans' Reemployment Rights Act, enacted pursuant to Congress's war powers). But see
Velasquez v. Trustees of Ind. Univ., 994 F. Supp. 993 (S.D. Ind.) affd 994 F.3d 993 (7th
Cir.1998) (Federal Uniformed Services Employment & Reemployment Act of 1994
(USERA), 38 U.S.C. § 4311 (1994), which prohibits discrimination in employment based
upon an employee's membership or service in the uniformed services, does not abrogate
states' Eleventh Amendment immunity because Seminole Tribe applies to the war power,
which is the power used to enact USERA), vacated in part 165 F.3d 593 (1999) (USERA
amended by Congress on November 11, 1998 to give state courts exclusive USERA jurisdic-
tion in suits against the states); Palmatier v. Michigan Dep't of State Police, 981 F. Supp 529,
531-32 (W.D. Mich. 1997) (asserting that "Congress could not effectively abrogate the
states' Eleventh Amendment immunity in USERA.").
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